Climate change poses a threat to the survival of the human race. Increased interest in climate change, carbon peaks, and carbon neutralization and rising recognition of the challenges inherent to highlighting this issue provides the opportunity to carry out a bibliometric study to identify what research can generate ideas regarding climate change, carbon peaks, and carbon neutralization. As expected, it may align with the dual goals of the Chinese government agenda in terms of a carbon peak and carbon neutralization in 2030 and 2060, respectively. The recent argument has induced calls for improved transparency and standardization in the approaches adopted to synthesize climate change, carbon peak, and carbon neutralization research. Nevertheless, key questions are still unanswered, namely, what are the key contributions that the research community has produced in relation to climate change, carbon peaks, and carbon neutralization? Have their contributions been inclined toward specific geographical areas, directions, and themes? As such, software tools for bibliometric analysis, VOSviewer, and Python were used to conduct a systematic quantitative analysis of the relevant literature on climate change, carbon peaks, and carbon neutralization. The results show that carbon peaks and carbon neutralization have received wide attention from academic scholars. In the meantime, China faces the unfolding challenges of economic, technological, and political factors that need to be addressed to achieve carbon peak and carbon neutralization. This study provides policy implications for achieving China’s emission reduction targets.

Purpose: Although green logistics has become a new focus of cooperation between government and enterprises under environmental constraints, how local governments formulate subsidy policies to effectively guide the green transformation of regional logistics and how to facilitate the reasonable cost-sharing are rather critical. This paper will deeply explore the dynamic process of the tripartite participation (government, platform, and logistics enterprises) in the selection of regional green logistics strategy, and reveal the evolutionary game relationship of the three parties.Design/methodology/approach: To explore the dynamics involving the government, platform and logistics enterprises for the green logistic transformation, and reveal the evolutionary gaming among the three parties, based on the bounded rationality premise, this study constructs the tripartite asymmetric evolutionary game models, uses the stability theorem of differential equation to explore the evolution and stability strategy of the system in different cases and explicates the paths of influence on the tripartite behaviors via simulations.Findings: Results of this study indicate that there exist stable equilibrium strategies among the three parties regarding the regional green logistics, and they are affected by different factors. The government's subsidy, subsidy intensity and the platform's cost-sharing proportion can generate positive effects, but the latter two can also impact negatively beyond the effective ranges. The findings provide a theoretical basis for local governments, platforms and logistics enterprises to formulate justifiable subsidy intensity and determine reasonable sharing proportion.Originality/value: Firstly, considering the significant relevance of local government, it is included in the evolution model, and the tripartite game (among government, platform and enterprises) is explored; Secondly, by comparing the equilibrium results under different game conditions, this paper analyzes the evolution of each party's game strategy to achieve the optimal return under bounded rationality and the important factors determining the strategic selection; Finally, the key factor of platform cost sharing is involved, and to what extent the change of platform cost sharing ratio will influence the systematic stability is explored.

Purpose: To remedy the inherent defect in current research that focuses only on a single type of participants, this paper endeavors to look into the situation as an evolutionary game between a representative Logistics Service Integrator (LSI) and a representative Functional Logistics Service Provider (FLSP) in an environment with sudden crisis and tries to analyze how LSI supervises FLSP's operations and how FLSP responds in a recurrent pattern with different interruption probabilities.Design/methodology/approach: Regarding the risks of supply chain interruption in emergencies, this paper develops a two-level model of single LSI and single FLSP, using Evolutionary Game theory to analyze their optimal decision-making, as well as their strategic behaviors on different risk levels regarding the interruption probability to achieve the optimal return with bounded rationality.Findings: The results show that on a low-risk level, if LSI increases the degree of punishment, it will fail to enhance FLSP's operational activeness in the long term; when the risk rises to an intermediate level, a circular game occurs between LSI and FLSP; and on a high level of risk, FLSP will actively take actions, and its functional probability further impacts LSI's strategic choices. Finally, this paper analyzes the moderating impact of punishment intensity and social reputation loss on the evolutionary model in emergencies and provides relevant managerial implications.Originality/value: First, by taking both interruption probability and emergencies into consideration, this paper explores the interactions among the factors relevant to LSI's and FLSP's optimal decision-making. Second, this paper analyzes the optimal evolutionary game strategies of LSI and FLSP with different interruption probability and the range of their optimal strategies. Third, the findings of this paper provide valuable implications for relevant practices, such that the punishment intensity and social reputation loss determine the optimal strategies of LSI and FLSP, and thus it is an effective vehicle for LSSC system administrator to achieve the maximum efficiency of the system.

Although there are some studies on the risk management of logistics service supply chain (LSSC), we still know little about the effects of risk evolution and interactional mechanism of subjects in different urgent scenarios of logistics service supply chain from a micro perspective. Based on the structures of the LSSC, this study thus analyzed the risk evolution and the main actors’ reactions in the LSSC, including categorizing the urgent scenarios, analyzing their impacts on the diffusion intensity of pricing, profit and demand, and verifying the models’ validity with the numerical analysis. The results indicate divergent impacts of the different urgent scenarios on the logistics service supply chain: the price fluctuation can cause similar profit declines of the supplier and integrator, the reduced capacity can cause the supply chain’s price increase by 50%, and the demand risks can lead to similar changes of the upstream orders, prices and profits. The findings may provide clues for firms to develop effective countermeasures against the risks.

Logistics channel is the lifeblood to ensure that logistics serves the circulation inside and outside the region, and to realize regional economic integration, it greatly contributes to the implementation of the national unified market strategy. As the government plays an important role in the construction of logistics channels, this paper further clarifies the effect of government participation and support policies by defining the role and functions of the government in the construction of logistics channels. Based on the evolutionary game theory, the paper reveals the equilibrium conditions of logistics channel construction under the market mechanism and government guidance under the assumption of bounded rationality. We construct an evolutionary game model among participating stakeholders, then study the evolutionary stability strategy of logistics channel participation behavior using the stability theorem for the model’s differential equations. In order to explore the dynamic evolution process of both parties’ choices under the two modes, we investigates the influence of the initial intention, cooperative income, cost proportion, penalty coefficient and construction cost of participating enterprises on both parties’ strategic decisions under the market mechanism and government guidance modes through numerical simulation. We find that: (1) under the market mechanism and government guidance modes, there is a game equilibrium in the participation behavior of logistics enterprises in the national unified market, and that the conditions for realizing the equilibrium of cooperation among stakeholders under the guidance of the government are easier to meet; (2) The initial intentions of the two players in the game along the logistics channel influence each other, and government participation can change the effects of cooperative income, the penalty coefficient and construction cost on the system game strategy, which has a positive effect on the channel construction; (3) At the same time the simulation shows that the government’s promotion effect has certain limitations, and the government should provide reasonable guidance to prevent enterprises from hindering the healthy development of logistics channels. This study provides a theoretical reference for the government and logistics enterprises, especially relying on logistics channels to support the regional coordination of national unified market development.