Wen Zhang

Dr. Wen Zhang


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

6Years (2021-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
1 January 2022 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
VPValery Pavlov
Valery Pavlov
EKElena Katok
Elena Katok
WZWen Zhang
Wen Zhang
Problem definition: To improve the poor performance of supply chains caused by misaligned incentives under the wholesale price contract, theory proposes coordinating contracts. However, a common finding of experimental studies testing such contracts is that they tend to yield only a marginal, if any, performance improvement over wholesale pricing. These studies identify several behavioral factors that are at play but none accounted for by the theory proposing coordinating contracts. Among them, identified as the single most detrimental for the supply chain performance, is incomplete information about preferences for fairness causing contract rejections. Can the supply chain performance be improved with a contract designed allowing for this type of information asymmetry? What does this contract (mechanism) look like? Academic/practical relevance: The extant research characterized the optimal contracting mechanisms for such important practical cases as the suppliers’ private information about production cost or the retailers’ private information about the end customer demand. The present study addresses the gap in another important practical case: when the source of information asymmetry is the private information about preferences for fairness. Methodology: The underlying research method is mechanism design. Results: We prove that the optimal mechanism consists of a single contract positioned on the Pareto frontier and characterize the optimal profit split between the supplier and the retailer. We show that, under a wide range of preferences for fairness, the efficiency loss because of private information is strictly positive, but exceptions are possible. We also show that the optimal mechanism can be implemented with a variety of commonly used in practice and widely studied in academic literature contracts, including the minimum order quantity and the two-part tariff ones. Managerial implications: We establish a direct link between a large volume of theoretical and empirical literature on social preferences with the research on supply chain contracts. Because rejections that are because of incomplete information are an important cause of contract inefficiency observed in the laboratory, managers should avoid take it or leave it offers when they negotiate contracts. Instead, the bargaining process should be geared toward discovering the extent of the fairness preferences of the contracting parties.

20 January 2024 in Energies
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
WBWenlei Bai
Wenlei Bai
WZWen Zhang
Wen Zhang
RARichard Allmendinger
Richard Allmendinger
Innocent EnyekweInnocent Enyekwe
Innocent Enyekwe
Kwang Y. LeeKwang Y. Lee
Kwang Y. Lee
The growing distributed energy resource (DER) penetration into distribution networks, such as through residential and commercial photovoltaics (PV), has emerged through a transition from passive to active networks, which takes the complexity of planning and operations to the next level. Optimal PV allocation (sizing and location) is challenging because it involves mixed-integer non-linear programming with three-phase non-linear unbalanced power flow equations. Meta-heuristic algorithms have proven their effectiveness in many complex engineering problems. Thus, in this study, we propose to achieve optimal PV allocation by using several basic evolutionary algorithms (EAs), particle swarm optimization (PSO), artificial bee colony (ABC), differential evolution (DE), and their variants, all of which are applied for a study of their performance levels. Two modified unbalanced IEEE test feeders (13 and 37 bus) are developed to evaluate these performance levels, with two objectives: one is to maximize PV penetration, and the other is to minimize the voltage deviation from 1.0 p.u. To handle the computational burden of the sequential power flow and unbalanced network, we adopt an efficient iterative load flow algorithm instead of the commonly used and yet highly simplified forward–backward sweep method. A comparative study of these basic EAs shows their general success in finding a near-optimal solution, except in the case of the DE, which is known for solving continuous optimization problems efficiently. From experiments run 30 times, it is observed that PSO-related algorithms are more efficient and robust in the maximum PV penetration case, while ABC-related algorithms are more efficient and robust in the minimum voltage deviation case.

1 November 2021 in Operations Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
WZWen Zhang
Wen Zhang
QCQi (George) Chen
Qi (George) Chen
EKElena Katok
Elena Katok
Designing Open-bid Procurement Auction with Supplier Qualification Screenings Manufacturers often use re-sourcing initiatives to keep their suppliers’ pricing competitive; e.g., new entrant suppliers are identified and invited to compete with the incumbent supplier for supply contracts in an open-bid auction. To ensure that entrant suppliers have the capability of executing the contract, the conventional approach for many manufacturers is to conduct qualification screenings on all the entrants prior to auction bidding and only allow qualified entrant suppliers to compete in the auction. In “‘Now or Later?’ When to Deploy Qualification Screening in Open-Bid Auction for Re-Sourcing”, Zhang, Chen, and Katok explore an alternative arrangement of this process where all entrant suppliers are invited for bidding first before qualification screenings are selectively conducted afterward to determine the contract winner. This new approach helps reduce the waste of manufacturers’ screening efforts on suppliers with uncompetitive bids but in the meantime introduces incentives for less competitive supplier bidding behavior. They provide analytical and numerical evidence that this new approach could be very effective in managing manufacturers’ procurement costs.

1 January 2025 in SSRN Electronic Journal
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
WZWen Zhang
Wen Zhang
GWGuihua Wang
Guihua Wang
NWNancy Wang
Nancy Wang
Compared to offering a single shipping option, offering multiple shipping options in online marketplace bargaining may have either beneficial or detrimental effects on the final selling price. On the one hand, buyers seeking particular shipping options (e.g., expedited shipping or local pick up) only available within the multiple options are willing to offer high prices. On the other hand, buyers may view it as the seller's eagerness to sell, leading them to stick with low offer prices. In this paper, we study the effect of offering multiple shipping options on the final selling price in online marketplace bargaining. We first employ an IV regression to study the average effect. We find that offering multiple shipping options increases the final selling price in bargaining by 3.99%. We then adopt the IV forest approach to study the heterogeneous effect. We find that the effect is heterogeneous across different item categories and conditions. Finally, we derive the potential increase in selling price at the observation level when multiple shipping options are offered. Our results are helpful to online marketplaces because we find offering multiple shipping options leads to higher selling prices. Our results are helpful to sellers because we show that the effect of offering multiple shipping options varies across different item categories and conditions, and our estimation of potential increases at the observation level supports their decision-making processes. Finally, our results are helpful to platform managers because we provide managerial insights to support their decision-making on policies or regulations related to bargaining.

14 July 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
FLFernando Lezama
Fernando Lezama
JAJosé Almeida
José Almeida
Joao SoaresJoao Soares
Joao Soares
Zita ValeZita Vale
Zita Vale
WBWenlei Bai
Wenlei Bai
WZWen Zhang
Wen Zhang
In the field of energy systems, the "WCCI(CEC)/GECCO 2024 Competition Evolutionary Computation in the Energy Domain: Optimal PV System Allocation" serves as a platform for evaluating and comparing various metaheuristic algorithms tailored to address complex energy challenges. The current competition ranking metric, focused on mean fitness values, provides a basis for assessing algorithm performance. This work assesses several algorithms in a new testbed of the competition. The primary goal is to compare the performance of these algorithms based on their ability to address the challenges posed by the integration of PV systems in distribution networks. These results offer an early glimpse into how these metaheuristics perform, paving the way for further exploration of their capabilities.

29 October 2026 in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
GWGuihua Wang
Guihua Wang
WZWen Zhang
Wen Zhang
Problem definition: In online marketplace bargaining, how fast to respond to a buyer’s offer is a question that many sellers face. Whereas a fast response signals the seller’s eagerness to sell, a slow response signals the seller’s insincerity or irresponsibility. In this paper, we use a unique data set from eBay’s best-offer platform to study the effect of the seller’s response time on the buyer’s concession. Methodology/results: We first use a multiple instrumental variable (IV) regression to study the average effect of the seller’s response time. We find that the effect of the seller’s response time on the buyer’s concession first increases and then decreases (i.e., following an inverted U shape). We then develop a new multitreatment IV forest approach, which incorporates a multiple IV regression into a forest, to study the heterogeneous and nonlinear effects of the seller’s response time. We find that the effect of the seller’s response time varies widely across different items. Finally, we use the results from our empirical analyses to derive the best response time for the seller. We find that using the best response time leads to a sizeable increase in the buyer’s concession. Managerial implications: Our results are helpful to online marketplaces because we find that the effect of the seller’s response time is nonlinear and heterogeneous across different items. Our results are also helpful to the seller because we find the best response time that increases the buyer’s concession. Finally, our results are helpful to academia because we develop a new causal machine learning method for analyzing the heterogeneous effects of multiple treatments with endogeneity issues. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at 10.1287/msom.2023.0565 .