In many cases, the pieces of information at our disposal (messages) come from a recommender source, which can be either an official news system, a large language model or simply a social network. Often, also, these messages are build so as to promote their active spreading, which, on the other hand, has a positive effect on one’s own popularity. However, the content of the message can be false, giving origin to a phenomenon analogous to the spreading of a disease. In principle, there is always the possibility of checking the correctness of the message by “investing” some time, so we can say that this checking has a cost. We develop a simple model based on the mechanism of “risk perception” (propensity to check the falseness of a message) and mutual trustability (affinity), based on the average number of fake messages received and checked. On the other side, the probability of emitting a fake message is inversely proportional to one’s risk perception and the affinity among agents is also exploited by the recommender system. We aim at investigating this process with the goal of deriving methods for identifying the penetration level of fake news from behavioral patterns of users. This model represents an integration of cognitive psychology with computational agent-based modeling.
In many cases, the pieces of information at our disposal come from a recommender source, that can be either an official news system, a large language model or simply a social network. Often, also, these messages are build so to promote their active spreading, which, on the other hand, has a positive effect on one’s own popularity. However, the content of the message can be false, giving origin to a phenomenon analogous to the spreading of a disease. In principle, there is always the possibility of checking the correctness of the message by “investing” some time, so we can say that this checking has a cost. We develop a simple model based on the mechanism of “risk perception” (propensity of checking the falseness of a message) and mutual trustability, based on the average number of fake messages received and checked. On the other side, the probability of emitting a fake message is inversely proportional to risk perception and the affinity (trustability) among agents is also exploited by the recommender system. This model represents an integration of cognitive psychology with computational agent-based modeling.
This study provides a symmetrical, cross-genre comparison of human expertise transfer and “blind” artificial intelligence (AI) performance in audio-only gaming environments. Although previous research has focused on human performance in audio games and the feasibility of blind agents trained on auditory inputs separately, a direct comparison of these two forms of expertise is missing. We fill this gap with a robust experimental design, involving 37 human players (aged 18–44), grouped by gaming experience and specialized blind AI agents. We measured key performance variables, including win ratios, health differences, and task completion times across two genres: a fighting game (DareFightingICE) and a first-person shooter (SonicDoom). Our findings show a complex, task-dependent relationship. In DareFightingICE, expert humans (73.0% win ratio) significantly outperformed the AI (54.0% win ratio), demonstrating effective cognitive transfer. Meanwhile, the AI’s performance matched the overall human average (54.0% vs. 53.0%). Conversely, in SonicDoom, AI achieved superhuman speed in simple tasks (1.55 s vs. 5.35 s) but underperformed compared to expert humans in complex scenarios, highlighting that the AI’s proficiency is specialized but fragile, whereas human expertise is more robust and adaptable. The results provide practical insights for audio-rich game design and highlight the crucial need for AI models beyond reactive policies.
In coordination games, the distinctive presence of multiple equilibria poses a challenge to coordination, and this has led over time to the proposal of numerous determinants of the latter. In this paper, we study coordination in a repeated Stag-hunt game played by two agents who are able to learn from the outcomes of each game, but do not know the payoff matrix. By modulating their learning capabilities, we show that agents are able to coordinate on the social optimum when they learn slowly from experience and are prone to making mistakes. A comparison with the results from a recent laboratory experiment is also provided.
This study provides a symmetrical, cross-genre comparison of human expertise transfer and "blind" artificial intelligence performance in audio-only gaming environments. Although previous research has focused on human performance in audio games and the feasibility of reinforcement learning agents trained on auditory inputs separately, a direct comparison of these two forms of expertise is missing from the literature. We fill this gap with a robust experimental design involving 37 human players (5 females, 31 males, 1 non-binary individual, aged 18-44), grouped by gaming experience, and specialized blind Artificial Intelligence (AI) agents across two different genres: a fighting game (DareFightingICE) and a first-person shooter (SonicDoom). Our findings show a complex, task-dependent relationship between performance. In DareFightingICE, expert humans significantly outperformed the AI, demonstrating effective cognitive transfer. Meanwhile, AI’s performance matched the overall human average, establishing a key benchmark. Conversely, in SonicDoom, AI achieved superhuman speed in simple tasks but underperformed compared to expert humans in complex scenarios. This difference highlights that the AI's proficiency is specialized but fragile, whereas human expertise is more robust and adaptable. The results provide practical insights for designing audio-rich games and highlight the crucial need for AI models that extend beyond reactive policies.
In coordination games, the distinctive presence of multiple equilibria poses a challenge to coordination, and this has led over time to the proposal of numerous determinants of the latter. In this paper, we study coordination in a repeated stag-hunt game played by two agents who are able to learn from the outcomes of each game, but do not know the payoff matrix. By modulating their learning capabilities, we show that agents are able to coordinate on the social optimum when they learn slowly from experience and are prone to making mistakes. A comparison with the results from a recent laboratory experiment is also provided.