An energy deviation settlement (EDS) mechanism has been proposed to settle the deviation between consumption and energy contracts in China's forward electricity market. Due to high EDS costs of electricity retailers, a deviation mutual insurance (DMI) mechanism is put forward, representing an option for electricity retailers to reduce the deviation through contract transfer. Given this background, an optimal alliance strategy is proposed to maximize the combined utility of different types of individual electricity retailers. The alliance income model considers the EDS cost reduction and the cooperation cost analyzed based on transaction cost theory (TCT). An improved income allocation method, which considers distribution indexes selected by game theory and resource dependence theory (RDT), is proposed to ensure the comprehensive and reasonable allocation of alliance income. Considering the expected income and financial risk, an evaluation model using conditional value at risk (CVaR) as the financial risk assessment indicator is presented to measure the stability of alliances. Simulations based on data from a provincial electricity market in China illustrate that the EDS costs of retailers can be reduced by selecting appropriate partners for alliance. In addition, the proposed alliance income allocation method is more reasonable and more targeted than the cooperative game-based methods.
The ever‐increasing competition in electricity retail markets has become one of the pivotal causes for electricity retailers to provide attractive packages to consumers for enhancing their market shares. Based on the current user‐side time‐of‐use electricity price mechanism in China, a bi‐level optimization model for designing a time‐phased and quantity‐incentive electricity package is proposed for electricity retailers considering bounded rationality of consumers. In the upper‐level model, the optimization objective is to maximize the electricity purchase and sale revenue of a specified retailer. In the lower‐level model, consumers are modelled as bounded rational decision‐makers whose objective is to purchase the electricity package with the highest value, considering the value of the excess electricity of the package. In addition, consumer psychology theory is introduced to describe the bounded rational responses of consumers to electricity packages. Simulations based on data of residential consumers in a city of China illustrate that by properly determining package quotas in different time periods, electricity retailers can guide consumers to change consumption time and volume, and hence, increase their revenues by increasing trading volume or reducing electricity procurement costs in forward bilateral transactions and spot markets.
The urban utility tunnel presents solutions for the sustainable development of urban underground space, and is an important carrier of power distribution network and integrated energy systems. Considering the high investment cost of utility tunnels and the limitations of traditional cost sharing methods (i.e., spatial proportional method, direct-laying cost method and benefit-based proportional method), it is of great significance to establish a fair and practical cost sharing mechanism. First, an improved Shapley value-based spatial proportional method is proposed. A comprehensive decision-making mechanism for utility tunnel construction cost allocation is established by using the improved spatial proportion, the life-cycle direct-laying cost proportion, and the benefit proportion of pipeline companies as the cost allocation indexes. The resource dependence theory is introduced to quantify the bargaining power of each pipeline company in the negotiation of the cost allocation. The weights of the cost allocation indexes in the comprehensive decision-making model are optimized with the objective of maximizing the overall satisfaction of the pipeline companies. Simulations based on the data of utility tunnel pilots in China illustrate that the proposed cost allocation mechanism has the highest overall satisfaction and is more acceptable and more feasible than the traditional cost allocation methods. For power companies, the cost of laying power cables can be significantly reduced by utility tunnels, and laying 10 kV power cables has been shown to have higher economic benefits.
Along with the continuous development of renewable energy sources (RES) such as wind power and photovoltaic, a large proportion of RES were connected to the power grid. However, the volatility and intermittency of RES threaten the safe and stable operation of the power system. Virtual power plants (VPPs) were introduced to solve such problems. In order to study the cooperation mode of integrating wind-solar-storage for multi VPPs, this paper established multi-objective individual and joint dispatching model for single VPP and multi VPPs with wind-solar-storage, respectively. Then, this paper analyzed the cooperation and the fair distribution of benefits between VPPs. By establishing the competitive strategies of the participating subjects and integrating the Shapley value to effectively distribute the benefits, the cooperative game theory was applied to effectively enhance the benefit in the VPP, to maximize the economic benefits, and to reduce the RES uncertainty risks and carbon emissions, which provided new ideas for the subsequent research on the optimal operation of RES and their engineering applications. NSGA-II was adopted to solve the multi-objective optimization problem. The strategy achieved a 10.1% reduction on the original peak load. It could effectively reduce the peak load of the VPP and ensure the accuracy of load regulation, to reach 12% of the total capacity of the VPP.