19 September 2016 in Economica
25 April 2022 in European Journal of Political Economy
1 March 2018 in Italian Economic Journal
9 April 2026 in Theory and Decision
While many socially desirable actions are risky and involve non-anonymous others, it remains largely untested whether lower subject-subject anonymity affects behavior under risk. In variations of the dictator game, we vary the party who is exposed to risk and manipulate anonymity by reducing the social and moral distance between parties. We propose a model that allows for ex ante and ex post fairness as well as for context-dependent altruism. Consistent with the model, we find that reducing anonymity increases the frequency of equal splits and hyperfair choices. Allocations nonetheless fall when the dictator’s payoff is risky, regardless of the treatment.
23 December 2016 in Review of Behavioral Economics
We enrich the choice task of responders in ultimatum games by allowing them to independently decide whether to collect what is offered to them and whether to destroy what the proposer demanded. Such a multidimensional response format intends to cast further light on the motives guiding responder behavior. Using a conservative approach to type classification, we find that the majority of responder participants choose consistently with outcome-based preference models. There are, however, few responders that destroy the proposer’s demand of a large pie share and concurrently reject their own offer. According to our data, this result can be explained by a concern for moral integrity rather than by a strong preference for equality.
29 August 2026 in SSRN Electronic Journal
Petty collusive bribery is hard to curb because both the briber and the bribed official benefit from the transaction, while the harm falls on a third party. In a laboratory experiment, we show that a simple accountability reminder-stating that both actors are equally responsible for the corrupt exchange and its consequences---substantially reduces collusive bribery, lowering the frequency of both bribe offers and bribe acceptances. Giving the harmed third party the opportunity to express approval or disapproval of the actors' decisions, however, does not yield a further statistically significant reduction in corruption when combined with the accountability reminder. The results suggest that a low-cost intervention designed to counteract the diffusion of responsibility inherent in jointly produced corrupt outcomes can discourage corrupt behavior on both sides of the exchange and that combining behavioral interventions need not amplify their effects.