Infrastructure projects require a great amount of capital investment resulting from their tremendous size, complexity, and risk. Due to the limitation of public finances, the private sector is invited to participate in infrastructure project development. The private sector can entirely or partially invest in an infrastructure project in the form of public-private partnership (PPP) scheme, which has been an attractive option for several developing countries, including Vietnam. Unfortunately, despite the PPP scheme will improve project efficiencies and attract capital investments of private investors, the success of PPP implementation is not guaranteed. This paper investigates the critical success factors (CSFs) of PPP infrastructure projects in Vietnam. Relevant data were collected through in-depth interviews with six PPP experts and questionnaire surveys with 150 interviewees, and then analyzed by the word cloud technique and the one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) test. The CSFs were ranked based on the viewpoints of the public sector, the private sector, and the PPP consultants. The outcomes show that there was no significant difference in the perceptions of all three parties concerning the success factors for PPP infrastructure projects in Vietnam. The top five critical success factors are (1) timely land acquisition and appropriate compensation, (2) financial capacity of the private sector, (3) effective project management, (4) favorable and complete legal framework and regulations, and (5) financial feasibility and attraction. Recognizing the CSFs is indispensable to ensure the success of PPP infrastructure project implementation.

This study investigates the influence of human intellectual and social capital on the reciprocity (mutual exchange) between non-tourist populations and actors in the Kampung Coklat tourism of Plosorejo village, Indonesia. The existence of a sense of trust, mutual respect, and social networks between communities are important values in the dimension of social capital and form interchange between communities. The question in this research is whether interpersonal trust has a beneficial impact on relationship social capital and whether the existence of trust, social networks, and social norms has a beneficial impact on community reciprocity. The findings indicate that social capital is pivotal in advancing cocoa tourism, especially for individuals not directly involved in the tourism industry.

Sustainable operation of public-private partnership (PPP) infrastructure projects that are characterized by considerable external benefits is of vital importance. However, a liquidity shock might trigger an inefficient liquidation of a project by the special purpose vehicle (SPV) and the bank, whose objectives are to maximize the profits generated by the project. This study argues that performance guarantee and subsidy policies implemented by the government play a role in encouraging socially efficient decision-making by the SPV and the bank to ensure the continuation of socially valuable projects. The results show that both government subsidy and performance guarantee policies are effective in avoiding the inefficient liquidation of PPP infrastructure projects when the external benefits are large and certain. However, a performance guarantee policy might lead to inefficient continuation when the external benefits of a project are uncertain. Finally, we discuss the possibility that an integrated policy combining performance guarantees and government subsidies improves the efficiency of a PPP infrastructure project.

This study analyses the contractual efficiency of public-private partnership (PPP) infrastructure projects, with a focus on two financial aspects: the nonrecourse principal and incompleteness of debt contracts. The nonrecourse principal releases the sponsoring companies from the debt contract when the special purpose vehicle (SPV) established by the sponsoring companies falls into default. Consequently, all obligations under the debt contract are limited to the liability of the SPV following its default. Because the debt contract is incomplete, a renegotiation of an additional loan between the bank and the SPV might occur to enable project continuation or liquidation, which in turn influences the SPV’s ex ante strategies (moral hazard). Considering these two financial features of PPP infrastructure projects, this study develops an incomplete contract model to investigate how the renegotiation triggers ex ante moral hazard and ex post inefficient liquidation. We derive equilibrium strategies under service fees endogenously determined via bidding and examine the effect of equilibrium strategies on contractual efficiency. Finally, we propose an optimal combination of a performance guarantee, the government’s termination right, and a service fee to improve the contractual efficiency of PPP infrastructure projects.