Receiving-end grid fault may induce DC overvoltage in the high voltage direct current-based voltage source converter (VSC-HVDC). The existing DC voltage control method has a fixed initiation threshold, and the active power regulation of the sending-end converter (SEC) and receiving-end converter (REC) are independent, which is prone to non-essential activation of active power regulation of SEC and the energy-dissipating device(EDD). By quantifying the DC voltage control capability of REC under AC current and reactive power constraints, the concept of maximum permissible duration (MPD) to avoid DC overvoltage when regulating REC alone and its calculation method are proposed. By introducing the power rebalancing duration, the operating range of converters that ensures DC voltage safety, namely the DC voltage safety domain (DVSD), is portrayed. Considering the MPD and the frequency limitation of sending-end grid, the calculation methods of control sequence and reference values of SEC and REC are proposed. In conjunction with DVSD, the DC voltage control method is proposed based on active power linear reduction of SEC and cooperation with REC. Simulations show that the proposed method can prevent excessive active power regulation of SEC and avoid EDD to the maximum extent while avoiding DC overvoltage.
Commutation failures in line commuted converter-based high voltage direct current (LCC-HVDC) transmission systems leads to an increase in the converter bus voltage of the rectifier station, thus resulting in AC transient overvoltage in the sending-end grid. The transient overvoltage could lead to the disconnection of renewable energy generation and threaten the stable operation of the sending-end grid. However, the influences of the coupling between AC and DC systems caused by the interaction between the active and reactive power of the sending-end grid, the AC bus voltage of the rectifier station, and the DC current are ignored. The AC transient overvoltage cannot be accurately suppressed. Therefore, in this study, the transient voltage characteristics of the rectifier station under a commutation failure of the inverter station are analyzed. The influence of LCC-HVDC control on the AC bus voltage of a rectifier station through the active and reactive power of the rectifier station is analyzed. A dynamic model of the AC bus voltage of a rectifier station under an AC-DC system coupling is established. The calculation method of the command value of the DC current of the rectifier station is proposed by a predictive control model, and an improved suppression method for AC transient overvoltage is proposed. The case studies show that the accuracy and effectiveness of the suppression of AC transient overvoltage are improved by considering the coupling between AC and DC systems.
In modern power systems, distributed generation (DG) clusters such as wind and solar resources are increasingly being integrated into active distribution networks through DG cluster control, which enhances the economic efficiency and adaptability of the DGs. However, cyber attacks on cyber–physical systems (CPS) may disable control links within the DG cluster, leading to the loss of control over slave DGs and resulting in power deficits, thereby threatening system stability. Existing CPS security assessment methods have limited capacity to capture cross-domain propagation effects caused by cyber attacks and lack a comprehensive evaluation framework from the attacker’s perspective. This paper establishes a CPS system model and control–communication framework and then analyzes the cyber–physical interaction characteristics under DG cluster control. A logical model of cyber attack strategies targeting DG cluster inverters is proposed. Based on the control topology and master–slave logic, a probabilistic failure model for DG cluster control is developed. By considering power deficits at cluster point of common coupling (PCC) and results in internal network of the DG cluster, a physical consequence quantification method is introduced. Finally, a cyber risk assessment method is proposed for DG cluster control under cyber attacks. Simulation results validate the effectiveness of the proposed method.
The cyber–physical deep integration in distribution networks containing distributed generators (DGs) enables false data injection attacks (FDIAs) through data tampering in monitoring systems, posing cross-domain threats to power system security. Effective FDIA identification methods remain unavailable for distribution networks containing DGs under distributed cluster control. The cyber–physical interaction characteristics are systematically analyzed in the cyber–physical system (CPS) of distribution networks containing DGs under distributed cluster control. A latent FDIA model is established with a specific attack penetration pattern being revealed. The operational impact mechanism of latent FDIAs on distributed cluster control is theoretically elucidated. A synchronous detection signal-based localization methodology is developed for latent FDIAs, coupled with an attack signal computation algorithm. These innovations enable dynamic attack identification and proactive signal isolation, thereby facilitating subsequent defense operations by system operators. Simulation results confirm the effectiveness of the proposed dynamic identification method for latent FDIAs in distribution networks containing DGs.