We investigate the quantum security of nonce-based encryption under the indistinguishability against quantum chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-qCPA). While classical results establish that IV-based modes such as CBC, CFB, OFB, and CTR achieve IND-qCPA security, we demonstrate that simply replacing the random IV with a nonce undermines both classical and quantum security. To address this, we propose a general transformation from R-IND-qCPA security to N-IND-qCPA security and introduce enhanced variants, namely, CBC2, CFB2, OFB2, and CTR2, that are provably secure in the nonce-based quantum setting. We further show that nonce-based stream cipher encryption inherently satisfies N-IND-qCPA security. These results provide a systematic framework for upgrading IV-based constructions to secure nonce-based counterparts, thereby strengthening practical symmetric encryption against quantum adversaries.
The Enhanced Cipher Block Chaining scheme (eCBC) is an authentication encryption scheme (AE) improved from the CBC encryption scheme. It is shown that eCBC scheme fails to achieve ciphertext integrity (INT-CTXT): the IV is unauthenticated and the tag is a linear XOR of ciphertext hashes, enabling trivial forgeries such as IV substitution, block cancellation, and permutation. Furthermore, the medical image application diagonal block encryption based on eCBC scheme is also insecure. Its deterministic design leaks structural information, breaking confidentiality (IND-CPA). At the same time, it also inherits the forgery weaknesses of eCBC scheme, breaking authenticity. The results highlight that neither eCBC scheme nor its application meet AE security goals. And it is recommended to use standardized AE schemes such as SIV, GCM, or Ascon instead of ad hoc designs.