Due to the increasing awareness of sustainable manufacturing, remanufacturing has been widely accepted by enterprises in many countries. In the process of Closed-Loop Supply Chain (CLSC) development, to stimulate the demand for remanufactured products, the Chinese government’s interventions such as the “Trade old for Remanufactured” program cannot be ignored. However, prior research has not answered the questions of whether governments should offer consumption subsidies and how to determine the optimal subsidy value. This paper investigates the optimal government consumption subsidy policy and its impact on the operation of Closed-Loop Supply Chain (CLSC) where an Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) produces new products, while a Third-Party Remanufacturer (TPR) remanufactures the used products collected from consumers. A game model with a leader (government) and two followers (OEM and TPR) is then introduced. The government determines the consumption subsidy to maximize the social welfare, while the TPR and OEM attempt to maximize their own profit functions. Game theoretic models are proposed to explore and compare the scenarios, i.e., CLSC with a consumption subsidy policy and without a consumption subsidy policy. The equilibrium characteristics with respect to the government’s consumption subsidy decisions and the price decisions for chain members are derived. Based on the theoretical and numerical analysis, the results show that: (1) governments should not always offer a consumption subsidy; (2) the consumption subsidy cannibalizes demand for new products while boosting the demand for remanufactured products; (3) the consumption subsidy should be shared between the TPR and consumers when the TPR raises the sales price of remanufactured product; (4) the members of the CLSC do not always benefit from the consumption subsidy policy.

Closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) management faces collection and remanufacturing cost disruption challenges. This study explores a CLSC system wherein original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) license the third-party remanufacturer (TPR) to bear the remanufacturing activities and investigate pricing decisions in the CLSC, while considering collection and remanufacturing cost disruptions. To obtain the optimal pricing strategy, we develop game theory models under the disruptions of both centralized and decentralized CLSCs. Based on theoretical and numerical analyses, we obtain the following results: (1) Whether or not disruption events occur, the centralized supply chain can better encourage consumers to participate in the collection of used products than a decentralized supply chain; (2) when collection disruption in a large positive region or the remanufacturing cost disruption in a large negative region occurs, OEM and TPR profits will greatly increase, and the OEM will raise the licensing fee to extract more profit from the remanufacturing activity; (3) a certain robust region exists for the retail price and wholesale price when the supply chain faces disruption increase; (4) when the supply chain faces the disruptions, it has great influence on the OEM’s licensing fee but little on the TPR’s acquisition price. The main contributions of the study include: (1) We considered the impacts of both technology licensing and collection and remanufacturing cost disruption; (2) we developed game theory models to determine the optimal manufacturing and remanufacturing quantities, and pricing strategy under the disruptions; (3) based on theoretical and numerical analyses, we presented some interesting and important insights. The results of this paper could provide useful guidelines for supply chain members on how to effectively control costs to obtain more profit by adjusting prices and selecting a better operation mode for the closed-loop supply chain.

Considering the network externality of remanufactured product, this paper develops the Stackelberg game models in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a retailer with dual sales channel under three scenarios, i.e., no sales effort (Model N), the retailer exerting sales effort (Model R) and the OEM exerting sales effort (Model M). The study investigates the pricing and sales effort decisions for CLSC members. The results show that: (1) Compared with no sales effort, the sales effort behavior can always improve the profits of the OEM and entire CLSC. The retailer’s profit can be improved in Model R, so OEM exerting sales effort could cause a loss for the retailer and the sales effort behavior can promote the sales of remanufactured products and further cannibalize the new product market. (2) Model M is more favorable to improve the profits of the OEM and entire CLSC, while the retailer prefers Model R. Model M is more beneficial for boosting the sales of remanufactured products. (3) As the network externality/consumer’s sensitivity of sales effort becomes more obvious, CLSC members exert more sales effort, and the OEM exerts more sales effort compared to the retailer. (4) Only when the retailer’s sales effort cost is much lower than the OEM sales effort cost is it that OEM could obtain more profit when the retailer exerts sales effort; then, the win-win situation between OEM and the retailer is achieved.

Remanufacturing plays an important role in the circular economy and environmental protection. In the development of the remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), the impact of government policy cannot be ignored. However, previous studies have rarely answered the impact of government dual policy (the policy combination of trade-old-for-remanufactured and carbon tax policy) on the optimal decisions of CLSC enterprises. To fill the gap, this work considers the remanufacturing modes and government dual policy simultaneously and investigates a CLSC of waste of electronic and electrical equipment (WEEE) consisting of an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a third-party remanufacturer (TPR). Here the OEM has three strategies for regulating third-party remanufacturing activities: outsourcing (Model O), authorization (Model A), and nonregulation (Model D). The results show that: (i) Whether the government implements the dual policy or not, Model O is the best choice for OEM. And compared with nongovernment policy intervention, government dual policy can improve the recovery rate of WEEE products and then effectively promote the recycling of waste resources; (ii) When the government dual policy parameters meet a certain condition, the dual policy could effectively increase supply chain members’ profits and the total profits of CLSC and boost market demand expansion; (iii) Compared with the other two remanufacturing modes, the CLSC under nonregulation strategy is the optimal remanufacturing mode for the whole society; meanwhile, OEM nonregulation strategy is the worst strategy for the environmental protection. In addition, when the government sets appropriate parameters, government dual policy is beneficial to the consumer, supply chain member, and the society simultaneously, but the impact of the dual policy on the environment is also related to the ratio of the two products’ impact on the environment.

This paper examines the impact of the contrast/assimilation effect and network externality of remanufactured products on remanufacturing mode selection for original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) under government subsidy. We develop a two-period Stackelberg game model in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) composed of an OEM and a third-party remanufacturer (TPR) considering two remanufacturing modes: authorization remanufacturing mode and outsourcing remanufacturing mode. The results show the following: (1) The OEM prefers to select authorization when the contrast/assimilation effect and government subsidy level are both relatively low; otherwise, the OEM prefers outsourcing. The TPR always prefers the outsourcing mode. Therefore, a win–win situation between the OEM and the TPR could be achieved through OEM outsourcing remanufacturing when the government raises subsidy levels or the contrast/assimilation effect is relatively obvious. (2) The outsourcing mode is more beneficial in promoting the sales of remanufactured products and is more environmentally friendly, while the authorization mode is better in regards to consumer surplus and social welfare. (3) OEM, TPR and CLSC could benefit from network externality increasing. The stronger contrast effect (assimilation effect) is profitable to the OEM and CLSC (TPR), but hurts the TPR (OEM and CLSC). (4) Government subsidy can significantly reduce consumer spending on remanufactured products. CLSC members encroach government subsidies which are offered to consumers through pricing adjustments. The findings provide managerial implications for OEMs’ remanufacturing mode strategy in the context of the contrast/assimilation effect and network externality of remanufactured products under government subsidy.

Purpose: This study attempts to determine the optimal pricing and warranty strategies for remanufactured products offered by independent remanufacturers (IRs). Specifically, it takes into account price competition and warranty service competition between the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and IR, ultimately providing recommendations on the selection of warranty service modes for IRs. Design/methodology/approach: This study considers two warranty modes for IRs: in-housing and outsourcing. Based on game theory, this study identifies the conditions under which the warranty service for remanufactured product is outsourced to retailers in IR-remanufacturing mode. Furthermore, this study investigates how this strategic decision affects closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) operations by comparing the two modes in terms of profit, consumer surplus (CS), quantity and overall social welfare (SW). Findings: Firstly, the provision strategy for IRs' warranty on remanufactured products depends mainly on the retailer’s warranty cost. If retailers have lower costs for warranties, IR opts to outsource the remanufactured product warranty to the retailer. Second, when retailers offer warranties at a lower cost, IRs prefer outsourcing remanufactured product warranty to retailers. In this way, it will maximize both the remanufacturer’s and retailer’s profits while achieving the optimal total profit for the entire supply chain. However, it’s not beneficial for the OEM. Third, the IR’s preference for warranty service provision strategy is influenced by customers’ acceptance of remanufactured product, customer sensitivity toward remanufactured product warranty and economies of scale in warranty service. Practical implications: The findings offer operational insights into IR decision-making in selecting warranty service provision strategies for remanufactured products. Originality/value: This study is among the first to examine warranty provision strategy for IRs in CLSC.