Dependability and security analysis of the industrial control computer-based systems (ICS) is an open problem. ICS is a complex system that as a rule consists of two levels - supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) and programmable logic controllers (PLC) and has vulnerabilities on both levels. This paper presents results of the SCADA-based ICS dependability and security analysis using a modification of standardized FMEA (failure modes and effects analysis)-technique. The technique mentioned takes into account possible intrusions and is called F(I)MEA (failure (intrusion) modes and effects analysis). F(I)MEA-technique is applied for determining the weakest parts of ICS and the required means of fault prevention, fault detection and fault-tolerance ensuring. An example of F(I)MEA-technique applying for SCADA vulnerabilities analysis is provided. The solutions of SCADA-based ICS dependability improvement are proposed.
28 September 2020 in RADIOELECTRONIC AND COMPUTER SYSTEMS
Operating reliability assessment of instrumentation and control systems (I&Cs) is always one of the most important activities, especially for critical domains such as nuclear power plants (NPPs). It is an important source of I&C reliability information preferable to lab testing data because it provides information on I&C reliability under real use conditions. That is the reason that now it is a common practice for companies to have an established process of collecting operating reliability data on a large variety of used components on regular basis, maintaining a database with failure information, total operation time, typical failure modes, etc. The intensive use of complicated components like field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) in I&C which appear in upgrades and newly-built nuclear power plants makes the task to develop and validate advanced operating reliability assessment methods that consider specific technology features very topical. Increased integration densities make the reliability of integrated circuits the most crucial point in modern NPP I&Cs. Moreover, FPGAs differ in some significant ways from other integrated circuits: they are shipped as blanks and are very dependent on the design configured into them. Furthermore, FPGA design could be changed during planned NPP outage for different reasons. Considering all possible failure modes of FPGA-based NPP instrumentation and control systems at the design stage is a quite challenging task. Therefore, operating reliability assessment is one of the most preferable ways to perform a comprehensive analysis of FPGA-based NPP I&Cs. Based on information in the literature and own experience, operational vs analytical reliability could be pretty far apart. For that reason, analytical reliability assessment using reliability block diagrams (RBD), failure modes, effects and diagnostics analysis (FMEDA), fault tree analysis (FTA), fault insertion testing (FIT), and other techniques and their combinations are important to meet requirements for such systems. The paper summarizes our experience in operating and analytical reliability assessment of FPGA based NPP I&Cs.
There are many techniques for the Nuclear Power Plants Instrumentation and Control (NPP I&C) systems safety assessment. Each of them is suitable for specific types of I&C systems and life cycle stages. Though general procedures of techniques application are specified by standards and described by guides, there is no universal solution that could be unambiguously applied to any NPP I&C system. The Failure Modes, Effects and Diagnostics/Criticality Analysis (FME(D/C)A) is the one that is most often used. Using this technique, the process of assessment is not trivial because of dimensionality problem that is especially critical for modern NPP I&C systems that contain many complex electronic components. Another challenge is the need of compliance to varying requirements of standards. Furthermore, modern I&C systems are based on different platforms (FPGA, microcontrollers). Most of safety and reliability assessment techniques, including mentioned FME(D/C)A, are based on expertise and thereby results are dependent on experts’ decisions very much. This could be a serious challenge, because it is very difficult to find universal experts that have sufficient experience to be equally qualified in different electronic components (FPGA, microcontrollers etc.) used in modern I&C systems. The goal of this paper is to analyze the ways of automation of FMEDA-based NPP I&C systems safety assessment and minimization of uncertainty degree of experts’ decisions. Possible experts’ errors and the uncertainty degree of their decisions are analyzed. We propose integration of all existing FMEA-based techniques into XME(D/C)A that includes Functional FMEA, Design FMEA, Software FMEA, Hardware FMEA etc. Such approach allows performing more comprehensive analysis. Developed tool AXMEA (Automated XMEA) represents an integrated solution that provides the automation of stages of FMEDA technique applied to NPP I&C. The case study is the application of proposed technique and tool during SIL3 certification of the modular RadICS™ platform.
Safety and reliability assessment of instrumentation and control systems used in different safety critical industries is a responsible and challenging task. Different assessment models recommended by international and national normative documents and used by experts worldwide still have disadvantages and limitations. Therefore, studies of assessment model improvements and refinements are essential. In this work we suggest assessment model improvement by taking into account different architectures of communications both between different systems and within one particular system. In most models communication lines are being considered absolutely reliable, but our experience shows that addressing communications should be done. A few analytical models are described to assess reliability of safety critical systems for nuclear power plants such as rod control system with different communication options.
1 January 2012 in Information & Security: An International Journal
This paper addresses the problems associated with dependability analysis of complex information and control systems (I&CS). FME(C)A-technique is proposed as a unified approach to I&CS dependability assessment. Classic philosophy is extended by introducing new items into assessed objects, relevant causes, assessed effects, assessed attributes and used means. FME(C)A-tables and models for dependability (reliability, survivability and safety) attributes assessment are constructed. Elements of information technology of I&CS analysis are presented.