Due to the increasing awareness of sustainable manufacturing, remanufacturing has been widely accepted by enterprises in many countries. In the process of Closed-Loop Supply Chain (CLSC) development, to stimulate the demand for remanufactured products, the Chinese government’s interventions such as the “Trade old for Remanufactured” program cannot be ignored. However, prior research has not answered the questions of whether governments should offer consumption subsidies and how to determine the optimal subsidy value. This paper investigates the optimal government consumption subsidy policy and its impact on the operation of Closed-Loop Supply Chain (CLSC) where an Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) produces new products, while a Third-Party Remanufacturer (TPR) remanufactures the used products collected from consumers. A game model with a leader (government) and two followers (OEM and TPR) is then introduced. The government determines the consumption subsidy to maximize the social welfare, while the TPR and OEM attempt to maximize their own profit functions. Game theoretic models are proposed to explore and compare the scenarios, i.e., CLSC with a consumption subsidy policy and without a consumption subsidy policy. The equilibrium characteristics with respect to the government’s consumption subsidy decisions and the price decisions for chain members are derived. Based on the theoretical and numerical analysis, the results show that: (1) governments should not always offer a consumption subsidy; (2) the consumption subsidy cannibalizes demand for new products while boosting the demand for remanufactured products; (3) the consumption subsidy should be shared between the TPR and consumers when the TPR raises the sales price of remanufactured product; (4) the members of the CLSC do not always benefit from the consumption subsidy policy.

Closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) management faces collection and remanufacturing cost disruption challenges. This study explores a CLSC system wherein original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) license the third-party remanufacturer (TPR) to bear the remanufacturing activities and investigate pricing decisions in the CLSC, while considering collection and remanufacturing cost disruptions. To obtain the optimal pricing strategy, we develop game theory models under the disruptions of both centralized and decentralized CLSCs. Based on theoretical and numerical analyses, we obtain the following results: (1) Whether or not disruption events occur, the centralized supply chain can better encourage consumers to participate in the collection of used products than a decentralized supply chain; (2) when collection disruption in a large positive region or the remanufacturing cost disruption in a large negative region occurs, OEM and TPR profits will greatly increase, and the OEM will raise the licensing fee to extract more profit from the remanufacturing activity; (3) a certain robust region exists for the retail price and wholesale price when the supply chain faces disruption increase; (4) when the supply chain faces the disruptions, it has great influence on the OEM’s licensing fee but little on the TPR’s acquisition price. The main contributions of the study include: (1) We considered the impacts of both technology licensing and collection and remanufacturing cost disruption; (2) we developed game theory models to determine the optimal manufacturing and remanufacturing quantities, and pricing strategy under the disruptions; (3) based on theoretical and numerical analyses, we presented some interesting and important insights. The results of this paper could provide useful guidelines for supply chain members on how to effectively control costs to obtain more profit by adjusting prices and selecting a better operation mode for the closed-loop supply chain.

Recycling and remanufacturing waste electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) can promote the comprehensive utilization of resources and promote the development of the circular economy. However, there are associated risks involved. This study explored the effectiveness of risk control in the WEEE closed-loop supply chain to provide decision support in the sustainable development of WEEE. The catastrophe progression method was used for risk evaluation, and the WEEE risk control model was constructed using system dynamics to analyze the influence of risk control strategies. The results show that adopting risk control strategies positively promotes risk control. Risk mitigation is most pronounced when both the fund subsidy and the green and low-carbon strategies are adopted. When only one approach is implemented, the green and low-carbon strategy has a more considerable effect. When the intensities of the mitigation measures are improved to the same extent, the risk control effect generated by the fund subsidy strategy was found to have a greater impact. The findings provide a useful reference for formulating subsequent risk control strategies in the WEEE closed-loop supply chain.

Considering the network externality of remanufactured product, this paper develops the Stackelberg game models in a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) consisting of an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a retailer with dual sales channel under three scenarios, i.e., no sales effort (Model N), the retailer exerting sales effort (Model R) and the OEM exerting sales effort (Model M). The study investigates the pricing and sales effort decisions for CLSC members. The results show that: (1) Compared with no sales effort, the sales effort behavior can always improve the profits of the OEM and entire CLSC. The retailer’s profit can be improved in Model R, so OEM exerting sales effort could cause a loss for the retailer and the sales effort behavior can promote the sales of remanufactured products and further cannibalize the new product market. (2) Model M is more favorable to improve the profits of the OEM and entire CLSC, while the retailer prefers Model R. Model M is more beneficial for boosting the sales of remanufactured products. (3) As the network externality/consumer’s sensitivity of sales effort becomes more obvious, CLSC members exert more sales effort, and the OEM exerts more sales effort compared to the retailer. (4) Only when the retailer’s sales effort cost is much lower than the OEM sales effort cost is it that OEM could obtain more profit when the retailer exerts sales effort; then, the win-win situation between OEM and the retailer is achieved.

In a closed-loop supply chain, uncertainty of recyclables quality is a major factor of supply chain members decision-making. Because of this uncertainty, manufacturers must pay varying manufacturing costs for remanufacturing recyclables. Our study assumed that manufacturers are risk-averse towards uncertainty in manufacturing costs and constructed a retailer recycling model and a third-party recycling model to investigate pricing decisions in a decentralized closed-loop supply chain under uncertainty about recyclables quality. Our findings can be summarized as follows: (1) the higher the degree of consumer preference for remanufactured products, the higher the wholesale and retail prices of remanufactured products and the higher the recycling price of used products; (2) the two recycling models showed a U-shaped relationship between supply chain revenue and the degree of consumer preference for remanufactured products, and this supply chain revenue is related to the consumer preference coefficient; (3) there is a U-shaped relationship between the retailers expected revenue and the degree of consumer preference for remanufactured products in the R mode and an M-shaped relationship between them in the 3P mode; (4) in both recycling modes, the manufacturers risk aversion is inversely proportional to supply chain revenue, and supply chain revenue in the R mode is higher than that in the 3P mode; and (5) the higher the uncertainty of recyclables quality, the lower the recycling price of used products and the lower the manufacturers enthusiasm for recycling or for used products.