Yu Tai

Yu Tai

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Yu Tai

School of Cybersecurity, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xian, China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

11Years (2016-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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5 June 2024 in IEEE Systems Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HZHuixiang Zhang
Huixiang Zhang
KLKaihua Liao
Kaihua Liao
YTYu Tai
Yu Tai
WMWenqiang Ma
Wenqiang Ma
GCGuoyan Cao
Guoyan Cao
Lexi XuLexi Xu
Lexi Xu
Edge intelligence has recently attracted great interest from industry and academia, and it greatly improves the processing speed at the edge by moving data and artificial intelligence to the edge of the network. However, edge devices have bottlenecks in battery capacity and computing power, making it challenging to perform computing tasks in dynamic and harsh network environments. Especially in disaster scenarios, edge (rescue) devices are more likely to fail due to unreliable wireless communications and scattered rescue requests, which makes it urgent to explore how to provide low-latency, reliable services through edge collaboration. In this article, we investigate the task offloading mechanism in mobile edge computing networks, aiming to ensure fault tolerance and rapid response of computing services in dynamic and harsh scenarios. Specifically, we design a fault-tolerant distributed task offloading scheme, which minimizes task execution time and system energy consumption through the multi-agent proximal policy optimization algorithm. Furthermore, we introduce logarithmic ratio reward functions and action masking to reduce the impact of different task queue lengths while accelerating model convergence. Numerical results show that the proposed algorithm is suitable for service failure scenarios, effectively meeting the reliability requirements of tasks while simultaneously reducing system energy consumption and processing latency.

1 July 2018
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
MQMaoyuan Qin
Maoyuan Qin
WHWei Hu
Wei Hu
DMDeJun Mu
DeJun Mu
YTYu Tai
Yu Tai
The design of modern computer hardware heavily relies on third-party intellectual property (IP) cores, which may contain malicious hardware Trojans that could be exploited by an adversary to leak secret information or take control of the system. Existing hardware Trojan detection methods either require a golden reference design for comparison or extensive functional testing to identify suspicious signals. In this paper, we propose a new formal verification method to verify the security of hardware designs. The proposed solution formalizes fine grained gate level information flow model for proving security properties of hardware designs in the Coq theorem prover environment. Compare with existing register transfer level (RTL) information flow security models, our model only needs to translate a small number of logic primitives to their formal representations without the need of supporting the rich RTL HDL semantics or dealing with complex conditional branch or loop structures. As a result, a gate level information flow model can be created at much lower complexity while achieving significantly higher precision in modeling the security behavior of hardware designs. We use the AES-T1700 benchmark from Trust-HUB to demonstrate the effectiveness of our solution. Experimental results show that our method can detect and pinpoint the Trojan.

1 September 2016 in Automatic Control and Computer Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
YTYu Tai
Yu Tai
WHWei Hu
Wei Hu
HZHuixiang Zhang
Huixiang Zhang
DMDeJun Mu
DeJun Mu
XHXing-Li Huang
Xing-Li Huang

7 December 2017 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
YTYu Tai
Yu Tai
WHWei Hu
Wei Hu
DMDejun Mu
Dejun Mu
BMBaolei Mao
Baolei Mao
LZLu Zhang
Lu Zhang
Computing hardware has become an attractive attack surface due to the globalization of semi-conductor design and supply chain, and the wide integration of third party intellectual property (IP) cores. Recently, gate level information flow tracking (GLIFT) has been proposed to monitor the flow of information in secure hardware design by associating data objects with sensitivity labels and tracking the flow of labeled data. GLIFT can be used to model and verify security-related properties such as confidentiality and integrity. However, existing work in this realm only considers binary labels. These are inadequate for understanding simultaneous information flow behaviors and the root source information flows. In this paper, we propose a precise multi-bit GLIFT method to perform simultaneous multi-bit flow tracking for understanding exactly which bits are affecting a data object at the same time. The proposed method provides more detailed insights into simultaneous information flow behaviors and thus allows proof of quantitative information flow data properties. We compare the complexity and verification performance for different information flow models using primitive gates, IWLS benchmarks, several cryptographic cores and Trust-HUB benchmarks. Experimental results have demonstrated that our method can reason about multi-bit information flow behaviors and identify potential security flaws.

26 April 2024 in IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
LZLu Zhang
Lu Zhang
DMDejun Mu
Dejun Mu
JWJingyu Wang
Jingyu Wang
RLRuoyang Liu
Ruoyang Liu
YHYifan He
Yifan He
Yongpan LiuYongpan Liu
Yongpan Liu
As domain-specific training data is recognized as valuable intellectual property, acquiring well-trained weights in convolutional neural networks (CNN) has emerged as a new threat to the neural network design community. To design a CNN accelerator that is resilient to side-channel threats, it is crucial to have an accurate and efficient security-driven framework at the early design stage. However, there is no standard way to perform root-cause analysis on the power side channel that exists in FPGA-based CNN accelerators. Therefore, we build RE-Specter, a framework that facilitates security-driven design space exploration (DSE) across various building components, combination patterns, and parallelism configurations in CNNs. The goal is to fully understand the power side-channel effects resulting from architectural modifications or optimization decisions. We further compare the benchmarks considering precision, resource utilization, and power side-channel leakage. Finally, we experimentally explore the design space of various architectural features. The experimental results show that low-bit precision delivers more secure architectures ( $68.9\times $ among DSPs, $2439\times $ among LUTs) in measurement-to-disclosure (MTD), but mixed-precision strategies are necessary to maintain the model accuracy. For loop optimization, in 16-parallel scenario, accumulator-based architecture outperforms the architecture featuring an adder tree with the improvements of $8.28\times $ in MTD and $1.38\times $ in PST.

16 July 2025 in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MQMingping Qi
Mingping Qi
WHWei Hu
Wei Hu
YTYu Tai
Yu Tai
password-authenticated key exchange (PAKE) allows involved participants to establish cryptographically strong keys over insecure channels by using a low-entropy password as credential. SAE as a widely deployed PAKE in Wi-Fi networks, has no tight security proof and requires the use of the hash-to-curve (H2C) function to map password into an elliptic curve point that is challenging to implement securely. To this end, in this article, we present a tightly secure one-round SAE variant, called as TBSAE for Two-Basis Simultaneous Authentication of Equals. TBSAE can work in both multiplicative and elliptic curve additive groups, and it uses two random group elements as the common reference strings to circumvent the use of Hash-to-Group (Curve) function. In the elliptic curve setting, avoiding the use of H2C function will bring ease-of-implementation advantages over its predecessor SAE and some other H2C-based PAKE protocols since H2C is actually not easy to be implemented securely in practice over a commonly used elliptic curve additive group. TBSAE is peer-to-peer, supporting simultaneous initiation in the authenticated key exchange phase, which makes it also suitable for mesh networks besides the traditional client-server setting. It is secure against the tricky off-line dictionary attack, and further supports the intended forward secrecy. Moreover, we provide a tight formal security proof for TBSAE in the random oracle model using the gap computational Diffie–Hellman (GDH) security assumption, which implies that compared to nontightly secure password-AKE (PAKE) protocols, it can achieve the expected security level with relatively small parameters in practice, making it gain more practical performance advantages.