Pierre von Mouche

Dr. Pierre von Mouche


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

17Years (2010-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
1 January 2020 in Games
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
AHAchim Hagen
Achim Hagen
PMPierre von Mouche
Pierre von Mouche
HWHans-Peter Weikard
Hans-Peter Weikard
Coalition formation is often analysed in an almost non-cooperative way, as a two-stage game that consists of a first stage comprising membership actions and a second stage with physical actions, such as the provision of a public good. We formalised this widely used approach for the case where actions are simultaneous in each stage. Herein, we give special attention to the case of a symmetric physical game. Various theoretical results, in particular, for cartel games, are provided. As they are crucial, recent results on the uniqueness of coalitional equilibria of Cournot-like physical games are reconsidered. Various concrete examples are included. Finally, we discuss research strategies to obtain results about equilibrium coalition structures with abstract physical games in terms of qualitative properties of their primitives.

9 April 2010 in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
RHRein Haagsma
Rein Haagsma
PMPierre von Mouche
Pierre von Mouche
We analyze a game in strategic form, where each player's payoff depends on his action and his social status, which is given by his rank in the actions distribution. Our focus is on the relation between the degree of heterogeneity among status-seeking players and the distribution of their Nash equilibrium actions. We find that if among players intrinsic concerns are sufficiently important relative to status concerns, individual equilibrium actions diverge, but if status concerns are relatively important, individual equilibrium actions are the same. Another key result of the analysis is that, in contrast to what is usually claimed, status seeking need not always be socially inefficient. If players are sufficiently heterogeneous, there exists a Nash equilibrium that is unique, separating, and Pareto efficient.


13 March 2023 in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
PMPierre von Mouche
Pierre von Mouche
FSFerenc Szidarovszky
Ferenc Szidarovszky
We enrich the theory of variational inequalities in the case of an aggregative structure by implementing recent results obtained by using the Selten–Szidarovszky technique. We derive existence, semi-uniqueness and uniqueness results for solutions and provide a computational method. As an application we derive very powerful practical equilibrium results for Nash equilibria of sum-aggregative games and illustrate with Cournot oligopolies.

30 July 2011
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
WHWilhelmus Johannes Maria Heijman
Wilhelmus Johannes Maria Heijman
PMPierre von Mouche
Pierre von Mouche

20 July 2021 in Optimization Letters
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
JIJun-Ichi Itaya
Jun-Ichi Itaya
PMPierre von Mouche
Pierre von Mouche
Various Nash equilibrium results for a broad class of aggregative games are presented. The main ones concern equilibrium uniqueness. The setting presupposes that each player has $$\mathbb {R}_+$$ R + as strategy set, makes smoothness assumptions but allows for a discontinuity of stand-alone payoff functions at 0; this possibility is especially important for various contest and oligopolistic games. Conditions are completely in terms of marginal reductions which may be considered as primitives of the game. For many games in the literature they can easily be checked. They automatically imply that conditional payoff functions are strictly quasi-concave. The results are proved by means of the Szidarovszky variant of the Selten–Szidarovszky technique. Their power is illustrated by reproducing quickly and improving upon various results for economic games.