Blockchain technology offers a novel solution to address the issue of information silos present in the complex network system of regional logistics service supply chains. Furthermore, enhancing the willingness of participants to engage in this system has emerged as a critical issue requiring urgent resolution. This study assumes bounded rationality and constructs an evolutionary game model to analyze the adoption behaviors of logistics service providers (LSPs) and logistics service integrators (LSIs) in a blockchain environment. The stability theorem of differential equations is employed to elucidate the inherent decision-making mechanisms present in the game. Acknowledging that traditional evolutionary mechanisms often neglect individual heterogeneity and the dynamic changes in the topological structures of complex networks, this study further involves the development of an evolutionary game model tailored for the complex network of a regional logistics service supply chain. After validating the effectiveness of the model, this research investigates how market environmental factors influence the adoption behaviors of LSPs and LSIs. Finally, through case simulations, the effects of key influencing factors on participatory behaviors within the regional logistics service supply chain are analyzed. The findings indicate that, in a blockchain environment, both prior to and following the adoption of complex network technology in the regional logistics service supply chain, the equilibrium stability of the network system is jointly determined by the total revenues of LSPs and LSIs. External factors in the blockchain environment significantly influence technology adoption strategies. Notably, when both the sensitivity coefficients of market demand relative to price and logistics service costs concerning quality enhancement are high, the willingness of supply chain participants to adopt the technology declines rapidly. As the quality elasticity increases, the technology adoption rates of providers and integrators initially stabilize and subsequently increase exponentially. Changes in the revenues of logistics service providers have no significant impact on technology adoption rates within the regional logistics service supply chain.
18 September 2024 in Journal of Infrastructure, Policy and Development
The proportion of national logistics costs to Gross Domestic Product (NLC/GDP) serve as a valuable indicator for estimating a country’s overall macro-level logistics costs. In some developing nations, policies aimed at reducing the NLC/GDP ratio have been elevated to the national agenda. Nevertheless, there is a paucity of research examining the variables that can determine this ratio. The purpose of this paper is to offer a scientific approach for investigating the primary determinants of the NLC/GDP and to advice policy for the reduction of macro-level logistics costs. This paper presents a systematic framework for identifying the essential criteria for lowering the NLC/GDP score and employs co-integration analysis and error correction models to evaluate the impact of industrial structure, logistics commodity value, and logistics supply scale on NLC/GDP using time series data from 1991 to 2022 in China. The findings suggest that the industrial structure is the primary factor influencing logistics demand and a significant determinant of the value of NLC/GDP. Whether assessing long-term or short-term effects, the industrial structure has a substantial impact on NLC/GDP compared to logistics supply scale and logistics commodity value. The research offers two policy implications: firstly, the goals of reducing NLC/GDP and boosting the logistics industry’s GDP are inherently incompatible; it is not feasible to simultaneously enhance the logistics industry’s GDP and decrease the macro logistics cost. Secondly, if China aims to lower its macro-level logistics costs, it must make corresponding adjustments to its industrial structure.
In the face of economic, social, and environmental pressures, the issue of sustainable development has garnered widespread attention in the Logistics Service Supply Chain (LSSC) with risk attitudes under Technical Output Uncertainty. In this regard, this paper first constructs an optimal emission reduction investment game model for an LSSC composed of Logistics Service Integrators (LSIs) and Logistics Service Providers (LSPs) against the backdrop of Technical Output Uncertainty. To this end, it quantifies the participants’ risk attitudes using a mean-variance model to analyze optimal emission reduction investment decisions for centralized and decentralized LSSC under different levels of risk tolerance. Subsequently, it designs a joint contract with altruistic preferences for sharing emission reduction costs in the LSSC. This contract analyzes the parameter constraints for achieving Pareto optimization within the supply chain. Finally, the study employs a case simulation to analyze the changes in expected revenues for centralized LSSC and joint contracts under different risk tolerance levels. The study reveals that (1) in a centralized LSSC, under risk-neutral attitudes, there exists a unique optimal emission reduction investment, which yields the highest expected return from emission reduction. However, under risk-averse attitudes, the expected return is always lower than the optimal expected return under risk neutrality. (2) In a decentralized LSSC, the emission reduction investment decisions of the Logistics Service Providers are similar to those in a centralized LSSC. (3) Under risk-neutral attitudes, the cost-sharing and altruistic preference-based joint contract can also coordinate the risk-averse LSSC under certain constraints, and by adjusting the cost-sharing and altruistic preference parameters, the expected returns can be reasonably allocated.
Under the background of the carbon cap and trading mechanism, the shipping logistics service supply chain faces pressure to reduce carbon emissions, and artificial intelligence technology provides a new technological path for emission reduction. In the context of a carbon cap-and-trade system, this study examines a shipping logistics service supply chain comprising a service provider and a service integrator, where the provider adopts AI technologies for direct emission reduction and the integrator contributes indirectly. It investigates optimal decision-making under two models: a single emission-reduction model (only provider uses AI) and a joint-emission-reduction model (both adopt AI), while also exploring one-way and two-way cost-sharing contracts between them. The study establishes these models to analyze the impact of cost-sharing contracts on emission reduction levels, total service volume, and profits, and further examines how government regulation of carbon trading prices can promote reduction. Findings reveal that cost-sharing contracts effectively enhance emission reduction, output, and member benefits; one-way contracts are conducive to operations, while two-way contracts are effective only within a small cost-sharing ratio range. The joint model outperforms the single model under specific parameter thresholds, and cost-sharing ratios influence decentralized versus centralized decision-making. Government carbon price regulation can encourage reduction but must consider its effects on low-carbon logistics volume and profits.