Through a thematic analysis on major themes researched in network governance and collaborative governance, this paper identifies the entangled relationship between these two research streams. We note the common and distinct themes in these two research streams that reveal four entanglements in the research and practice of network governance and collaborative governance. We propose future research could focus more on the implementation and comparative studies, adopting microperspectives of collaborative governance and network governance at the grass-root level in juxtaposition with interorganizational and institutional levels that are led by non-public actors for value co-creation in different institutional contexts.
1 January 2019 in International Journal of Project Management
Public–private collaborations have the potential to effectively respond to extreme events. However, traditional public–private collaborations that are usually led by governmental actors often encounter significant difficulties in a crisis. Based on a case study of a public–private collaboration dealing with COVID-19 in China, we explore how a private actor emerges as a leader to initiate and manage a public–private collaboration in the crisis, and how stakeholders in this collaboration work together to effectively handle the crisis. The findings indicate critical characteristics and contingencies when a private actor leads the cross-sector collaboration to effectively cope with uncertainties and deliver public services in crisis time.
1 July 2018 in Journal of Computing in Civil Engineering
Public–private partnerships (PPPs) use long-term contracts between the government and the private-sector partner to deliver public infrastructure or service. Due to unexpected contingencies, renegotiations have been common in PPP projects and significantly influenced efficiencies. In the renegotiation game, the private contractor has to decide whether to initiate a renegotiation or not, while the government has to decide whether to accept a renegotiation or not. The criteria for each to make such decisions are private, which causes information asymmetry. This study proposes a game theoretical model to study the influence of information asymmetry on the decision making of renegotiations in PPP projects. It is shown that the renegotiation decision making considering information asymmetry is a Bayesian game, and thus Bayesian Nash equilibrium is applied for solutions. This study provides the decision-making rules for renegotiations, identifies the opportunistic behaviors of players, and improves the renegotiation game through eliminating information asymmetry. The results show that (1) the private contractor can achieve the best outcome by sharing its private information with the government, (2) the government is willing to share its private information with the private contractor only if it has been informed of the private contractor’s private information, and (3) the sharing of the government’s private information will not increase the payoffs of either player. Different from previous studies, the proposed model in this study for the first time takes into consideration the information asymmetry in renegotiations of PPPs, thus contributing to the body of knowledge. In addition, the findings of this study help enhance the decision making of renegotiations, thereby contributing to practice.
Public services have experienced a wave of privatisation reversal worldwide since 1990s. The debate about privatisation reversal has thus increased growing scholarly attention. To fully understand the reversal, this paper attempts to identify the reasons for reversal (why do actors engage in them), reveal the characteristics of reversal process (how does it happen), and evaluate the performance after reversal in urban bus transport field. The reversal of the privatised Shanghai public bus service was selected for illustration. The findings suggest that: (1) there exist various reversal reasons in different institutional environments, involving economic, political, and societal factors; (2) The reversal process is characterised by multi-actor interactions embedded in institutional environments; (3) The performance is improved after reversal.