Numerous construction enterprises have insufficient efficiency in resource utilization for construction and demolition waste (CDW), restricting global circular economic development. How to improve resource utilization has become an urgent problem. While existing studies have extensively explored operational decisions in CDW resource supply chains, insufficient attention has been given to construction enterprises’ information misreporting and its interaction with on-site conversion efficiency. This paper aims to elucidate the mechanism of action of misreporting and systematically analyzes its effects on the pricing decisions of the CDW supply chain. Drawing on information misreporting theory, this study constructs a Stackelberg game model involving construction firms and recycled building materials manufacturers, and compares supply chain decision-making behaviors under two scenarios: information misreporting and honest disclosure. The main conclusions are as follows: (1) misreporting alters recycled building material pricing and profit distribution by affecting manufacturers’ supply capacity expectations; (2) higher on-site conversion efficiency enhances CDW treatment ability and affects stakeholders’ profits; and (3) misreporting is related to on-site conversion efficiency and onsite conversion costs—enterprises prefer misreporting for short-term gains under low on-site conversion efficiency or high costs, while higher on-site conversion efficiency makes truthful disclosure conducive to long-term stable returns. This paper reveals the CDW supply chain decision-making mechanism from enterprises’ perspective, providing a new theoretical basis and practical value for CDW utilization and supply chain optimization.

The advancement of rural urbanization has led to a steady increase in construction and demolition waste (CDW) in rural areas; its dispersed nature complicates management efforts, yet existing research has not sufficiently explored the synergistic effects of subsidies and transportation costs. In this paper, a Stackelberg game model is constructed among the government, farmers, and manufacturers within the framework of a reward–penalty mechanism (RPM), and rural governance efficiency is introduced to characterize regulatory enforcement losses. Furthermore, on the basis of existing research and discussions with experts in the construction industry, this study conducted numerical simulations of key parameters by integrating multiple data sources and calibrating parameters. The aim was to analyze the mechanisms through which key factors—such as differences in subsidy structures and transportation costs—influence the decision-making behavior of farmers and manufacturers, as well as the equilibrium outcomes of the supply chain. The results indicate that (1) the reward–penalty mechanism has a significant and nonlinear effect on the decision-making of the parties involved; (2) although subsidy intensity promotes technological investment, its impact on revenue and pricing varies because of transportation cost constraints; (3) the proportion of additional subsidies for farmers is key to policy coordination, and a reasonable subsidy structure can simultaneously improve both economic and environmental performance; and (4) as a key constraint, farmers’ transportation costs play a significant moderating role in the effectiveness of regulatory measures. This paper reveals the decision-making mechanisms of rural CDW resource recovery supply chains under multiple constraints from a farmer-led perspective, providing a reference for promoting rural CDW resource recovery.