Large-scale disasters, particularly when handled poorly, often spark popular outrage and threaten an autocrat’s hold on power. Autocrats frequently employ blame-shifting strategies to redirect public anger and weather these storms. We examine whether blame shifting after a large-scale disaster helps or hurts an autocrat’s popularity through a mixed-methods research design in the electoral autocracy of Turkey in April–July 2023, following the February 2023 earthquakes. An online survey experiment (n = 3,839) identifies the effects of blaming the aftermath of the earthquakes on the opposition, a force majeure, private construction companies, or a government minister, while focus groups explore the mechanisms behind these effects. We find that blaming the opposition or a force majeure leads to a backlash, especially among those more able to critically evaluate information. Focus groups reveal that these backlash effects are driven by voters’ dismay at electoral opportunism and the incumbent’s polarizing language following a large-scale disaster.
Are the highest-ranking public officials rewarded for good performance? Using the case of finance ministers, we argue that this depends on the type of regime. Democratic leaders have incentives to retain high-performing finance ministers because they are accountable to the population through free and fair elections. In the absence of free and fair elections, autocrats face opposing incentives. While growth stabilizes the regime, a high-performing minister of finance can also be a potential rival. Moreover, autocratic finance ministers will, to a higher degree than democratic, be judged on their ability to enrich the leader rather than creating growth. As a result, autocrats reward finance ministers less for economic growth than democrats. Using data on over 2,800 finance ministers in the period 1966–2021, we demonstrate a close link between economic growth and the retention of finance ministers in democracies but not in autocracies. The findings indicate that democracies are better at fostering and rewarding competence at the highest level of political office, speaking to the merits of democracy relative to autocracy.
We investigate how fiscal deficits affect the political survival of finance ministers in democracies and autocracies. While finance ministers occupy formally similar roles across regimes, we argue they serve fundamentally different political functions. Drawing on regime-specific incentives and the distinct constraints on public borrowing, we hypothesize that fiscal deficits increase the likelihood of ministerial removal in democracies but not in autocracies. Using global data on finance ministers from 1981 to 2021, we find robust support for our argument. Higher deficits predict an increased risk of ministerial exit, but only in democracies. This speaks to broader debates on economic policy-making, accountability, and elite politics. More broadly, we show that similar institutions operate under diverging logics depending on regime type. This highlights the need for comparative research to take seriously the context-dependent meaning of institutional performance—and to develop theories that reflect variation in how policymakers are constrained and evaluated.