Kyung Bae Jang

Mr. Kyung Bae Jang

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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23 May 2021 in Applied Sciences
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Journal Article
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KJKyung Bae Jang
Kyung Bae Jang
GSGyeongJu Song
GyeongJu Song
KHkim hyunjun
kim hyunjun
HKHyeokDong Kwon
HyeokDong Kwon
HKHyunji Kim
Hyunji Kim
HSHwajeong Seo
Hwajeong Seo
Grover search algorithm is the most representative quantum attack method that threatens the security of symmetric key cryptography. If the Grover search algorithm is applied to symmetric key cryptography, the security level of target symmetric key cryptography can be lowered from n-bit to n2-bit. When applying Grover’s search algorithm to the block cipher that is the target of potential quantum attacks, the target block cipher must be implemented as quantum circuits. Starting with the AES block cipher, a number of works have been conducted to optimize and implement target block ciphers into quantum circuits. Recently, many studies have been published to implement lightweight block ciphers as quantum circuits. In this paper, we present optimal quantum circuit designs of symmetric key cryptography, including PRESENT and GIFT block ciphers. The proposed method optimized PRESENT and GIFT block ciphers by minimizing qubits, quantum gates, and circuit depth. We compare proposed PRESENT and GIFT quantum circuits with other results of lightweight block cipher implementations in quantum circuits. Finally, quantum resources of PRESENT and GIFT block ciphers required for the oracle of the Grover search algorithm were estimated.

14 September 2020 in Applied Sciences
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KJKyung Bae Jang
Kyung Bae Jang
SCSeungju Choi
Seungju Choi
HKHyeokDong Kwon
HyeokDong Kwon
HKHyunji Kim
Hyunji Kim
JPJaehoon Park
Jaehoon Park
HSHwajeong Seo
Hwajeong Seo
The Grover search algorithm reduces the security level of symmetric key cryptography with n-bit security level to O(2n/2). In order to evaluate the Grover search algorithm, the target block cipher should be efficiently implemented in quantum circuits. Recently, many research works evaluated required quantum resources of AES block ciphers by optimizing the expensive substitute layer. However, few works were devoted to the lightweight block ciphers, even though it is an active research area, nowadays. In this paper, we present optimized implementations of every Korean made lightweight block ciphers for quantum computers, which include HIGHT, CHAM, and LEA, and NSA made lightweight block ciphers, namely SPECK. Primitive operations for block ciphers, including addition, rotation, and exclusive-or, are finely optimized to achieve the optimal quantum circuit, in terms of qubits, Toffoli gate, CNOT gate, and X gate. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first implementation of ARX-based Korean lightweight block ciphers in quantum circuits.

8 April 2025 in IACR Communications in Cryptology
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Journal Article
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KJKyung Bae Jang
Kyung Bae Jang
ABAnubhab Baksi
Anubhab Baksi
HKHyunji Kim
Hyunji Kim
GSGyeongJu Song
GyeongJu Song
HSHwajeong Seo
Hwajeong Seo
ACAnupam Chattopadhyay
Anupam Chattopadhyay
Our work explores the key recovery attack using the Grover's search on the three variants of AES (-128, -192, -256). In total, we develop a pool of 26 implementations per AES variant (totaling 78), by taking the state-of-the-art advancements in the relevant fields into account. We present the least Toffoli depth and full depth implementations of AES, thereby improving from Zou et al.'s Asiacrypt'20 paper by more than 97 percent for each variant of AES. We show that the qubit count - Toffoli depth product is reduced from theirs by more than 87 percent. Furthermore, we analyze the Jaques et al.'s Eurocrypt'20 implementations in detail, fix the bugs (arising from some problem of the quantum computing tool used), and report corrected benchmarks (which seem to improve from the authors' own bug-fixing, thanks to our architecture consideration). To the best of our finding, our work improves from all the previous works (including the Asiacrypt'22 paper by Huang and Sun, the Asiacrypt'23 paper by Liu et al. and the Asiacrypt'24 paper by Shi and Feng) in terms of various quantum circuit complexity metrics. To be more precise, we estimate the currently best-known quantum attack complexities for AES-128 ( 2 156.2630 ), AES-192 ( 2 221.5801 ) and AES-256 ( 2 286.0731 ). Additionally, we achieve the least Toffoli depth - qubit count product for AES-128 ( 121920 , improving from 130720 by Shi and Feng in Asiacrypt'24), AES-192 ( 161664 , improving from 188880 by Liu et al. in Asiacrypt'23) and AES-256 ( 206528 , improving from 248024 by Liu et al. in Asiacrypt'23) so far. We further investigate the prospect of the Grover's search. We propose four new implementations of the S-box, one new implementation of the MixColumn; as well as five new architecture (one is motivated by the architecture by Jaques et al. in Eurocrypt'20, and the rest four are entirely our innovation). Under the MAXDEPTH constraint (specified by NIST), the circuit depth metrics (Toffoli depth, T -depth and full depth) become crucial factors and parallelization for often becomes necessary. We provide the least depth implementation in this respect that offers the best performance in terms of metrics like depth-squared - qubit count product, depth - gate count product.

23 August 2023 in Cryptography and Communications
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KJKyung Bae Jang
Kyung Bae Jang
ABAnubhab Baksi
Anubhab Baksi
JBJakub Breier
Jakub Breier
HSHwajeong Seo
Hwajeong Seo
ACAnupam Chattopadhyay
Anupam Chattopadhyay

7 March 2025 in IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
KJKyung Bae Jang
Kyung Bae Jang
SLSejin Lim
Sejin Lim
YOYujin Oh
Yujin Oh
HKHyunjun Kim
Hyunjun Kim
ABAnubhab Baksi
Anubhab Baksi
HSHwajeong Seo
Hwajeong Seo
Quantum computers have the potential to solve a number of hard problems that are believed to be almost impossible to solve by classical computers. This observation has sparked a surge of research to apply quantum algorithms against the cryptographic systems to evaluate its quantum resistance. In assessing the security strength of the cryptographic algorithms against the upcoming quantum threats, it is crucial to precisely estimate the quantum resource requirement (generally in terms of circuit depth and quantum bit count). The National Institute of Standards and Technology by the US government specified five quantum security levels so that the relative quantum strength of a given cipher can be compared to the standard ones. There have been some progress in the NIST-specified quantum security levels for the odd levels (i.e., 1, 3 and 5), following the work of Jaques et al. (Eurocrypt'20). However, levels 2 and 4, which correspond to the quantum collision finding attacks for the SHA-2 and SHA-3 hash functions, quantum attack complexities are arguably not well-studied. This is where our article fits in. In this article, we present novel techniques for optimizing the quantum circuit implementations for SHA-2 and SHA-3 algorithms in all the categories specified by NIST. After that, we evaluate the quantum circuits of target cryptographic hash functions for quantum collision search. Finally, we define the quantum attack complexity for levels 2 and 4, and comment on the security strength of the extended level. We present new concepts to optimize the quantum circuits at the component level and the architecture level.

17 May 2021 in Electronics
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Journal Article
Open access
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KJKyung Bae Jang
Kyung Bae Jang
GSGyeongJu Song
GyeongJu Song
HKHyeokDong Kwon
HyeokDong Kwon
SESiwoo Eum
Siwoo Eum
HKHyunji Kim
Hyunji Kim
HSHwajeong Seo
Hwajeong Seo
The emergence of quantum computers is threatening the security of cryptography through various quantum algorithms. Among them, the Grover search algorithm is known to be efficient in accelerating brute force attacks on block cipher algorithms. To utilize the Grover’s algorithm for brute force attacks, block ciphers must be implemented in quantum circuits. In this paper, we present optimized quantum circuits of the SPN (Substitution Permutation Network) structured lightweight block cipher, namely the PIPO block cipher. In particular, the compact design of quantum circuits for the 8-bit Sbox is investigated. These optimization techniques are used to implement other cryptographic operations as quantum circuits. Finally, we evaluate quantum resources of Grover search algorithm for the PIPO block cipher in ProejctQ, a quantum simulator provided by IBM.