Information and communication technologies (IT) and IT-based instrumentation and control (I&C) systems, hardware and software components are analyzed in context of “green” paradigm. Green IT paradigm is formulated as a Cartesian product of a pair “external (E) and internal (I) aspects of IT and computer-based I&Csystems” and a pair “power (recourse) consumption minimization (Rmin) and safety maximization (Smax)”. In the paper we discuss main research challenges and development solutions, education and training activities in the domain of green and safe computing and communication. Finally, we report results of EU-TEMPUS projects in the area of safe and green ITs and define models of academia and industry cooperation for excellence, innovations and knowledge exchange.

Dependability and security analysis of the industrial control computer-based systems (ICS) is an open problem. ICS is a complex system that as a rule consists of two levels - supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) and programmable logic controllers (PLC) and has vulnerabilities on both levels. This paper presents results of the SCADA-based ICS dependability and security analysis using a modification of standardized FMEA (failure modes and effects analysis)-technique. The technique mentioned takes into account possible intrusions and is called F(I)MEA (failure (intrusion) modes and effects analysis). F(I)MEA-technique is applied for determining the weakest parts of ICS and the required means of fault prevention, fault detection and fault-tolerance ensuring. An example of F(I)MEA-technique applying for SCADA vulnerabilities analysis is provided. The solutions of SCADA-based ICS dependability improvement are proposed.

In the paper we discuss main functional characteristics and distinctive implementation features of the modern unmanned aerial vehicles autopilots. We consider eight different autopilots, including Micropilot's MP2x28, unmanned aerial vehicles Navigation's Vector, Moog Crossbow's GNC1000, etc. and compare their performance, communication interfaces, types of controlled vehicles and a set of supported functions.

This experience report analyses security problems of modern computer systems caused by vulnerabilities in their operating systems. An aggregated vulnerability database has been developed by joining vulnerability records from two publicly available vulnerability databases: the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures system (CVE) and the National Vulnerabilities database (NVD). The aggregated data allow us to investigate the stages of the vulnerability life cycle, vulnerability disclosure and the elimination statistics for different operating systems. The specific technical areas the paper covers are the quantitative assessment of vulnerabilities discovered and fixed in operating systems, the estimation of time that vendors spend on patch issuing, and the analysis of the vulnerability criticality and identification of vulnerabilities common for different operating systems.