Mandar Datar

Dr. Mandar Datar

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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25 October 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MDMandar Datar
Mandar Datar
EAEitan Altman
Eitan Altman
HCHélène Le Cadre
Hélène Le Cadre
We consider a marketplace in the context of 5G network slicing, where Application Service Providers (ASP), i.e., slice tenants, providing heterogeneous services, are in competition for the access to the virtualized network resource owned by a Network Slice Provider (NSP), who relies on network slicing. We model the interactions between the end users (followers) and the ASPs (leaders) as a Stackelberg game. We prove that the competition between the ASPs results in a multi-resource Tullock rent-seeking game. To determine resource pricing and allocation, we devise two innovative market mechanisms. First, we assume that the ASPs are pre-assigned with fixed shares (budgets) of infrastructure, and rely on a trading post mechanism to allocate the resource. Under this mechanism, the ASPs can redistribute their budgets in bids and customise their allocations to maximize their profits. In case a single resource is considered, we prove that the ASPs’ coupled decision problems give rise to a unique Nash equilibrium. Second, when ASPs have no bound on their budget, we formulate the problem as a pricing game with coupling constraints capturing the shared resource finite capacities, and derive the market prices as the duals of the coupling constraints. In addition, we prove that the pricing game admits a unique variational equilibrium. We implement two online learning algorithms to compute solutions of the market mechanisms. A third fully distributed algorithm based on a proximal method is proposed to compute the Variational equilibrium solution of the pricing game. Finally, we run numerical simulations to analyse the market mechanism’s economic properties and the convergence rates of the algorithms.

1 January 2020
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
YMYogesh Mahajan
Yogesh Mahajan
SOShashank Obla
Shashank Obla
MNMini K. Namboothiripad
Mini K. Namboothiripad
MDMandar Datar
Mandar Datar
NSNiraj N. Sharma
Niraj N. Sharma
SPSachin B. Patkar
Sachin B. Patkar
It is well known that solving a sparse system of linear equations is the workhorse critical step in analog and RF circuit simulation. The LU factorization of sparse system matrix is a key operation in order to solve a system of linear equations. Extracting parallelism to factorize a sparse matrix requires knowledge of pattern of non-zeros in the matrix. Exploiting the fact that sparsity patterns of matrices involved in circuit simulations do not change across iterations, the schedule of computing steps of LU factorization can be statically determined and analyzed for parallelism. This approach has been well investigated by [1] and [2] in recent years. Our work improvises this well-researched approach and exposes more parallelism, thereby yielding improved results (by factor up to 2). The accelerated design is prototyped using custom high-level-synthesis tool specific to LU decomposition problem.The case of RF Circuits is treated slightly differently. Such circuits have a number of nonlinear components. Periodic steady state response can be determined efficiently using Harmonic Balance method even when amplitudes are not small. Acceleration of this method has been a subject of vigorous interest in recent years [4], [7]. The system matrix appearing in this method is a sparse set of tiles whose solution can benefit from the techniques mentioned above. The sparsity pattern is inherited from the circuit connections. This paper describes FPGA-and manycore-based acceleration of automated Harmonic Balance (HB) simulator which simulates a circuit with a netlist similar to SPICE. Our 100MHz custom digital design on the FPGA of ZedBoard (XC7Z020) yields a speed up of up to 4.39 over the on-chip dual Core ARM Cortex-A9, 666 MHz processor. And on Intel’s Xeon Phi Knights Landing (KNL) manycore chip, we obtain a speed up of up to 8.96 over a 4-core Intel i7 processor running at 3GHz clock frequency.

2 April 2019
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
EAEitan Altman
Eitan Altman
MDMandar Datar
Mandar Datar
GBGerard Burnside
Gerard Burnside
CTCorinne Touati
Corinne Touati

5 May 2025 in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HCHélène Le Cadre
Hélène Le Cadre
MDMandar Datar
Mandar Datar
MGMathis Guckert
Mathis Guckert
EAEitan Altman
Eitan Altman
We consider a peer-to-peer electricity market modeled as a private network game, where end users minimize their cost by computing their demand and controllable generation. Their nominal demand constitutes sensitive information that they might want to keep private. We prove that the private network game admits a unique variational equilibrium, which depends on the private information of all end users. Thus, to update their strategy, end users rely on randomized readings. A data aggregator is introduced, which aims to learn the end users' private information, while remunerating them depending on the quality of their readings. Using performative prediction, we define a decision-dependent game explicitly taking into account the distribution shift caused by the end users' hidden ability. The decision-dependent game coincides with a Stackelberg game when the end users' hidden abilities are best responses. Further, the market robustness can be quantified by evaluating the efficiency loss as the difference between the social cost in the performatively stable equilibrium and the optimum. We show that under mild assumptions, the performatively stable equilibrium can be found by distributed and sequential variants of the repeated stochastic gradient method while we propose a two-timescale stochastic approximation method to learn Stackelberg equilibrium. Finally, we formulate the data aggregator's optimal contract design as a bilevel optimization problem that we cast as a more tractable nonlinear nonconvex optimization problem, which can be solved using simulated annealing. Simulations on small and large scale problem instances illustrate the results.

21 April 2025 in Games
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
Samira HabliSamira Habli
Samira Habli
Rachid El-AzouziRachid El-Azouzi
Rachid El-Azouzi
Essaid SabirEssaid Sabir
Essaid Sabir
MDMandar Datar
Mandar Datar
HEHalima Elbiaze
Halima Elbiaze
MSMohamed Sadik
Mohamed Sadik
Fog computing introduces a new dimension to the network edge by pooling diverse resources (e.g., processing power, memory, and bandwidth). However, allocating resources from heterogeneous fog nodes often faces limited capacity. To overcome these limitations, integrating fog nodes with cloud resources is crucial, ensuring that Service Providers (SPs) have adequate resources to deliver their services efficiently. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretic model to describe the competition among non-cooperative SPs as they bid for resources from both fog and cloud environments, managed by an Infrastructure Provider (InP), to offer paid services to their end-users. In our game model, each SP bids for the resources it requires, determining its willingness to pay based on its specific service demands and quality requirements. Resource allocation prioritizes the fog environment, which offers local access with lower latency but limited capacity. When fog resources are insufficient, the remaining demand is fulfilled by cloud resources, which provide virtually unlimited capacity. However, this approach has a weakness in that some SPs may struggle to fully utilize the resources allocated in the Nash equilibrium-balanced cloud solution. Specifically, under a nondiscriminatory pricing scheme, the Nash equilibrium may enable certain SPs to acquire more resources, granting them a significant advantage in utilizing fog resources. This leads to unfairness among SPs competing for fog resources. To address this issue, we propose a price differentiation mechanism among SPs to ensure a fair allocation of resources at the Nash equilibrium in the fog environment. We establish the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium and analyze its key properties. The effectiveness of the proposed model is validated through simulations using Amazon EC2 instances, where we investigate the impact of various parameters on market equilibrium. The results show that SPs may experience profit reductions as they invest to attract end-users and enhance their quality of service QoS. Furthermore, unequal access to resources can lead to an imbalance in competition, negatively affecting the fairness of resource distribution. The results demonstrate that the proposed model is coherent and that it offers valuable information on the allocation of resources, pricing strategies, and QoS management in cloud- and fog-based environments.

1 January 2026 in IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MDMandar Datar
Mandar Datar
MMMattia Merluzzi
Mattia Merluzzi