Globally, recycled building materials have attracted much attention, but the ambiguity of the use of recycled building materials makes it difficult for the building material remanufacturer (BMR) to compete with the building material manufacturer (BMM). Brand building is an important strategic tool for enterprises to increase product competitiveness. From the new perspective of the supply chain, this paper aims to examine the decision-making behavior of enterprises under two scenarios of consumer ambiguity neutrality and ambiguity tolerance and to analyze the impact of ambiguity tolerance on the pricing decisions of building materials supply chains in a brand-building scenario. This paper constructs a building material supply chain game model consisting of the BMM and BMR, according to the cognitive–affective personality system (CAPS) theory and through the Stackelberg game. The main findings are as follows. (1) Strengthening brand building can mitigate the negative impact of ambiguity tolerance on new product pricing. The selling price of recycled building materials is positively related to ambiguity tolerance. (2) When the BMM has higher brand value, there is a U-shaped trend between profit and ambiguity tolerance at a cost coefficient above the threshold value of 0.61. (3) When the BMR has higher brand value, profit is negatively related to ambiguity tolerance at operational inefficiencies and cost coefficients below the threshold value of 0.45. Otherwise, profits and ambiguity tolerance follow a U-shaped trend. This paper not only expands the research on brand building and ambiguity tolerance but also provides theoretical guidance for enterprises to make effective decisions in response to consumers’ ambiguity psychology.

Pricing decisions for construction and demolition waste recycling are severely hampered by consumer uncertainty in assessing the value of recycled building materials. This paper uses a construction and demolition waste (CDW) recycling utilization model that consists of a building materials manufacturer and a building materials remanufacturer and compares both the prices and the profits under different carbon tax scenarios, i.e., consumer risk-averse and risk-neutral scenarios. The main conclusions are as follows. (1) The optimal price of traditional products is always negatively correlated with consumer risk aversion. Unlike traditional products, the optimal price of recycled building materials is negatively related to the degree of consumer risk aversion in the case of a low carbon tax; the opposite conclusion is obtained in the case of a high carbon tax. (2) When the abatement cost coefficient is below the threshold and the carbon tax is low, the profits of the building materials manufacturer and remanufacturer show a U-shaped trend with consumer risk aversion; in the case of a high carbon tax, the profits of the two enterprises are positively correlated with consumer risk aversion. In addition, when the abatement cost coefficient is above the threshold, there is an interval in which the profits of the building materials manufacturer are positively correlated with consumer risk aversion in the case in which the carbon tax satisfies this interval. In all the other cases, there is a U-shaped trend in profits and consumer risk aversion levels for both the building materials manufacturer and the remanufacturer.

Recycled building materials offer an effective economic solution to the environmental issues caused by construction and demolition waste (CDW). However, they also create opportunities for information misrepresentation by remanufacturers. Despite the significance of this issue, existing research has largely overlooked the impact of such misrepresentation on the pricing decisions for recycled building materials. The study aims to reveal how information misrepresentation influences pricing in the context of recycled building materials. This paper develops a supply chain model for the resource utilization of construction waste, consisting of both a remanufacturer of recycled building materials and a traditional building material manufacturer. The model evaluates the effects of information misrepresentation by the remanufacturer on pricing decisions. The main findings are as follows: (1) The impact of misrepresentation of information on manufacturers depends on government subsidies and the remanufacturing process misrepresentation factor. When the government adopts a low subsidy policy, as the remanufacturing process misrepresentation factor increases, manufacturers’ profits are U shaped. When the government adopts a high subsidy policy, manufacturers’ profits are positively related to the remanufacturing process misrepresentation factor. (2) When government subsidies exceed a certain threshold, there is a negative impact on remanufacturers, who tend to reduce the level of misrepresentation in their remanufacturing processes. This study not only broadens the research on information misrepresentation through the lens of social exchange theory but also provides valuable insights for government policy decisions, particularly in regulating misrepresentation behaviors by remanufacturers under various scenarios.

Green building materials play a vital role in mitigating the significant carbon emissions produced by the construction industry. However, the widespread presence of greenwashing, where firms falsely portray their products or practices as environmentally friendly, presents a critical obstacle to the adoption of genuinely sustainable materials. The risk of collusion between building material enterprises and certification institutions further exacerbates this challenge by undermining trust in green certification processes. To investigate these issues, this study develops an evolutionary game model that captures the strategic interactions between building material enterprises and certification institutions. The model incorporates the behavioral assumptions of prospect theory, specifically bounded rationality, loss aversion, and diminishing sensitivity, to reflect the real-world decision-making behavior of the involved actors. The findings reveal three evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) within the system. First, a higher initial willingness by both enterprises and certifiers to engage in ethical practices increases the likelihood of convergence to an optimal and stable outcome. Second, a greater degree of diminishing sensitivity in the value function promotes the adoption of authentic green behavior by enterprises. In contrast, a lower degree of diminishing sensitivity encourages certification institutions to refrain from collusion. Third, although the loss aversion coefficient does not directly affect strategy selection, higher levels of loss aversion lead to stronger preferences for green behavior among enterprises and noncollusive behavior among certifiers. This research makes a novel theoretical contribution by introducing prospect theory into the analysis of greenwashing behavior in the building materials sector. It also provides actionable insights for improving regulatory frameworks and certification standards to mitigate greenwashing and enhance institutional accountability.

Although the beneficial role of enterprises in the management of construction and demolition waste (CDW) should not be overlooked, existing relevant studies have neglected to address the specific effects of the behavioral decisions of leaders and employees within enterprises in CDW recycling projects. This study creatively introduces psychological contract theory into the field of CDW management and aims to reveal the mechanism of recycling participation behaviors between leaders and employees in CDW recycling projects. Using the Stackelberg game method, a model consisting of leaders and employees in the construction enterprise was constructed to analyze the optimal decision-making of the enterprise under two cases of whether or not the employees contributed additional effort. The conclusions of this study are as follows: (1) The profits of construction enterprise leaders are always positively correlated with the degree of employee additional effort. Unlike the case of leaders, the effect of additional effort on employee profits hinges on the coefficient of employee additional effort. When the coefficient of employee additional effort is below the threshold, excessive additional effort can negatively impact their own profits. When the additional effort coefficient exceeds the threshold, the employee profits are positively related to the degree of additional effort. (2) Similar to the change in employee profits, the change in the total profit of the construction enterprise with the degree of additional effort is influenced by the additional effort coefficient. However, as the additional effort coefficient increases, the total profit of the enterprise shows a significant increase before employee profits. This study enriches the theoretical study of psychological contracts and provides guidance for decision-making between leaders and employees in the management of CDW recycling projects.

Numerous construction enterprises have insufficient efficiency in resource utilization for construction and demolition waste (CDW), restricting global circular economic development. How to improve resource utilization has become an urgent problem. While existing studies have extensively explored operational decisions in CDW resource supply chains, insufficient attention has been given to construction enterprises’ information misreporting and its interaction with on-site conversion efficiency. This paper aims to elucidate the mechanism of action of misreporting and systematically analyzes its effects on the pricing decisions of the CDW supply chain. Drawing on information misreporting theory, this study constructs a Stackelberg game model involving construction firms and recycled building materials manufacturers, and compares supply chain decision-making behaviors under two scenarios: information misreporting and honest disclosure. The main conclusions are as follows: (1) misreporting alters recycled building material pricing and profit distribution by affecting manufacturers’ supply capacity expectations; (2) higher on-site conversion efficiency enhances CDW treatment ability and affects stakeholders’ profits; and (3) misreporting is related to on-site conversion efficiency and onsite conversion costs—enterprises prefer misreporting for short-term gains under low on-site conversion efficiency or high costs, while higher on-site conversion efficiency makes truthful disclosure conducive to long-term stable returns. This paper reveals the CDW supply chain decision-making mechanism from enterprises’ perspective, providing a new theoretical basis and practical value for CDW utilization and supply chain optimization.