Antoine Dubus

Mr. Antoine Dubus


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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31 May 2021 in The RAND Journal of Economics
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DBDavid Bounie
David Bounie
ADAntoine Dubus
Antoine Dubus
PWPatrick Waelbroeck
Patrick Waelbroeck

22 April 2022 in Telecommunications Policy
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Journal Article
Open access
YBYann Balgobin
Yann Balgobin
ADAntoine Dubus
Antoine Dubus

1 February 2026 in Management Science
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HBHemant Bhargava
Hemant Bhargava
ADAntoine Dubus
Antoine Dubus
DRDavid Ronayne
David Ronayne
SSShiva Shekhar
Shiva Shekhar
Large, generalist, technology firms—so-called “big-tech” firms—powerful in their primary market, routinely enter secondary markets consisting of specialist firms. Naturally, one might expect a specialist firm to be fiercely protective of its data as a way to maintain its market position in the secondary market. Counter to this intuition, we demonstrate that a specialist firm willingly shares its market data with an intruding generalist. We do so by developing a model of cross-market competition in which the data collected via consumer usage in one market can improve product quality in another. We show that a specialist firm shares its data to strategically create codependence between the two firms, thereby softening competition and transforming the generalist firm from a traditional competitor into a coopetitor. For the generalist intruder, data from the specialist firm substitute for its own investments in product quality in the secondary market. As such, the act of sharing data makes the generalist a stakeholder in the data collected by the specialist, and consequently in the specialist’s continued success. Moreover, although the firms benefit from data sharing, consumers can be worse off from weakened price competition and lower investments in innovation. Our results have managerial and policy implications, notably on account of backlash against data collection and the market power of big-tech firms. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, information systems. Funding: D. Ronayne is grateful for support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft [CRC TRR 190; Project 280092119]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.04938 .

7 February 2024 in Information Economics and Policy
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ADAntoine Dubus
Antoine Dubus

11 April 2025 in International Review of Law and Economics
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Journal Article
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DBDavid Bounie
David Bounie
ADAntoine Dubus
Antoine Dubus
PWPatrick Waelbroeck
Patrick Waelbroeck

15 September 2019 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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DBDavid Bounie
David Bounie
ADAntoine Dubus
Antoine Dubus
PWPatrick Waelbroeck
Patrick Waelbroeck
We investigate the strategies of a data intermediary selling customized consumer information to firms for price discrimination purpose. We analyze how the mechanism through which the data intermediary sells information influences how much consumer data he will collect and sell to firms, and how it impacts consumer surplus. We consider three selling mechanisms tailored to sell customized consumer information: take it or leave it offers, sequential bargaining, and simultaneous offers. We show that the more data the intermediary collects, the lower consumer surplus. Consumer data collection is minimized, and consumer surplus maximized under the take it or leave it mechanism, which is the least profitable mechanism for the intermediary. We argue that selling mechanisms can be used as a regulatory tool by data protection agencies and competition authorities to limit consumer information collection and increase consumer surplus.