1 June 2021 in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
1 December 2017 in Journal of Mathematical Psychology
31 January 2021 in International Economic Review
The large and growing industry of price comparison websites (PCWs) or “web aggregators” is poised to benefit consumers by increasing competitive pricing pressure on firms by acquainting shoppers with more prices. However, these sites also charge firms for sales, which feeds back to raise prices. I find that introducing any number of PCWs to a market increases prices for all consumers, both those who use the sites and those who do not. I then use my framework to identify ways in which a more competitive environment could be achieved.
16 September 2021 in The Economic Journal
We study strategic interactions in markets in which firms sell to consumers both directly and via a competitive channel (CC), such as a price comparison website or marketplace, where multiple sellers’ offers are visible at once. We ask how a CC’s size influences market outcomes when some consumers have limited price information. A bigger CC means more consumers compare prices, increasing within-channel competition. However, we show such seemingly pro-competitive developments can raise prices and harm consumers by weakening between-channel competition.
1 February 2026 in Management Science
Large, generalist, technology firms—so-called “big-tech” firms—powerful in their primary market, routinely enter secondary markets consisting of specialist firms. Naturally, one might expect a specialist firm to be fiercely protective of its data as a way to maintain its market position in the secondary market. Counter to this intuition, we demonstrate that a specialist firm willingly shares its market data with an intruding generalist. We do so by developing a model of cross-market competition in which the data collected via consumer usage in one market can improve product quality in another. We show that a specialist firm shares its data to strategically create codependence between the two firms, thereby softening competition and transforming the generalist firm from a traditional competitor into a coopetitor. For the generalist intruder, data from the specialist firm substitute for its own investments in product quality in the secondary market. As such, the act of sharing data makes the generalist a stakeholder in the data collected by the specialist, and consequently in the specialist’s continued success. Moreover, although the firms benefit from data sharing, consumers can be worse off from weakened price competition and lower investments in innovation. Our results have managerial and policy implications, notably on account of backlash against data collection and the market power of big-tech firms. This paper was accepted by David Simchi-Levi, information systems. Funding: D. Ronayne is grateful for support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft [CRC TRR 190; Project 280092119]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2024.04938 .
1 September 2021 in The Journal of Industrial Economics
We study a model of simultaneous price competition that subsumes many employed in the literature over the last several decades. Firms sell a homogeneous good to consumers characterized by the number of prices they (exogenously) consider. We show there is a unique equilibrium if and only if some consumers consider exactly two prices. The equilibrium is in symmetric mixed strategies. When no consumer considers exactly two prices, there is, in addition, an uncountable infinity of asymmetric equilibria. Our results show that the paradigm generically produces a unique equilibrium, and only the commonly sought symmetric equilibrium is robust to perturbations in consumer behavior.