Manufacturers often face capital constraints when opening up online channel, at this time external financing and internal financing are usually considered. Previous literature has shown that internal financing, turns out to be a better option. To figure out how trade credit financing discount contract affects operations and performances of supply chain, this paper studies the pricing decision of a retailer-dominant dual-channel supply chain with manufacturer's capital constraints. The Stackelberg game models under centralized decision and decentralized decision are constructed. Moreover, this paper conducts research about the effects of revenue-sharing (RS) contract, direct channel price discount (DP) contract and retail channel price discount (RP) contract on the performance of supply chain. Numerical examples are provided to explore the comparison of the optimal pricing strategies and total profits under different contracts. The results show that the retailer prefers RS and DP contracts to RP contract. Among them, RS contract has a broader scope of coordination, while DP contract can achieve a higher profit. The results can serve as insights for decision-makers to choose the most appropriate financial discount contract.

Traditional EOQ models are assumed that it is upstream full trade credit and down steam partial trade credit. In most business transactions, this assumption is debatable. In this note, this paper establishes a new EOQ model under two levels of trade credit, in which the supplier offers to the retailer a partial trade credit period for payments even if the order quantity is less than W, and simultaneously the retailer in turn provides a full trade credit period to its customers. Furthermore, we assume that the trade credit period (N) offered by the retailer to the customers is less than or equal to the trade credit period (M) offered by the supplier. And the retailer starts earning revenue from time N to time (T + N), not from time 0 to time T. Six theorems are developed to determine retailer’s optimal ordering policies and numerical examples are given to illustrate these theorems.

Most of the previous literatures proposed a single coordination contract to increase the total profit of the supply chain, while this paper focuses on how to design environmental contracts to increase economic and environmental performance in the context of sustainable development. This paper designs the environmental contract based on cap-and-trade mechanism and trade credits which has rarely been studied before, especially the impact of trade credit on environmental performance. We consider a green supply chain, assuming that the demand rate is linear with retail prices, joint carbon emission reduction efforts and trade credit. Two models, a decentralized one and a centralized one, are compared; four contracts are proposed. Via numerous examples and sensitivity analysis, we gain some insight into how to select supply chain contracts to better improve environmental performance. The results reveal that the manufacturer sharing the retailer's revenue and cost contract obtains the highest profit. While revenue sharing contract between both parties is the optimal environmental contract, but it is difficult to increase the profit of supply chain. Furthermore, it is found that trade credit works well in protecting the environment and plays a significant role in achieving coordination.

Purpose: In a complex and ever-changing market environment, manufacturers’ channel encroachment and retailers’ market entry strategies are crucial for business development. This paper aims to explore the strategic interaction mechanism between manufacturers and retailers under an asymmetric market structure, particularly focusing on how the two parties reach equilibrium strategies when manufacturers decide whether to implement channel encroachment and retailers choose whether to enter high-potential markets and to identify the conditions for achieving a “win-win” situation. Design/methodology/approach: This study constructs a game theory model to depict the sequential decision-making process between manufacturers and retailers under asymmetric information and cost structures. By introducing the “plundering effect” and the “competition effect,” the study systematically analyzes the impact of changes in channel encroachment costs on manufacturers’ strategy shifts and examines the evolution paths of equilibrium strategies under different market conditions. The research also specifically investigates the boundary conditions for manufacturers implementing encroachment strategies and their disturbance to the overall equilibrium structure. Findings: The study finds that (1) retailers generally tend to adopt market entry strategies, which often also enhance manufacturers’ profits; (2) contrary to conventional views, higher channel encroachment costs do not necessarily suppress manufacturers’ downstream encroachment behavior and their impact is diverse; (3) under specific parameter conditions, both parties can achieve a “win-win” equilibrium and (4) although the range of equilibrium strategies fluctuates significantly with market conditions, the changes always follow a stable pattern, indicating high robustness of the findings. Originality/value: The originality of this paper lies in integrating the “plundering effect” and the “competition effect” into the channel encroachment and market entry interaction framework under an asymmetric market for the first time, revealing the non-monotonic impact mechanism of encroachment costs on manufacturers’ strategies. At the same time, it systematically depicts the structural evolution of equilibrium strategies under different market conditions, providing new theoretical insights into strategy coordination among supply chain members and offering practical managerial implications for firms in formulating channel and market expansion strategies.