One key aspect of cell division in multicellular organisms is the orientation of the division plane. Proper division plane establishment contributes to normal plant body organization. To determine the importance of cell geometry in division plane orientation, we designed a three-dimensional probabilistic mathematical model to directly test the century-old hypothesis that cell divisions mimic soap-film minima. According to this hypothesis, daughter cells have equal volume and the division plane occurs where the surface area is at a minimum. We compared predicted division planes to a plant microtubule array that marks the division site, the preprophase band (PPB). PPB location typically matched one of the predicted divisions. Predicted divisions offset from the PPB occurred when a neighboring cell wall or PPB was directly adjacent to the predicted division site to avoid creating a potentially structurally unfavorable four-way junction. By comparing divisions of differently shaped plant cells (maize [Zea mays] epidermal cells and developing ligule cells and Arabidopsis thaliana guard cells) and animal cells (Caenorhabditis elegans embryonic cells) to divisions simulated in silico, we demonstrate the generality of this model to accurately predict in vivo division. This powerful model can be used to separate the contribution of geometry from mechanical stresses or developmental regulation in predicting division plane orientation.
The wrong idea that Wittgenstein proposes a version of hinge epistemology has stalled progress in understanding and applying his insights into religious life. The concepts of “belief system” and “hinge proposition” were nothing more than metaphors for Wittgenstein, not theoretical posits. The misinterpretation of that point by hinge epistemologists has obscured and diminished what Wittgenstein means when he says that religious believers “think differently” than non-believers do. The difference is not merely a matter of fundamental assumptions, as hinge epistemology suggests, but a matter of living and thinking entirely differently, so that our ordinary concepts of “belief”, “assumption”, “inference”, and so on fundamentally misrepresent them. To understand such different modes of living, Wittgenstein’s philosophy implies that we must strive to see life from the believer’s point of view. We must give up trying to explain other ways of life and instead strive to “catch on” to what it would be like to live as others live, to think as they do.
Wittgenstein's remarks on religion suggest a provocative and nuanced account of what makes rituals meaningful – and why some living rituals might have little or no meaning despite their hold on congregants. Wittgenstein's view has been obscured, I argue, in part by the consistent misinterpretation of his controversial ‘scapegoat remark’, which has been taken to be a comment on the internal incoherence of the ancient Jewish scapegoat rite. In fact, Wittgenstein's point is that the scapegoat ritual is particularly easy to misinterpret, and so reflection on it helps illustrate the sort of confusion that plagues much thinking about religion and ritual.
The central insight of Wittgenstein's critique of psychology can be summarized fairly plainly: when we talk about ‘minds’, ‘thoughts’, ‘feelings’ and other psychological phenomena, we are not talking about states and processes inside our heads, whether those states be further imagined as physical or transcendent. Our psychological language has many functions, Wittgenstein's work implies, but we can roughly describe it as a system of tools that evolved to operate within the course of human social life, and it is the complexity of our lives that psychology all too often mistakes for a complexity of a hidden system. This essay is an attempt to invoke a Wittgensteinian shift in the reader's way of thinking about psychological language while working largely within the idiom of science. By thinking carefully about the evolution of psychological language in human prehistory, I hope to help clarify the sense and importance of Wittgenstein's philosophy of psychology.