Savings and credit cooperatives support financial inclusion, community-based economic participation, and the social economy in emerging countries, yet their protection mechanisms are often discussed through models designed for commercial banks. This article examines whether bank-based deposit insurance is institutionally suitable for Indonesian savings and credit cooperatives and how alternative protection arrangements can be designed without weakening cooperative governance. Using conceptual institutional analysis and comparative policy analysis, the article combines institutional economics, financial safety net theory, cooperative governance literature, Indonesian regulatory developments, and comparative lessons from European cooperative banking systems, particularly Germany’s Institutional Protection Scheme. The analysis shows that direct transplantation of bank-centric deposit insurance may create institutional mismatch because cooperative members may simultaneously act as owners, savers, borrowers, users, and governance participants. The article develops the Contextualized Cooperative Deposit Protection Design (CC-DPD) framework, integrating external protection with federated risk pooling, tiered eligibility, peer monitoring, early intervention, and governance-aligned incentives. It contributes to debates on institutional resilience, social economy sustainability, and inclusive financial governance by showing that financial safety nets are not institutionally neutral; their effectiveness depends on governance congruence between regulatory design and the organizational logic of the institutions they protect. In this article, cooperative deposit protection refers specifically to protection of member-savings claims rather than cooperative equity or ordinary commercial bank deposits.

In order to attain developmental objectives, the government allocates transfer funds, including profit-sharing funds (PSF), general allocation funds (GAF), non-physical special allocation funds (SAF-NP), physical special allocation funds (SAF-P), and village funds (VF). This study seeks to assess the impact of these transfer funds on economic performance in land-border areas and formulate development strategies. Utilising secondary data from 2017 to 2022, the analysis employs Panel Data Regression and the Analytical Network Process (ANP). The chosen locations are provinces in Indonesia that share land borders with neighbouring countries, specifically the Kalimantan corridor and the East Nusa Tenggara-Papua corridor. The findings indicate that in the Kalimantan corridor, some of the transfer funds significantly contribute to the economic performance, but not to regional inequality. In the East Nusa Tenggara-Papua corridor, all transfer funds, except SAF-P, significantly influence economic performance. In terms of strategy, the East Nusa Tenggara-Papua corridor takes precedence for development, followed by the Kalimantan corridor. The overarching developmental goals include improving welfare, enhancing productivity, and reducing inequality. In the allocation of development funding through transfer funds, the priority is PSF, VF, SAF-NP, GAF, and SAF-P, with SAF-P being the last.