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Johannes PerssoniD
Lund University

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Article
Published: 16 August 2021
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With a few exceptions extreme weather event attribution is recognised as necessarily oriented towards tracing the history of present (or past) extreme events. However, it must be noted that the usefulness of a true causal claim linking climate change to its specific, local impacts may not be exhausted by its being an answer to a pre-specified scientific question about event attribution. This is because there is an important difference between problem-solving and solution-use. And solution-use can neither be controlled by the problem-solving science nor by its taskmasters. The users can have other questions than the problem-solvers. This commentary defends detection and attribution science's importance for individuals' adaptation decisions.

ACS Style

Johannes PerssoniD. Detection and attribution science facing the future: the importance of not confusing problem-solving and solution-use. 2021, 1 .

AMA Style

Johannes PerssoniD. Detection and attribution science facing the future: the importance of not confusing problem-solving and solution-use. . 2021; ():1.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Johannes PerssoniD. 2021. "Detection and attribution science facing the future: the importance of not confusing problem-solving and solution-use." , no. : 1.

Health care
Published: 02 June 2021 in PLOS ONE
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Clinical expertise has since 1891 a Swedish counterpart in proven experience. This study aims to increase our understanding of clinicians’ views of their professional expertise, both as a source or body of knowledge and as a skill or quality. We examine how Swedish healthcare personnel view their expertise as captured by the (legally and culturally relevant) Swedish concept of “proven experience,” through a survey administered to a simple random sample of Swedish physicians and nurses (2018, n = 560). This study is the first empirical attempt to analyse the notion of proven experience as it is understood by Swedish physicians and nurses. Using statistical techniques for data dimensionality reduction (confirmatory factor analysis and multidimensional scaling), the study provides evidence that the proven experience concept is multidimensional and that a model consisting of three dimensions–for brevity referred to as “test/evidence”, “practice”, and “being an experienced/competent person”–describes the survey responses well. In addition, our results cannot corroborate the widely held assumption in evidence-based medicine that an important component of clinical expertise consists of experience of patients’ preferences.

ACS Style

Barry Dewitt; Johannes Persson; Lena Wahlberg; Annika Wallin. The epistemic roles of clinical expertise: An empirical study of how Swedish healthcare professionals understand proven experience. PLOS ONE 2021, 16, e0252160 .

AMA Style

Barry Dewitt, Johannes Persson, Lena Wahlberg, Annika Wallin. The epistemic roles of clinical expertise: An empirical study of how Swedish healthcare professionals understand proven experience. PLOS ONE. 2021; 16 (6):e0252160.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Barry Dewitt; Johannes Persson; Lena Wahlberg; Annika Wallin. 2021. "The epistemic roles of clinical expertise: An empirical study of how Swedish healthcare professionals understand proven experience." PLOS ONE 16, no. 6: e0252160.

Journal article
Published: 01 March 2021 in Land
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Why do citizens’ decisions made because they favour the mitigation of climate change outnumber those made because they favour adaptation to its impacts? Using data collected in a survey of 338 citizens of Malmö, Sweden, we tested two hypotheses. H1: the motivation for personal decisions because they favour adaptation to the impacts of climate change correlates with the decision-making agent´s knowledge of specific local impacts of climate change, and H2: the motivation for personal decisions because they favour mitigation of climate change correlates with the risk perception of the decision-making agent. While decisions made because they favour mitigation correlated with negative net values of expected impacts of climate change (risk perception), decisions made because they favour adaptation correlated with its absolute value unless tipping point behaviour occurred. Tipping point behaviour occurs here when the decision-making agent abstains from decisions in response to climate change in spite of a strongly negative or positive net value of expected impacts. Hence, the decision-making agents´ lack of knowledge of specific climate change impacts inhibited decisions promoting adaptation. Moreover, positive experiences of climate change inhibited mitigation decisions. Discussing the results, we emphasised the importance of understanding the drivers of adaptation and mitigation decisions. In particular, we stress that attention needs to be paid to the balance between decisions solving problems ‘here and now’ and those focusing on the ‘there and then’.

ACS Style

Kristina Blennow; Johannes Persson. To Mitigate or Adapt? Explaining Why Citizens Responding to Climate Change Favour the Former. Land 2021, 10, 240 .

AMA Style

Kristina Blennow, Johannes Persson. To Mitigate or Adapt? Explaining Why Citizens Responding to Climate Change Favour the Former. Land. 2021; 10 (3):240.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Kristina Blennow; Johannes Persson. 2021. "To Mitigate or Adapt? Explaining Why Citizens Responding to Climate Change Favour the Former." Land 10, no. 3: 240.

Journal article
Published: 01 November 2020 in Environmental Research Letters
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K Blennow; J Persson; L M S Gonçalves; A Borys; I Dutcă; J Hynynen; E Janeczko; M Lyubenova; J Merganič; K Merganičová; M Peltoniemi; M Petr; F Reboredo; G Vacchiano; C P O Reyer. The role of beliefs, expectations and values in decision-making favoring climate change adaptation—implications for communications with European forest professionals. Environmental Research Letters 2020, 15, 114061 .

AMA Style

K Blennow, J Persson, L M S Gonçalves, A Borys, I Dutcă, J Hynynen, E Janeczko, M Lyubenova, J Merganič, K Merganičová, M Peltoniemi, M Petr, F Reboredo, G Vacchiano, C P O Reyer. The role of beliefs, expectations and values in decision-making favoring climate change adaptation—implications for communications with European forest professionals. Environmental Research Letters. 2020; 15 (11):114061.

Chicago/Turabian Style

K Blennow; J Persson; L M S Gonçalves; A Borys; I Dutcă; J Hynynen; E Janeczko; M Lyubenova; J Merganič; K Merganičová; M Peltoniemi; M Petr; F Reboredo; G Vacchiano; C P O Reyer. 2020. "The role of beliefs, expectations and values in decision-making favoring climate change adaptation—implications for communications with European forest professionals." Environmental Research Letters 15, no. 11: 114061.

Journal article
Published: 27 March 2020 in Sustainability
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The role of values in climate-related decision-making is a prominent theme of climate communication research. The present study examines whether forest professionals are more driven by values than scientists are, and if this results in value polarization. A questionnaire was designed to elicit and assess the values assigned to expected effects of climate change by forest professionals and scientists working on forests and climate change in Europe. The countries involved covered a north-to-south and west-to-east gradient across Europe, representing a wide range of bio-climatic conditions and a mix of economic–social–political structures. We show that European forest professionals and scientists do not exhibit polarized expectations about the values of specific impacts of climate change on forests in their countries. In fact, few differences between forest professionals and scientists were found. However, there are interesting differences in the expected values of forest professionals with regard to climate change impacts across European countries. In Northern European countries, the aggregated values of the expected effects are more neutral than they are in Southern Europe, where they are more negative. Expectations about impacts on timber production, economic returns, and regulatory ecosystem services are mostly negative, while expectations about biodiversity and energy production are mostly positive.

ACS Style

Johannes Persson; Kristina Blennow; Luísa Gonçalves; Alexander Borys; Ioan Dutcă; Jari Hynynen; Emilia Janeczko; Mariyana Lyubenova; Simon Martel; Jan Merganic; Katarína Merganičová; Mikko Peltoniemi; Michal Petr; Fernando H. Reboredo; Giorgio Vacchiano; Christopher P.O. Reyer. No polarization–Expected Values of Climate Change Impacts among European Forest Professionals and Scientists. Sustainability 2020, 12, 2659 .

AMA Style

Johannes Persson, Kristina Blennow, Luísa Gonçalves, Alexander Borys, Ioan Dutcă, Jari Hynynen, Emilia Janeczko, Mariyana Lyubenova, Simon Martel, Jan Merganic, Katarína Merganičová, Mikko Peltoniemi, Michal Petr, Fernando H. Reboredo, Giorgio Vacchiano, Christopher P.O. Reyer. No polarization–Expected Values of Climate Change Impacts among European Forest Professionals and Scientists. Sustainability. 2020; 12 (7):2659.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Johannes Persson; Kristina Blennow; Luísa Gonçalves; Alexander Borys; Ioan Dutcă; Jari Hynynen; Emilia Janeczko; Mariyana Lyubenova; Simon Martel; Jan Merganic; Katarína Merganičová; Mikko Peltoniemi; Michal Petr; Fernando H. Reboredo; Giorgio Vacchiano; Christopher P.O. Reyer. 2020. "No polarization–Expected Values of Climate Change Impacts among European Forest Professionals and Scientists." Sustainability 12, no. 7: 2659.

Journal article
Published: 24 January 2018 in Metaphysica
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The paper is concerned with the existence of objective uncertainties. What would it take for objective uncertainties to exist, and what would be the consequences for our understanding of the world we live in? We approach these questions by considering two common theories on how we are to understand the being of propensities and how it pertains to possible outcomes that remain unmanifested. It is argued that both or these theories should be rejected, and be replaced with a theory we call unrestricted actualism according to which the possible outcomes of propensities (whether realized or unrealized) are denizens of the actual world.

ACS Style

Robin Stenwall; Johannes Persson; Nils-Eric Sahlin. A New Challenge for Objective Uncertainties and The Propensity Theorist. Metaphysica 2018, 19, 219 -224.

AMA Style

Robin Stenwall, Johannes Persson, Nils-Eric Sahlin. A New Challenge for Objective Uncertainties and The Propensity Theorist. Metaphysica. 2018; 19 (2):219-224.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Robin Stenwall; Johannes Persson; Nils-Eric Sahlin. 2018. "A New Challenge for Objective Uncertainties and The Propensity Theorist." Metaphysica 19, no. 2: 219-224.

Journal article
Published: 01 January 2018 in Ecology and Society
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Persson, J., H. Thorén, and L. Olsson. 2018. The interdisciplinary decision problem: Popperian optimism and Kuhnian pessimism in forestry. Ecology and Society 23(3):40. https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-10401-230340

ACS Style

Johannes Persson; Henrik Thorén; Lennart Olsson. The interdisciplinary decision problem: Popperian optimism and Kuhnian pessimism in forestry. Ecology and Society 2018, 23, 1 .

AMA Style

Johannes Persson, Henrik Thorén, Lennart Olsson. The interdisciplinary decision problem: Popperian optimism and Kuhnian pessimism in forestry. Ecology and Society. 2018; 23 (3):1.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Johannes Persson; Henrik Thorén; Lennart Olsson. 2018. "The interdisciplinary decision problem: Popperian optimism and Kuhnian pessimism in forestry." Ecology and Society 23, no. 3: 1.

Journal article
Published: 01 January 2018 in Ecology and Society
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Persson, J., A. Hornborg, L. Olsson, and H. Thorén. 2018. Toward an alternative dialogue between the social and natural sciences. Ecology and Society 23(4):14. https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-10498-230414

ACS Style

Johannes Persson; Alf Hornborg; Lennart Olsson; Henrik Thorén. Toward an alternative dialogue between the social and natural sciences. Ecology and Society 2018, 23, 1 .

AMA Style

Johannes Persson, Alf Hornborg, Lennart Olsson, Henrik Thorén. Toward an alternative dialogue between the social and natural sciences. Ecology and Society. 2018; 23 (4):1.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Johannes Persson; Alf Hornborg; Lennart Olsson; Henrik Thorén. 2018. "Toward an alternative dialogue between the social and natural sciences." Ecology and Society 23, no. 4: 1.

Journal article
Published: 01 January 2018 in Ecology and Society
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Persson, J., E. L. Johansson, and L. Olsson. 2018. Harnessing local knowledge for scientific knowledge production: challenges and pitfalls within evidence-based sustainability studies. Ecology and Society 23(4):38. https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-10608-230438

ACS Style

Johannes Persson; Emma L. Johansson; Lennart Olsson. Harnessing local knowledge for scientific knowledge production: challenges and pitfalls within evidence-based sustainability studies. Ecology and Society 2018, 23, 1 .

AMA Style

Johannes Persson, Emma L. Johansson, Lennart Olsson. Harnessing local knowledge for scientific knowledge production: challenges and pitfalls within evidence-based sustainability studies. Ecology and Society. 2018; 23 (4):1.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Johannes Persson; Emma L. Johansson; Lennart Olsson. 2018. "Harnessing local knowledge for scientific knowledge production: challenges and pitfalls within evidence-based sustainability studies." Ecology and Society 23, no. 4: 1.

Original articles
Published: 06 December 2017 in Journal of Risk Research
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A key question for evidence-based medicine (EBM) is how best to model the way in which EBM should ‘[integrate] individual clinical expertise and the best external evidence’. We argue that the formulations and models available in the literature today are modest variations on a common theme and face very similar problems when it comes to risk analysis, which is here understood as a decision procedure comprising a factual assessment of risk, the risk assessment, and the decision what to do based on this assessment, the risk management. Both the early and updated models of evidence-based clinical decisions presented in the writings of Haynes, Devereaux and Guyatt assume that EBM consists of, among other things, evidence from clinical research together with information about patients’ values and clinical expertise. On this A-view, EBM describes all that goes on in a specific justifiable medical decision. There is, however, an alternative interpretation of EBM, the B-view, in which EBM describes just one component of the decision situation (a component usually based on evidence from clinical research) and in which, together with other types of evidence, EBM leads to a justifiable clincial decision but does not describe the decision itself. This B-view is inspired by a 100-years older version of EBM, a Swedish standard requiring medical decision-making, professional risk-taking and practice to be in accordance with ‘science and proven experience’ (VBE). In the paper, we outline how the Swedish concept leads to an improved understanding of the way in which scientific evidence and clinical experience can and cannot be integrated in light of EBM. How scientific evidence and clinical experience is integrated influences both the way we do risk assessment and risk management. In addition, the paper sketches the as yet unexplored historical background to VBE and EBM.

ACS Style

Johannes Persson; Niklas Vareman; Annika Wallin; Lena Wahlberg; Nils-Eric Sahlin. Science and proven experience: a Swedish variety of evidence-based medicine and a way to better risk analysis? Journal of Risk Research 2017, 22, 833 -843.

AMA Style

Johannes Persson, Niklas Vareman, Annika Wallin, Lena Wahlberg, Nils-Eric Sahlin. Science and proven experience: a Swedish variety of evidence-based medicine and a way to better risk analysis? Journal of Risk Research. 2017; 22 (7):833-843.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Johannes Persson; Niklas Vareman; Annika Wallin; Lena Wahlberg; Nils-Eric Sahlin. 2017. "Science and proven experience: a Swedish variety of evidence-based medicine and a way to better risk analysis?" Journal of Risk Research 22, no. 7: 833-843.

Research article
Published: 10 November 2017 in European Journal of Health Law
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In Swedish law, the notion of ‘science and proven experience’ (in Swedish, vetenskap och beprövad erfarenhet) defines the gold standard for public decision-making and practice, especially in medicine. The notion is notoriously vague but nevertheless plays an important role in the distribution of rights and duties of patients and healthcare workers. For example, failure to provide care in accordance with this standard can lead to penal responsibility. The notion also helps to define Swedish patients’ right to reimbursement for cross-border healthcare. From a legal point of view, the notion is especially intriguing because it appears to import medical standards into the legal conceptual apparatus. The purpose of this article is to explore the mechanisms of this and kindred ‘importing notions’ by investigating the role that the notion of science and proven experience plays in Swedish law and in the transfer of information between the legal and medical fields.

ACS Style

Lena Wahlberg; Johannes Persson. Importing Notions in Health Law: Science and Proven Experience. European Journal of Health Law 2017, 24, 565 -590.

AMA Style

Lena Wahlberg, Johannes Persson. Importing Notions in Health Law: Science and Proven Experience. European Journal of Health Law. 2017; 24 (5):565-590.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Lena Wahlberg; Johannes Persson. 2017. "Importing Notions in Health Law: Science and Proven Experience." European Journal of Health Law 24, no. 5: 565-590.

Articles
Published: 20 September 2017 in Journal of Risk Research
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In medical research, it is not unusual that risks are ruled out without any specification the exact risk that was ruled out. This makes it difficult to balance expected health benefits and risk of harm when choosing between alternative treatment options. International guidelines for reporting medical research results are sufficiently specific when it comes to establishing health benefits. However, there is a lack of standards for reporting on ruling out risks. We argue that transparency is needed, as in the case of non-inferiority trials. The Consolidated Standards of Reporting Trials and the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses statements should be revised accordingly.

ACS Style

Sten Anttila; Johannes Persson; Måns Rosén; Niklas Vareman; Sigurd Vitols; Nils-Eric Sahlin. Ruling out risks in medical research. Journal of Risk Research 2017, 22, 796 -802.

AMA Style

Sten Anttila, Johannes Persson, Måns Rosén, Niklas Vareman, Sigurd Vitols, Nils-Eric Sahlin. Ruling out risks in medical research. Journal of Risk Research. 2017; 22 (6):796-802.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Sten Anttila; Johannes Persson; Måns Rosén; Niklas Vareman; Sigurd Vitols; Nils-Eric Sahlin. 2017. "Ruling out risks in medical research." Journal of Risk Research 22, no. 6: 796-802.

Journal article
Published: 05 April 2016 in Journal of Clinical Epidemiology
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ObjectiveThe objective of our article is to show how “quality of evidence” and “imprecision”, as they are defined in GRADE articles, may lead to confusion. We focus only on the context of systematic reviews.Study Design and SettingWe analyse, with the aid of standard probabilistic and statistical concepts, the concepts of quality of evidence and imprecision as used in the GRADE framework. This enables us to point out some weaknesses in the relation between “quality of evidence” and “imprecision”.ResultsThe GRADE framework contains terms familiar from classical statistics, but these terms are used in non-standard ways. Notably, “imprecision” does not have the meaning in the GRADE framework that it has in statistics and the well-known table of “evidence levels” wrongly suggests that “quality of evidence” and “accuracy” express the same concept – they do not.ConclusionWe believe that “conclusiveness” rather than “imprecision” would be a suitable term to use when the question whether the CI excludes or includes certain critical margins is being addressed. Conclusiveness could also replace quality of evidence as the final step for a systematic reviewer.

ACS Style

Sten Anttila; Johannes Persson; Niklas Vareman; Nils-Eric Sahlin. Conclusiveness resolves the conflict between quality of evidence and imprecision in GRADE. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology 2016, 75, 1 -5.

AMA Style

Sten Anttila, Johannes Persson, Niklas Vareman, Nils-Eric Sahlin. Conclusiveness resolves the conflict between quality of evidence and imprecision in GRADE. Journal of Clinical Epidemiology. 2016; 75 ():1-5.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Sten Anttila; Johannes Persson; Niklas Vareman; Nils-Eric Sahlin. 2016. "Conclusiveness resolves the conflict between quality of evidence and imprecision in GRADE." Journal of Clinical Epidemiology 75, no. : 1-5.

Journal article
Published: 01 December 2015 in Lakartidningen
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ACS Style

Johannes Persson; Lena Wahlberg. Vår erfarenhet av beprövad erfarenhet - Några begreppsprofiler och ett verktyg för precisering. Lakartidningen 2015, 112, 1 .

AMA Style

Johannes Persson, Lena Wahlberg. Vår erfarenhet av beprövad erfarenhet - Några begreppsprofiler och ett verktyg för precisering. Lakartidningen. 2015; 112 ():1.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Johannes Persson; Lena Wahlberg. 2015. "Vår erfarenhet av beprövad erfarenhet - Några begreppsprofiler och ett verktyg för precisering." Lakartidningen 112, no. : 1.

Articles
Published: 01 April 2015 in Sustainability: Science, Practice and Policy
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The notion of resilience has become widely diffused in sustainability research over the past two decades. This process has not unfolded without contention and critique of the concept has often focused on its content. In this article, we discuss how concepts, including resilience, come to be defined in scientific terms. We distinguish between ostensively defined concepts that point to some phenomena and stipulatively defined concepts where the content is given in the definition itself. We argue that although definitions are remarkably similar across many disciplines where resilience is used—most notably psychology and ecology—they may nonetheless differ in whether they are to be taken as stipulative or ostensive. This situation has interesting consequences for the ways in which different disciplines can be connected and integrated. It is notable that integration on the basis of ostensive definition turns on sharing the extension (the phenomena itself) of the concept, but not necessarily the intension (the definition), whereas integration on the basis of stipulatively defined concepts works in the opposite way.

ACS Style

Henrik Thorén; Johannes Persson. Resilience: some philosophical remarks on ostensively and stipulatively defined concepts. Sustainability: Science, Practice and Policy 2015, 11, 64 -74.

AMA Style

Henrik Thorén, Johannes Persson. Resilience: some philosophical remarks on ostensively and stipulatively defined concepts. Sustainability: Science, Practice and Policy. 2015; 11 (1):64-74.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Henrik Thorén; Johannes Persson. 2015. "Resilience: some philosophical remarks on ostensively and stipulatively defined concepts." Sustainability: Science, Practice and Policy 11, no. 1: 64-74.

Book chapter
Published: 14 August 2014 in Mind, Values, and Metaphysics
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This chapter discusses the concept of explanation in metaphysics. Scientific explanation is compared with (alleged) metaphysical explanation. The comparison illustrates the difficulties with applying the concept of explanation in metaphysics.

ACS Style

Ingar Brinck; Göran Hermerén; Johannes Persson; Nils-Eric Sahlin. Why Metaphysicians Do Not Explain. Mind, Values, and Metaphysics 2014, 257 -266.

AMA Style

Ingar Brinck, Göran Hermerén, Johannes Persson, Nils-Eric Sahlin. Why Metaphysicians Do Not Explain. Mind, Values, and Metaphysics. 2014; ():257-266.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Ingar Brinck; Göran Hermerén; Johannes Persson; Nils-Eric Sahlin. 2014. "Why Metaphysicians Do Not Explain." Mind, Values, and Metaphysics , no. : 257-266.

Journal article
Published: 17 November 2013 in Journal for General Philosophy of Science
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Traditionally, interdisciplinarity has been taken to require conceptual or theoretical integration. However, in the emerging field of sustainability science this kind of integration is often lacking. Indeed sometimes it is regarded as an obstacle to interdisciplinarity. Drawing on examples from sustainability science, we show that problem-feeding, i.e. the transfer of problems, is a common and fruitful-looking way of connecting disparate disciplines and establishing interdisciplinarity. We identify two species of problem-feeding: unilateral and bilateral. Which of these is at issue depends on whether solutions to the problem are fed back to the discipline in which the problem originated. We suggest that there is an interesting difference between the problem-feeding approach to interdisciplinarity and the traditional integrative perspective suggested by among others Erich Jantsch and his colleagues. The interdisciplinarity resulting from problem-feeding between researchers can be local and temporary and does not require collaboration between proximate disciplines. By contrast, to make good sense of traditional integrative interdisciplinarity we must arguably associate it with a longer-term, global form of close, interdisciplinary collaboration.

ACS Style

Henrik Thorén; Johannes Persson. The Philosophy of Interdisciplinarity: Sustainability Science and Problem-Feeding. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 2013, 44, 337 -355.

AMA Style

Henrik Thorén, Johannes Persson. The Philosophy of Interdisciplinarity: Sustainability Science and Problem-Feeding. Journal for General Philosophy of Science. 2013; 44 (2):337-355.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Henrik Thorén; Johannes Persson. 2013. "The Philosophy of Interdisciplinarity: Sustainability Science and Problem-Feeding." Journal for General Philosophy of Science 44, no. 2: 337-355.

Book chapter
Published: 26 September 2011 in EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009
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Philosophers of science have often favoured reductive approaches to how-possibly explanation. This chapter identifies three varieties of how-possibly explanation and, in so doing, helps to show that this form of explanation is a rich and interesting phenomenon in its own right. The first variety approaches “How is it possible that X?” by showing that, despite appearances, X is not ruled out by what was believed prior to X. This can sometimes be achieved by removing misunderstandings about the implications of one’s belief system (prior to observing X), but more often than not it involves a modification of this belief system so that one’s acceptance of X does not generate a contradiction.

ACS Style

Johannes Persson. Three Conceptions of Explaining How Possibly—and One Reductive Account. EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009 2011, 275 -286.

AMA Style

Johannes Persson. Three Conceptions of Explaining How Possibly—and One Reductive Account. EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009. 2011; ():275-286.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Johannes Persson. 2011. "Three Conceptions of Explaining How Possibly—and One Reductive Account." EPSA Philosophy of Science: Amsterdam 2009 , no. : 275-286.

Journal article
Published: 08 September 2011 in Metaphysica
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Arguments from explanation, i.e. arguments in which the explanatory value of a hypothesis or premise is appealed to, are common in science, and explanatory considerations are becoming more popular in metaphysics. The paper begins by arguing that explanatory arguments in science—even when these are metaphysical explanations—may fail to be explanatory in metaphysics; there is a distinction to be drawn between metaphysical explanation and explanation in metaphysics. This makes it potentially problematic to deploy arguments from explanation in, for instance, metaphysics of science. Part of this problem has its source in that the explanatory concept differs between contexts. The paper discusses a few explanatory concepts and their corresponding arguments from explanation. Towards the end of the paper, I identify two allegedly explanatory arguments in metaphysical discourse by the concluding decisions they give rise to: the rejection of X as a metaphysical fact if X does not explain anything (the argument from explanatory inability) and the rejection of X as a metaphysical fact if X can be non-metaphysically explained (the argument from the non-metaphysically explained). I ask: What kind of concept of explanation do these arguments rely upon, and is that concept suited to the metaphysical task? Two recent examples of these arguments are used as illustration. The preliminary conclusion is that several of the strengths of arguments from explanation in science seem not to be present in metaphysical contexts.

ACS Style

Johannes Persson. Explanation in Metaphysics? Metaphysica 2011, 12, 165 -181.

AMA Style

Johannes Persson. Explanation in Metaphysics? Metaphysica. 2011; 12 (2):165-181.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Johannes Persson. 2011. "Explanation in Metaphysics?" Metaphysica 12, no. 2: 165-181.

Book chapter
Published: 01 January 2011 in Stem Cell Biology and Regenerative Medicine
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This paper focuses on the risk of unknown and uncertain long-term effects of stem cell research and its applications. Research on human embryonic stem cells and induced pluripotent stem cells are used as examples. We discuss some problems that such uncertain knowledge creates for decision makers, and describe how difficult decision making in this context really is. A method for handling this type of hard choice situations is presented and discussed.

ACS Style

Nils-Eric Sahlin; Johannes Persson; Niklas Vareman. Unruhe und Ungewissheit: Stem Cells and Risks. Stem Cell Biology and Regenerative Medicine 2011, 421 -429.

AMA Style

Nils-Eric Sahlin, Johannes Persson, Niklas Vareman. Unruhe und Ungewissheit: Stem Cells and Risks. Stem Cell Biology and Regenerative Medicine. 2011; ():421-429.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Nils-Eric Sahlin; Johannes Persson; Niklas Vareman. 2011. "Unruhe und Ungewissheit: Stem Cells and Risks." Stem Cell Biology and Regenerative Medicine , no. : 421-429.