Inefficiencies in the construction and demolition waste (CDW) recycling supply chain constrain green innovation in the construction industry. However, existing studies have not analyzed the innovation behavior of recyclers in CDW recycling public-private partnership (PPP) projects from the perspective of innovation diffusion theory. To reveal the mechanism of recyclers’ innovation behavior in CDW recycling PPP projects in which recyclers and remanufacturers jointly participate in the operation stage, this study uses a Stackelberg game to analyze the optimal innovation strategy choice and total profit of the CDW recycling supply chain among the two innovation paths of green independent innovation and green imitation innovation under the combined effects of technology spillover, consumer green sensitivity, and government price subsidies to consumers. The main conclusions are as follows. (1) Remanufacturers and recyclers can improve their own innovation level and profit through technology spillover. (2) The total profit of the CDW recycling supply chain changes dynamically with the level of spillover. (3) The government price subsidy to consumers does not always improve the total profit of the CDW recycling supply chain. (4) The effect of consumers’ green sensitivity on the total profit of the CDW recycling supply chain shows heterogeneity with the innovation path of recyclers and the level of technological spillover. This study not only enriches the theoretical study of the green supply chain but also provides a basis for decision-making for recyclers and governments in practice.

Although construction and demolition waste (CDW) recycling projects have received increasing attention from national and regional governments, the mechanisms for the evolution of government green development behavior in such projects are not yet clear. From the perspective of ecological compensation for the cross-regional disposal of CDW, this study aims to reveal the evolutionary mechanism of government green development behavior through externality theory. The main findings are as follows. First, the initial probability of government adoption of green development behavior does not affect the final stable state of the system. Second, there is heterogeneity in the effects of the allocation coefficient of ecological benefits and the ecological compensation coefficient on different government green development behavior. Finally, ecological benefits can encourage the government to actively adopt green development behavior. This study introduces for the first time an ecological compensation perspective into the study of CDW project management, which not only enriches the knowledge system of the government green development behavior on project management but also provides a reference for the government to participate in the process of cross-regional disposal of CDW in favor of ecological compensation.

Research in the field of project management has focused on recycling construction and demolition waste (CDW). However, the problem of how to compensate for the performance of CDW recycling public–private partnership (PPP) projects during the operation period has not been resolved. This paper aims to reveal the compensation mechanism during the operation period of CDW recycling PPP projects considering the two-stage performance of recycling and remanufacturing. This paper takes CDW recycling PPP projects as the research object and uses the Stackelberg game and principal-agent theory to establish and solve the master-slave game decision model of CDW recycling PPP projects. The main conclusions are as follows. When social welfare is maximized, the performance compensation coefficients in the recycling and remanufacturing stages are the same and have homogeneity. In addition, the compensation policy positively promotes the two-stage performance, social capital profit and social welfare of the recycling and remanufacturing of CDW recycling PPP projects. This paper not only broadens the application knowledge system of the relevant knowledge of project management in the field of CDW recycling but also provides new evidence for principal-agent theory from the operation stage of CDW recycling PPP projects.

How to efficiently and greenly dismantle abandoned buildings and reuse them is a dilemma facing the building material industry’s low-carbon objective. However, relevant studies ignore the influence mechanism of altruistic preferences of enterprises on green dismantling technology in supply chains. Driven by filling this theoretical gap, this paper firstly integrates reciprocal altruism theory and the Stackalberg game method and constructs a construction and demolition waste (CDW) recycling supply chain system consisting of a recycler and a remanufacturer, in which enterprises’ altruistic preferences are considered. The main theoretical outcomes of this paper are as follows. (1) In the case of unilateral altruism, enterprises’ altruistic preference behaviors help in increasing the green dismantling technological level and the amount of CDW recycling. Under the mutual altruism model, the influence of the recycler’s altruistic preference degree on the amount of CDW recycled hinges on the remanufacturer’s altruistic preference degree. (2) The utility of the enterprises and the green dismantling technological level are optimized under the mutual altruism model. (3) In a system of unequal power, unilateral “goodwill” by the follower will have a negative effect on their own interests; the leader plays a crucial role in facilitating equal cooperation and realizing win–win situations. This paper enriches the reciprocal altruism theory in waste management. It also helps in providing guidance for the recycler and remanufacturer in making operational decisions.

Pricing decisions for construction and demolition waste recycling are severely hampered by consumer uncertainty in assessing the value of recycled building materials. This paper uses a construction and demolition waste (CDW) recycling utilization model that consists of a building materials manufacturer and a building materials remanufacturer and compares both the prices and the profits under different carbon tax scenarios, i.e., consumer risk-averse and risk-neutral scenarios. The main conclusions are as follows. (1) The optimal price of traditional products is always negatively correlated with consumer risk aversion. Unlike traditional products, the optimal price of recycled building materials is negatively related to the degree of consumer risk aversion in the case of a low carbon tax; the opposite conclusion is obtained in the case of a high carbon tax. (2) When the abatement cost coefficient is below the threshold and the carbon tax is low, the profits of the building materials manufacturer and remanufacturer show a U-shaped trend with consumer risk aversion; in the case of a high carbon tax, the profits of the two enterprises are positively correlated with consumer risk aversion. In addition, when the abatement cost coefficient is above the threshold, there is an interval in which the profits of the building materials manufacturer are positively correlated with consumer risk aversion in the case in which the carbon tax satisfies this interval. In all the other cases, there is a U-shaped trend in profits and consumer risk aversion levels for both the building materials manufacturer and the remanufacturer.

The utilization of resources plays a crucial role in mitigating the environmental pollution issue that improper disposal of construction and demolition waste (CDW) causes. However, the slow growth of the recycled building materials market limits the development of CDW resource utilization. Green value co-creation among remanufacturers, construction enterprises, and the public in CDW resource utilization projects is an effective way to address the issue. This study, based on the theory of value co-creation, uses the evolutionary game method to construct an evolutionary game model for CDW resource utilization projects. The main conclusions are as follows: (1) When the degree of green value co-creation is 0.1 or 0.5, the remanufacturer, the construction enterprise, and the public cannot maintain a state of green value co-creation; when the degree of green value co-creation is 0.9, the remanufacturer, the construction enterprise, and the public in the CDW resource utilization project finally reach a stable state of green value co-creation. (2) When the degree of green value co-creation is 0.5, enhancing the green value co-creation willingness of the remanufacturer or the public can lead other CDW resource utilization project stakeholders to participate in green value co-creation. This study contributes to the promotion of stakeholder cooperation in CDW resource utilization projects, thus providing implications for the promotion of CDW resources.