With the profound integration of digital technology and traditional agriculture, the whole industry chain of rural e-commerce, as an advanced system, is reshaping the production, sales, and management models of agriculture and is emerging as a new catalyst for the advancement of digital agriculture through significant innovation. This paper focuses on the digital empowerment attributes and strategic attributes of the whole industrial chain of rural e-commerce, and evolutionary game models under market mechanisms and regulations are constructed. It examines the influence of various elements, such as the digital technology empowerment coefficient, on collaborative innovation within the whole industry chain of rural e-commerce. Using case simulations, this paper discusses the role of government regulation and intervention when market mechanisms are inadequate. The study reveals that factors such as the digital technology empowerment coefficient, technology absorptive capacity, and the amount of technology and information stored in collaborative innovation positively influence the whole industry chain. Potential risk losses and free-rider gains have negative effects on the evolution of the system toward collaborative innovation. When market mechanisms are inadequate, a combination of operational cost subsidies and incentive measures can yield more effective policy synergy, with the incentive impact of cost subsidies being particularly notable. The strategic application of enterprise-liquidated damage and government penalties will aid in regulating and directing corporate behavior. The findings of this research not only offer a new microlevel explanation for understanding the decision-making mechanism behind collaborative innovation in the whole industrial chain of rural e-commerce but also serve as a reference for government policy formulation to ensure the stability of the whole rural e-commerce industry chain.

In the big data era, global business competition focuses on industrial chain coordination. The whole rural e-commerce industry chain, as an advanced system characterized by digital transformation, is experiencing rapid growth. This paper aims to explore the evolutionary mechanism of collaborative behavior in the digital transformation of platform enterprises and participating enterprises across the whole rural e-commerce industry chain. To achieve this, this paper combines prospect theory and evolutionary game theory, introduces the value function and decision weight of prospect theory, and constructs a two-party game model between platform enterprises and participating enterprises. Based on the demonstration of the impact of individual changes in major objective factors, such as the cooperative innovation benefit coefficient, as well as major behavioral characteristic factors, such as decision-makers’ risk attitude coefficients, on enterprises’ strategic choices, we further reveal the influence of the interaction of key factors on the evolutionary results through case simulations. The findings indicate that when the behavior characteristics of the players are introduced, the threshold interval of the cost–benefit ratio of the two sides to reach the optimal state of decision-making is obviously reduced. Under moderate risk attitudes and degrees of loss sensitivity, enhancing the resource absorption capacity of enterprises in the chain and reducing the potential risk loss of platform enterprises to alleviate the influence of subjective behavior characteristics on cooperation willingness are effective measures. Improving innovation ability is the key factor in alleviating the negative impact of uncertainty on the decision-making of both parties. This paper is one of the few studies to integrate prospect theory with evolutionary game analysis in examining the collaborative behaviors between platform enterprises and participating enterprises. Effective strategies are proposed to promote enterprises achieving synergy.

Logistics channel is the lifeblood to ensure that logistics serves the circulation inside and outside the region, and to realize regional economic integration, it greatly contributes to the implementation of the national unified market strategy. As the government plays an important role in the construction of logistics channels, this paper further clarifies the effect of government participation and support policies by defining the role and functions of the government in the construction of logistics channels. Based on the evolutionary game theory, the paper reveals the equilibrium conditions of logistics channel construction under the market mechanism and government guidance under the assumption of bounded rationality. We construct an evolutionary game model among participating stakeholders, then study the evolutionary stability strategy of logistics channel participation behavior using the stability theorem for the model’s differential equations. In order to explore the dynamic evolution process of both parties’ choices under the two modes, we investigates the influence of the initial intention, cooperative income, cost proportion, penalty coefficient and construction cost of participating enterprises on both parties’ strategic decisions under the market mechanism and government guidance modes through numerical simulation. We find that: (1) under the market mechanism and government guidance modes, there is a game equilibrium in the participation behavior of logistics enterprises in the national unified market, and that the conditions for realizing the equilibrium of cooperation among stakeholders under the guidance of the government are easier to meet; (2) The initial intentions of the two players in the game along the logistics channel influence each other, and government participation can change the effects of cooperative income, the penalty coefficient and construction cost on the system game strategy, which has a positive effect on the channel construction; (3) At the same time the simulation shows that the government’s promotion effect has certain limitations, and the government should provide reasonable guidance to prevent enterprises from hindering the healthy development of logistics channels. This study provides a theoretical reference for the government and logistics enterprises, especially relying on logistics channels to support the regional coordination of national unified market development.