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Zhi Zhang
College of Electrical Engineering, Zhejiang University, No. 38 Zheda Road, Xihu District, Hangzhou 310027, China

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Short communication
Published: 18 June 2021 in Energy Reports
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Fair and reasonable allocation of regulated consumption quota ratio (RCQR) of renewable energy is the foundation and key to guarantee the effective implementation of the mechanism associated with renewable energy consumption in China. Given this background, the allocation strategy of RCQR based on game theory is proposed for guaranteeing the consumption of renewable energy in this paper. In the proposed strategy, the RCQR of renewable energy for the market entities is allocated by determining the reasonable weights based on three proportional allocation methods (i.e., electricity consumption, electricity selling profits, and electricity purchasing cost) and the group satisfaction degree method. Then, game theory is used to coordinate the inconsistency of the four methods of determining weights. Finally, an allocation case of RCQR in Anhui, China is taken as an example for demonstration to verify the effectiveness and practicability of the proposed strategy. The simulation results show that the RCQR can be appropriately allocated by the proposed strategy, and it can be obtained that there is still a certain margin between the obliged consumption under the proposed strategy of each market entity and its maximum acceptable consumption.

ACS Style

Difei Tang; Chenjing Dong; Xueyan Wu; Hanhan Qian; Haichao Wang; Hailong Jiang; Zhi Zhang; Yuge Chen; Xin Deng; Zhenzhi Lin; Muhammad Waseem. Allocation strategy of regulated consumption quota ratio of renewable energy based on game theory. Energy Reports 2021, 1 .

AMA Style

Difei Tang, Chenjing Dong, Xueyan Wu, Hanhan Qian, Haichao Wang, Hailong Jiang, Zhi Zhang, Yuge Chen, Xin Deng, Zhenzhi Lin, Muhammad Waseem. Allocation strategy of regulated consumption quota ratio of renewable energy based on game theory. Energy Reports. 2021; ():1.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Difei Tang; Chenjing Dong; Xueyan Wu; Hanhan Qian; Haichao Wang; Hailong Jiang; Zhi Zhang; Yuge Chen; Xin Deng; Zhenzhi Lin; Muhammad Waseem. 2021. "Allocation strategy of regulated consumption quota ratio of renewable energy based on game theory." Energy Reports , no. : 1.

Short communication
Published: 10 June 2021 in Energy Reports
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The goal of China’s new round of electricity market reform is to orderly release the plan of power generation and power utilization and gradually expand the scale of market-oriented transactions. The generation adequacy is an indicator that needs to be paid attention to during releasing the plan of power generation and power utilization. Insufficient generation adequacy will result in market monopoly and high market-clearing prices. Given this background, the market power and bidding strategies of generators under the low and high generation adequacy are analyzed in this paper. Then, a synthetic decision model for the energy allocation between bilateral contracts and a pool market and the bidding strategy in the pool market is constructed considering the generation adequacy. Case studies are performed for demonstrating the decision-making model and simulation results show that the proposed model can assist generators to make energy allocation and bidding decision based on the generation adequacy, own power generation capacity and bilateral contract prices, and can provide guidance for market operation agencies to gradually release the plan of power generation and power utilization.

ACS Style

Yating Li; Chuan He; Xinyi Liu; Jiajun Tang; Zhi Zhang; Jing Li; Kai Wang; Weishi Zhang; Hailong Jiang; Li Yang; Zhenzhi Lin. Optimal strategy for energy allocation and bidding decision of generators considering generation adequacy. Energy Reports 2021, 1 .

AMA Style

Yating Li, Chuan He, Xinyi Liu, Jiajun Tang, Zhi Zhang, Jing Li, Kai Wang, Weishi Zhang, Hailong Jiang, Li Yang, Zhenzhi Lin. Optimal strategy for energy allocation and bidding decision of generators considering generation adequacy. Energy Reports. 2021; ():1.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Yating Li; Chuan He; Xinyi Liu; Jiajun Tang; Zhi Zhang; Jing Li; Kai Wang; Weishi Zhang; Hailong Jiang; Li Yang; Zhenzhi Lin. 2021. "Optimal strategy for energy allocation and bidding decision of generators considering generation adequacy." Energy Reports , no. : 1.

Short communication
Published: 13 April 2021 in Energy Reports
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The orderly release of electricity plan is an important measure for China’s electricity market reform which also lead to excessive pressure for coal power units caused by the low planned electricity quantity. Allowing high-priced units to participate in the market can effectively alleviate the market pressure. However, the participation of high-priced units in electricity market will have an impact on the declaration behavior of other generators. In this context, an evolutionary game model of bidding for two groups of generators considering the market liberalizing degree (MLD) is proposed. Above all, the profit model of two kinds of generators is proposed under two bidding strategies considering the MLD. On this basis, an evolutionary game model of generators’ bidding is built to qualitatively analyze the market equilibrium solution which is affected by the MLD coefficient. Thus, the expected evolutionary stable equilibrium of bidding can be formed spontaneously in electricity market by adjusting the MLD coefficient. The case studies are performed for demonstrating the proposed evolutionary game model of generators’ bidding, and simulation results show that different MLD and the initial state of bidding behavior of generators will influence the final evolutionary stable equilibrium of bidding market, and it also shown that the government can make the electricity market develop towards​ the expected state by adjusting MLD and supervising the bidding behavior of generators.

ACS Style

Jiajun Tang; Xinyi Liu; Chuan He; Yating Li; Zhi Zhang; Jing Li; Zhemin Lin; Yongbo Li; Hanhan Qian; Zhenzhi Lin; Li Yang. Design of market liberalizing degree based on the evolutionary game bidding of generators. Energy Reports 2021, 7, 396 -402.

AMA Style

Jiajun Tang, Xinyi Liu, Chuan He, Yating Li, Zhi Zhang, Jing Li, Zhemin Lin, Yongbo Li, Hanhan Qian, Zhenzhi Lin, Li Yang. Design of market liberalizing degree based on the evolutionary game bidding of generators. Energy Reports. 2021; 7 ():396-402.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Jiajun Tang; Xinyi Liu; Chuan He; Yating Li; Zhi Zhang; Jing Li; Zhemin Lin; Yongbo Li; Hanhan Qian; Zhenzhi Lin; Li Yang. 2021. "Design of market liberalizing degree based on the evolutionary game bidding of generators." Energy Reports 7, no. : 396-402.

Short communication
Published: 13 April 2021 in Energy Reports
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More and more requirements for the operation of the rural power systems arised with the increase of type and capacity of the rural load in China. In fact, the economy, flexibility and stability of the rural power grid can be improved by an emergency demand response (EDR) mechanism, which can fast reduce distributed load considering consumers’ satisfaction. An EDR mechanism for the rural power grid is proposed considering the characteristics of small distributed load capacity in rural areas. The optimal demand response model of diversified loads is built to maximize the utility of rural private industry. A bi-level optimization model is presented to minimize the deviation between the power shortage and reduced demand, considering the active demand response of rural consumers. Case studies are finally employed to demonstrate the effectiveness of the EDR mechanism for enhancing the security of the rural power system.

ACS Style

Yunchu Wang; Jianfeng Jin; Haifeng Liu; Zhi Zhang; Shengyuan Liu; Jien Ma; Chao Gong; Yufeng Zheng; Zhenzhi Lin; Li Yang. The optimal emergency demand response (EDR) mechanism for rural power grid considering consumers’ satisfaction. Energy Reports 2021, 7, 118 -125.

AMA Style

Yunchu Wang, Jianfeng Jin, Haifeng Liu, Zhi Zhang, Shengyuan Liu, Jien Ma, Chao Gong, Yufeng Zheng, Zhenzhi Lin, Li Yang. The optimal emergency demand response (EDR) mechanism for rural power grid considering consumers’ satisfaction. Energy Reports. 2021; 7 ():118-125.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Yunchu Wang; Jianfeng Jin; Haifeng Liu; Zhi Zhang; Shengyuan Liu; Jien Ma; Chao Gong; Yufeng Zheng; Zhenzhi Lin; Li Yang. 2021. "The optimal emergency demand response (EDR) mechanism for rural power grid considering consumers’ satisfaction." Energy Reports 7, no. : 118-125.

Journal article
Published: 18 September 2020 in Energies
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The uncertainty of generation and load increases in the transmission network in the power market. Considering the transmission congestion risk caused by various uncertainties of the transmission network, the optimal operation strategies of the transmission network under various operational scenarios are decided, aiming for the maximum of social benefit for the evaluation of the degree of scenario congestion. Then, a screening method for major congestion scenario is proposed based on the shadow price theory. With the goal of maximizing the difference between the social benefits and the investment and maintenance costs of transmission lines under major congestion scenarios, a multi-stage transmission network planning model based on major congestion scenarios is proposed to determine the configuration of transmission lines in each planning stage. In this paper, the multi-stage transmission network planning is a mixed integer linear programming problem. The DC power flow model and the commercial optimization software CPLEX are applied to solve the problem to obtain the planning scheme. The improved six-node Garver power system and the simplified 25-node power system of Zhejiang Province, China are used to verify the effectiveness of the proposed multi-stage planning model.

ACS Style

Yixin Huang; Xinyi Liu; Zhi Zhang; Li Yang; Zhenzhi Lin; Yangqing Dan; Ke Sun; Zhou Lan; Keping Zhu. Multi-Stage Transmission Network Planning Considering Transmission Congestion in the Power Market. Energies 2020, 13, 4910 .

AMA Style

Yixin Huang, Xinyi Liu, Zhi Zhang, Li Yang, Zhenzhi Lin, Yangqing Dan, Ke Sun, Zhou Lan, Keping Zhu. Multi-Stage Transmission Network Planning Considering Transmission Congestion in the Power Market. Energies. 2020; 13 (18):4910.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Yixin Huang; Xinyi Liu; Zhi Zhang; Li Yang; Zhenzhi Lin; Yangqing Dan; Ke Sun; Zhou Lan; Keping Zhu. 2020. "Multi-Stage Transmission Network Planning Considering Transmission Congestion in the Power Market." Energies 13, no. 18: 4910.

Journal article
Published: 25 November 2019 in IEEE Transactions on Power Systems
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An energy deviation settlement (EDS) mechanism has been proposed to settle the deviation between consumption and energy contracts in China's forward electricity market. Due to high EDS costs of electricity retailers, a deviation mutual insurance (DMI) mechanism is put forward, representing an option for electricity retailers to reduce the deviation through contract transfer. Given this background, an optimal alliance strategy is proposed to maximize the combined utility of different types of individual electricity retailers. The alliance income model considers the EDS cost reduction and the cooperation cost analyzed based on transaction cost theory (TCT). An improved income allocation method, which considers distribution indexes selected by game theory and resource dependence theory (RDT), is proposed to ensure the comprehensive and reasonable allocation of alliance income. Considering the expected income and financial risk, an evaluation model using conditional value at risk (CVaR) as the financial risk assessment indicator is presented to measure the stability of alliances. Simulations based on data from a provincial electricity market in China illustrate that the EDS costs of retailers can be reduced by selecting appropriate partners for alliance. In addition, the proposed alliance income allocation method is more reasonable and more targeted than the cooperative game-based methods.

ACS Style

Zhi Zhang; Yicheng Jiang; Zhenzhi Lin; Fushuan Wen; Yi Ding; Li Yang; Zhemin Lin; Yongbo Li; Hanhan Qian; Jing Li; Chuan He. Optimal Alliance Strategies Among Retailers Under Energy Deviation Settlement Mechanism in China's Forward Electricity Market. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 2019, 35, 2059 -2071.

AMA Style

Zhi Zhang, Yicheng Jiang, Zhenzhi Lin, Fushuan Wen, Yi Ding, Li Yang, Zhemin Lin, Yongbo Li, Hanhan Qian, Jing Li, Chuan He. Optimal Alliance Strategies Among Retailers Under Energy Deviation Settlement Mechanism in China's Forward Electricity Market. IEEE Transactions on Power Systems. 2019; 35 (3):2059-2071.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Zhi Zhang; Yicheng Jiang; Zhenzhi Lin; Fushuan Wen; Yi Ding; Li Yang; Zhemin Lin; Yongbo Li; Hanhan Qian; Jing Li; Chuan He. 2019. "Optimal Alliance Strategies Among Retailers Under Energy Deviation Settlement Mechanism in China's Forward Electricity Market." IEEE Transactions on Power Systems 35, no. 3: 2059-2071.

Journal article
Published: 28 August 2019 in Energies
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The urban utility tunnel presents solutions for the sustainable development of urban underground space, and is an important carrier of power distribution network and integrated energy systems. Considering the high investment cost of utility tunnels and the limitations of traditional cost sharing methods (i.e., spatial proportional method, direct-laying cost method and benefit-based proportional method), it is of great significance to establish a fair and practical cost sharing mechanism. First, an improved Shapley value-based spatial proportional method is proposed. A comprehensive decision-making mechanism for utility tunnel construction cost allocation is established by using the improved spatial proportion, the life-cycle direct-laying cost proportion, and the benefit proportion of pipeline companies as the cost allocation indexes. The resource dependence theory is introduced to quantify the bargaining power of each pipeline company in the negotiation of the cost allocation. The weights of the cost allocation indexes in the comprehensive decision-making model are optimized with the objective of maximizing the overall satisfaction of the pipeline companies. Simulations based on the data of utility tunnel pilots in China illustrate that the proposed cost allocation mechanism has the highest overall satisfaction and is more acceptable and more feasible than the traditional cost allocation methods. For power companies, the cost of laying power cables can be significantly reduced by utility tunnels, and laying 10 kV power cables has been shown to have higher economic benefits.

ACS Style

Zhi Zhang; Jiaorong Ren; Kaichao Xiao; Zhenzhi Lin; Jiayu Xu; Wei Wang; Chuanxun Pei. Cost Allocation Mechanism Design for Urban Utility Tunnel Construction Based on Cooperative Game and Resource Dependence Theory. Energies 2019, 12, 3309 .

AMA Style

Zhi Zhang, Jiaorong Ren, Kaichao Xiao, Zhenzhi Lin, Jiayu Xu, Wei Wang, Chuanxun Pei. Cost Allocation Mechanism Design for Urban Utility Tunnel Construction Based on Cooperative Game and Resource Dependence Theory. Energies. 2019; 12 (17):3309.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Zhi Zhang; Jiaorong Ren; Kaichao Xiao; Zhenzhi Lin; Jiayu Xu; Wei Wang; Chuanxun Pei. 2019. "Cost Allocation Mechanism Design for Urban Utility Tunnel Construction Based on Cooperative Game and Resource Dependence Theory." Energies 12, no. 17: 3309.