GyeongJu Song

Dr. GyeongJu Song

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

6Years (2021-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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23 May 2021 in Applied Sciences
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Journal Article
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KJKyung Bae Jang
Kyung Bae Jang
GSGyeongJu Song
GyeongJu Song
KHkim hyunjun
kim hyunjun
HKHyeokDong Kwon
HyeokDong Kwon
HKHyunji Kim
Hyunji Kim
HSHwajeong Seo
Hwajeong Seo
Grover search algorithm is the most representative quantum attack method that threatens the security of symmetric key cryptography. If the Grover search algorithm is applied to symmetric key cryptography, the security level of target symmetric key cryptography can be lowered from n-bit to n2-bit. When applying Grover’s search algorithm to the block cipher that is the target of potential quantum attacks, the target block cipher must be implemented as quantum circuits. Starting with the AES block cipher, a number of works have been conducted to optimize and implement target block ciphers into quantum circuits. Recently, many studies have been published to implement lightweight block ciphers as quantum circuits. In this paper, we present optimal quantum circuit designs of symmetric key cryptography, including PRESENT and GIFT block ciphers. The proposed method optimized PRESENT and GIFT block ciphers by minimizing qubits, quantum gates, and circuit depth. We compare proposed PRESENT and GIFT quantum circuits with other results of lightweight block cipher implementations in quantum circuits. Finally, quantum resources of PRESENT and GIFT block ciphers required for the oracle of the Grover search algorithm were estimated.

8 April 2025 in IACR Communications in Cryptology
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KJKyung Bae Jang
Kyung Bae Jang
ABAnubhab Baksi
Anubhab Baksi
HKHyunji Kim
Hyunji Kim
GSGyeongJu Song
GyeongJu Song
HSHwajeong Seo
Hwajeong Seo
ACAnupam Chattopadhyay
Anupam Chattopadhyay
Our work explores the key recovery attack using the Grover's search on the three variants of AES (-128, -192, -256). In total, we develop a pool of 26 implementations per AES variant (totaling 78), by taking the state-of-the-art advancements in the relevant fields into account. We present the least Toffoli depth and full depth implementations of AES, thereby improving from Zou et al.'s Asiacrypt'20 paper by more than 97 percent for each variant of AES. We show that the qubit count - Toffoli depth product is reduced from theirs by more than 87 percent. Furthermore, we analyze the Jaques et al.'s Eurocrypt'20 implementations in detail, fix the bugs (arising from some problem of the quantum computing tool used), and report corrected benchmarks (which seem to improve from the authors' own bug-fixing, thanks to our architecture consideration). To the best of our finding, our work improves from all the previous works (including the Asiacrypt'22 paper by Huang and Sun, the Asiacrypt'23 paper by Liu et al. and the Asiacrypt'24 paper by Shi and Feng) in terms of various quantum circuit complexity metrics. To be more precise, we estimate the currently best-known quantum attack complexities for AES-128 ( 2 156.2630 ), AES-192 ( 2 221.5801 ) and AES-256 ( 2 286.0731 ). Additionally, we achieve the least Toffoli depth - qubit count product for AES-128 ( 121920 , improving from 130720 by Shi and Feng in Asiacrypt'24), AES-192 ( 161664 , improving from 188880 by Liu et al. in Asiacrypt'23) and AES-256 ( 206528 , improving from 248024 by Liu et al. in Asiacrypt'23) so far. We further investigate the prospect of the Grover's search. We propose four new implementations of the S-box, one new implementation of the MixColumn; as well as five new architecture (one is motivated by the architecture by Jaques et al. in Eurocrypt'20, and the rest four are entirely our innovation). Under the MAXDEPTH constraint (specified by NIST), the circuit depth metrics (Toffoli depth, T -depth and full depth) become crucial factors and parallelization for often becomes necessary. We provide the least depth implementation in this respect that offers the best performance in terms of metrics like depth-squared - qubit count product, depth - gate count product.

17 May 2021 in Electronics
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Journal Article
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KJKyung Bae Jang
Kyung Bae Jang
GSGyeongJu Song
GyeongJu Song
HKHyeokDong Kwon
HyeokDong Kwon
SESiwoo Eum
Siwoo Eum
HKHyunji Kim
Hyunji Kim
HSHwajeong Seo
Hwajeong Seo
The emergence of quantum computers is threatening the security of cryptography through various quantum algorithms. Among them, the Grover search algorithm is known to be efficient in accelerating brute force attacks on block cipher algorithms. To utilize the Grover’s algorithm for brute force attacks, block ciphers must be implemented in quantum circuits. In this paper, we present optimized quantum circuits of the SPN (Substitution Permutation Network) structured lightweight block cipher, namely the PIPO block cipher. In particular, the compact design of quantum circuits for the 8-bit Sbox is investigated. These optimization techniques are used to implement other cryptographic operations as quantum circuits. Finally, we evaluate quantum resources of Grover search algorithm for the PIPO block cipher in ProejctQ, a quantum simulator provided by IBM.

7 July 2022 in Applied Sciences
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Journal Article
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GSGyeongJu Song
GyeongJu Song
KJKyoungbae Jang
Kyoungbae Jang
HKHyunjun Kim
Hyunjun Kim
SESiwoo Eum
Siwoo Eum
MSMinjoo Sim
Minjoo Sim
HSHwajeong Seo
Hwajeong Seo
In this paper, we propose a quantum circuit for the SPEEDY block cipher for the first time and estimate its security strength based on the post-quantum security strength presented by NIST. The strength of post-quantum security for symmetric key cryptography is estimated at the cost of the Grover key retrieval algorithm. Grover’s algorithm in quantum computers reduces the n-bit security of block ciphers to n2 bits. The implementation of a quantum circuit is required to estimate the Grover’s algorithm cost for the target cipher. We estimate the quantum resource required for Grover’s algorithm by implementing a quantum circuit for SPEEDY in an optimized way and show that SPEEDY provides either 128-bit security (i.e., NIST security level 1) or 192-bit security (i.e., NIST security level 3) depending on the number of rounds. Based on our estimated cost, increasing the number of rounds is insufficient to satisfy the security against quantum attacks on quantum computers.

10 March 2023 in Applied Sciences
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Journal Article
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GSGyeongJu Song
GyeongJu Song
KJKyung Bae Jang
Kyung Bae Jang
HSHwajeong Seo
Hwajeong Seo
To build a secure cryptography system in the post-quantum era, one must find the minimum security parameters against quantum attacks by estimating the quantum resources of a fault-tolerant quantum computer. In a fault-tolerant quantum computer, errors must reach an acceptable level for practical uses according to error detection and error correction processes. However, these processes utilize additional quantum resources. As the depth of the quantum circuit increases, the computation time per qubit increases together with the processing errors. Therefore, in terms of errors in quantum circuits, it is a fundamental requirement to reduce the depth by trading off the number of qubits. This paper proposes novel low-depth SHA3 quantum circuit implementations for fault-tolerant quantum computers to reduce errors. The proposed SHA3 quantum circuit was implemented with the aim of optimizing the quantum circuit depth through a trade-off between the number of qubits, the quantum gate, and the quantum depth in each function. Compared to other state-of-art techniques, the proposed method achieved T-depth and full-depth reductions of 30.3% and 80.05%, respectively. We believe that this work will contribute to the establishment of minimum security parameters for SHA3 in the quantum era.

9 November 2022 in Quantum Information Processing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
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KJKyung Bae Jang
Kyung Bae Jang
GSGyeongJu Song
GyeongJu Song
HKHyunjun Kim
Hyunjun Kim
HKHyeokDong Kwon
HyeokDong Kwon
HKhyunji kim
hyunji kim
HSHwajeong Seo
Hwajeong Seo