We investigate the quantum security of nonce-based encryption under the indistinguishability against quantum chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-qCPA). While classical results establish that IV-based modes such as CBC, CFB, OFB, and CTR achieve IND-qCPA security, we demonstrate that simply replacing the random IV with a nonce undermines both classical and quantum security. To address this, we propose a general transformation from R-IND-qCPA security to N-IND-qCPA security and introduce enhanced variants, namely, CBC2, CFB2, OFB2, and CTR2, that are provably secure in the nonce-based quantum setting. We further show that nonce-based stream cipher encryption inherently satisfies N-IND-qCPA security. These results provide a systematic framework for upgrading IV-based constructions to secure nonce-based counterparts, thereby strengthening practical symmetric encryption against quantum adversaries.
1 December 2025 in Journal of King Saud University Computer and Information Sciences
With the advancement of quantum computing and increasing demands for privacy protection in decentralized applications such as blockchain, digital signature schemes face significant challenges in simultaneously achieving anonymity, traceability, and resistance to dictatorship surveillance. Recently, anamorphic signatures were introduced to address extreme censorship scenarios, enabling parties to embed hidden messages within authenticated signatures even when communication channels and keys are entirely controlled by an adversarial dictator. Motivated by this scenario, we propose the first anamorphic group signature scheme based on the MAYO multivariate post-quantum signature algorithm. Our scheme achieves indistinguishable embedding of anamorphic messages into signatures, enabling confidential communication that remains undetectable even under strict monitoring. We further introduce an efficient confirmation and disavowal protocol combining 3-pass and 5-pass MQ identification protocols, facilitating secure member identification without compromising anonymity. Finally, a lightweight signature-opening mechanism based on salted hash bindings ensures that only the group manager can disclose signer identities during disputes. Our construction provides a practical, quantum-resistant, and dictator-resistant cryptographic toolset, making it particularly suitable for consortium blockchains, private chains, and regulated governmental networks.
Post-quantum cryptography has gained urgent attention as quantum computing poses fundamental threats to traditional public-key cryptosystems. Code-based cryptography stands out as a robust post-quantum candidate, but most existing schemes are built on Hamming distance, whereas Lee distance provides a more natural error model for specific communication channels like phase-modulation channels. This paper presents the Lee–Stern zero-knowledge identification protocol, which extends the classic Stern protocol from the binary Hamming metric to the Lee metric over arbitrary prime fields. We adopt the state-of-the-art LMMT-ISD attack framework to conduct rigorous security re-evaluation and derive necessary parameter bounds for standard post-quantum security levels. Extensive experiments analyze how code length and prime modulus affect the protocol’s overheads, showing that the proposed scheme achieves equivalent security with notably shorter code length and smaller public key size than the original binary Stern protocol.