Urban mobility is experiencing a profound change. Mobility patterns are becoming more complex, and typical home–work–home travel is no longer the rule, as journeys tend to connect multiple points in a rather inconstant pattern. This has changed the approach to transport planning. Existing transportation planning and operation approaches have been focussed on the ability to identify and forecast typical home–work/school–home travel and subsequently plan the transport system accordingly. The traditional approach has been: Forecast - > plan - > deliver. New mobility patterns and mobility solutions are characterised by greater flexibility, taking advantage of the “sharing concept” and simultaneously providing solutions that have lower greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. These dynamics and an evolving environment raise several new challenges at different levels, fostering the development of Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS). This system transforms the physical transportation system into a commodity and takes advantage of the internet of things (IoT). However, the onset of MaaS solutions is anything but linear. Several business models have emerged, with different partners originating from different industries (e.g., technological, transport operators, infrastructure managers, etc.) developing their own solutions, often in competition with others. It is not unusual to find different MaaS solutions in the same city, which integrate different solutions. This paper intends to provide an analysis on the main challenges affecting mobility in general, and MaaS in particular, as well as the main business models used for delivering MaaS solutions. The paper uses a case study in Lisbon to illustrate some of the challenges.

Purpose: – As public-private partnerships (PPPs) have become more widespread, doubts and criticisms about this type of infrastructural projects have emerged. The authors describe the PPP framework, discuss the financial structure and risk-sharing processes, and dissect the structure and organisation. The authors address the following questions: what are the main organisational characteristics of PPPs? How does the private sector structure and finance PPPs? And why and how are PPP contracts renegotiated? The paper aims to discuss these issues.Design/methodology/approach: – This paper draws on extensive theoretical and empirical research, which is presented in a literature overview on PPPs and their renegotiations. A comprehensive review is carried out and two case studies are developed to investigate the reasons behind success and failure of PPPs and the renegotiation of contracts.Findings: – Incomplete contracts and the long duration of concessions can bring uncertainty and change to PPPs. Joint decision making can be difficult due to different parties involved. Renegotiation outcomes tend to rely on the position of the government. In Fertagus, the private sector asked for financial help led to a very balanced agreement. Conversely, Lusoponte renegotiations were initiated by the government, which significantly changed the project. Instead of relying solely on commercial revenues, Lusoponte was substantial financed by public funds.Research limitations/implications: – Incomplete contracts and the long duration of concessions bring about much uncertainty to PPPs.Ex postdecision making in PPPs in the wake of changing risks is difficult as it necessarily involves negotiations between the public sector and the private firm. The paper shows that marked differences in renegotiation outcomes emerge. In one case study, the private sector asked for financial help and the negotiation outcome was a very balanced agreement. Conversely, renegotiations in a second case were initiated by the government mainly for political reasons, resulted in a significant change in the PPP’s structure, risk, financing, and returns, and yielded a large public losses.Practical implications: – Contrasting successful and unsuccessful PPPs enables the reader to examine the opportunities and pitfalls in case of PPP renegotiations, which frequently occur. He can gain insight in the determinants of negotiation outcomes and the importance of a governmental PPP entity as well as of an independent monitor such as a court of audits.Originality/value: – This paper should be useful for both academics and practitioners and should help increase the understanding of the several stages, structures, and renegotiation processes associated with PPPs.

Sustainability has become a significant issue for firms and investors throughout the world, although it cannot be attained if policies impact the stability of firms’ dividend policies. In this paper, we use data from the Stoxx Euro 600 firms from 2000 to 2019 and the ESG (environmental, social and governance) scores from Thomson Reuters to assess the relationship between ESG responsibility performances and the firm’s dividend policy. The results indicate that more sustainable firms exhibit a more stable dividend payout. This result is also valid when the ESG pillars are analysed, specifically, the environmental and governance pillars. The findings further suggest that higher ESG scores reveal better long-term alignment with shareholders and other stakeholders due to more proportionally stable profit sharing.

There is a significant concern about cost deviations and overruns in public projects, particularly by the local governments. The magnitude of expenditure on these infrastructure projects justifies the search for cost deviation reasons, particularly cost overruns. The existing literature also identifies a tendency towards cost overruns in infrastructure projects. However, the analysis of cost overruns determinants has mostly focused on endogenous project characteristics. This research uses a dataset of 4,305 public infrastructure projects, of which 3,338 are local projects, carried out in Portugal between 1980 and 2012. Exogenous determinants (e.g. political, institutional and governance, and economic-related) are also considered in the analysis. An average cost overrun of 19% (9 billion Euros in volume, with a 1 billion Euros overrun) is identified. It is found that central governments incur on an average cost overrun of 23% and local governments on 6%. The analysis confirmed that projects developed by local governments tend to perform better regarding cost deviations and overruns and that exogenous determinants (particularly the political, institutional and governance environment ones) have a strong impact on cost deviations and overruns. These findings on exogenous factors can help local governments to make better management decisions, enhancing governance and institutional frameworks to improve the decision-making process when launching new infrastructure.