With the development of artificial intelligence, deep-learning-based cryptanalysis has been actively studied. There are many cryptanalysis techniques. Among them, cryptanalysis was performed to recover the secret key used for cryptography encryption using known plaintext. In this paper, we propose a cryptanalysis method based on state-of-art deep learning technologies (e.g., residual connections and gated linear units) for lightweight block ciphers (e.g., S-DES, S-AES, and S-SPECK). The number of parameters required for training is significantly reduced by 93.16%, and the average of bit accuracy probability increased by about 5.3% compared with previous the-state-of-art work. In addition, cryptanalysis for S-AES and S-SPECK was possible with up to 12-bit and 6-bit keys, respectively. Through this experiment, we confirmed that the-state-of-art deep-learning-based key recovery techniques for modern cryptography algorithms with the full round and the full key are practically infeasible.
Distinguishing data that satisfy the differential characteristic from random data is called a distinguisher attack. At CRYPTO’19, Gohr presented the first deep-learning-based distinguisher for round-reduced SPECK. Building upon Gohr’s work, various works have been conducted. Among many other works, we propose the first neural distinguisher using single and multiple differences for format-preserving encryption (FPE) schemes FF1 and FF3. We harnessed the differential characteristics used in FF1 and FF3 classical distinguishers. They used SKINNY as the inner encryption algorithm for FF3. On the other hand, we employ the standard FF1 and FF3 implementations with AES encryption (which may be more robust). This work utilizes the differentials employed in FF1 and FF3 classical distinguishers. In short, when using a single 0x0F (resp. 0x08) differential, we achieve the highest accuracy of 0.85 (resp. 0.98) for FF1 (resp. FF3) in the 10-round (resp. 8-round) number domain. In the lowercase domain, due to an increased number of plaintext and ciphertext combinations, we can distinguish with the highest accuracy of 0.52 (resp. 0.55) for FF1 (resp. FF3) in a maximum of 2 rounds. Furthermore, we present an advanced neural distinguisher designed with multiple differentials for FF1 and FF3. With this sophisticated model, we still demonstrate valid accuracy in guessing the input difference used for encryption.
Advances in quantum computing pose a fundamental threat to classical public-key cryptosystems, including RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC), which form the foundation for authentication and key exchange in the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol. In response to these emerging threats, Korea launched the KpqC (Korea Post-Quantum Cryptography) project in 2021 to design, evaluate, and standardize domestic PQC algorithms. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first systematic evaluation of the finalized Korean PQC algorithms (HAETAE, AIMer, SMAUG-T, NTRU+) within a production-grade TLS/X.509 stack, enabling direct comparison against NIST PQC and ECC baselines. To contextualize KpqC performance, we further compare against NIST-standardized PQC algorithms and classical ECC baselines. Our evaluation examines both static overhead (certificate size) and dynamic overhead (TLS 1.3 handshake latency) across computation-bound (localhost) and network-bound (LAN) scenarios, including embedded device and hybrid TLS configurations. Our results show that KpqC certificates are approximately 4.6–48.8× larger than ECC counterparts and generally exceed NIST PQC sizes. In computation-bound tests, both NIST PQC (ML-KEM) and KpqC hybrids exhibited similar handshake latency increases of approximately 8–9× relative to ECC. In network-bound tests, the difference between the two families was negligible, with relative overhead typically around 30–41%. These findings offer practical guidance for balancing security level, key size, packet size, and latency and support phased PQC migration strategies in real-world TLS deployments.
In this paper, various types of quantum circuits for DES components are proposed to analyze the trade-offs in quantum resources for both DES and TDES block ciphers. Specifically, multiple optimized structures within the DES framework are devised, and by integrating different elements from each type, 34 possible configurations for the DES block cipher are generated. The required quantum resources for these configurations are then estimated, identifying not only qubit-optimized and depth-optimized circuits but also those achieving a balanced trade-off between qubit and circuit depth. Building on these optimized DES designs, TDES circuits are constructed, and the corresponding cost of a Grover-based attack on the TDES is estimated.