The current analysis of cascading failures in command and control networks pays little attention to their roles and mechanisms, resulting in challenges in quantifying survivability evaluation metrics and limiting practical application. To address these issues, this paper designs a command and control network model with a recovery strategy to improve the scientific evaluation of critical nodes and enhance the reliability of subsequent cascading failure simulations. Two capacity parameters are introduced to analyze the nonlinear behavior between network node load and capacity, and an optimal recovery strategy is proposed. This strategy prioritizes the recovery of critical nodes, thereby minimizing the overall probability of network failure. Simulations were conducted under both random failure and deliberate attack scenarios, comparing the proposed strategy with random recovery and betweenness-priority recovery strategies to identify the optimal recovery approach. The experiments showed that the optimal recovery strategy significantly enhanced the network’s survivability and recovery efficiency, allowing for the restoration of basic network functions in the shortest possible time and reducing the impact of cascading failures. By integrating the operability and uncertainty of real-world command and control networks, this method improved the network’s recovery capability and overall stability in the face of cascading failures through scientific evaluation and strategy optimization.

In joint operations, Command and Control (C2) Networks are crucial to operational effectiveness, directly impacting the coordination and efficiency of the operational system. As the interdependence between Information and Communication (IC) Networks and Command and Control (C2) Networks becomes increasingly tight, cascading failures have emerged as a significant factor affecting network reliability. This paper investigates the resilience of cascading failures in coupled dependency networks of command and control and Information and Communication (IC) Networks. It proposes an asymmetric group-dependency coupled network model and introduces four improved load redistribution strategies based on this model. To address the cascading failure issue caused by the one-way dependency between Command and Control (C2) Networks and Information and Communication (IC) Networks, the paper uses a nonlinear capacity-load model to simulate the cascading failure process of the coupled network and conducts simulation experiments under different attack modes and parameters to comprehensively evaluate the resilience of the coupled network. The results show that the four proposed load redistribution strategies effectively enhance the resilience of the coupled network under various attack modes and intensities. In particular, the comprehensive redistribution strategy (CR) demonstrates higher robustness and resilience across multiple scenarios. Additionally, the study reveals that simply increasing the node load capacity and repair capability does not always lead to improved resilience performance for the coupled network. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed comprehensive redistribution strategy achieves 15-20% improvement in network resilience compared to traditional methods, with optimal performance observed at overload parameter \(\delta =0.6\) and recovery coefficient \(\eta =0.5\).