The utilization of resources plays a crucial role in mitigating the environmental pollution issue that improper disposal of construction and demolition waste (CDW) causes. However, the slow growth of the recycled building materials market limits the development of CDW resource utilization. Green value co-creation among remanufacturers, construction enterprises, and the public in CDW resource utilization projects is an effective way to address the issue. This study, based on the theory of value co-creation, uses the evolutionary game method to construct an evolutionary game model for CDW resource utilization projects. The main conclusions are as follows: (1) When the degree of green value co-creation is 0.1 or 0.5, the remanufacturer, the construction enterprise, and the public cannot maintain a state of green value co-creation; when the degree of green value co-creation is 0.9, the remanufacturer, the construction enterprise, and the public in the CDW resource utilization project finally reach a stable state of green value co-creation. (2) When the degree of green value co-creation is 0.5, enhancing the green value co-creation willingness of the remanufacturer or the public can lead other CDW resource utilization project stakeholders to participate in green value co-creation. This study contributes to the promotion of stakeholder cooperation in CDW resource utilization projects, thus providing implications for the promotion of CDW resources.

Green building materials play a vital role in mitigating the significant carbon emissions produced by the construction industry. However, the widespread presence of greenwashing, where firms falsely portray their products or practices as environmentally friendly, presents a critical obstacle to the adoption of genuinely sustainable materials. The risk of collusion between building material enterprises and certification institutions further exacerbates this challenge by undermining trust in green certification processes. To investigate these issues, this study develops an evolutionary game model that captures the strategic interactions between building material enterprises and certification institutions. The model incorporates the behavioral assumptions of prospect theory, specifically bounded rationality, loss aversion, and diminishing sensitivity, to reflect the real-world decision-making behavior of the involved actors. The findings reveal three evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) within the system. First, a higher initial willingness by both enterprises and certifiers to engage in ethical practices increases the likelihood of convergence to an optimal and stable outcome. Second, a greater degree of diminishing sensitivity in the value function promotes the adoption of authentic green behavior by enterprises. In contrast, a lower degree of diminishing sensitivity encourages certification institutions to refrain from collusion. Third, although the loss aversion coefficient does not directly affect strategy selection, higher levels of loss aversion lead to stronger preferences for green behavior among enterprises and noncollusive behavior among certifiers. This research makes a novel theoretical contribution by introducing prospect theory into the analysis of greenwashing behavior in the building materials sector. It also provides actionable insights for improving regulatory frameworks and certification standards to mitigate greenwashing and enhance institutional accountability.