Chiara Nardi

Chiara Nardi

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Chiara Nardi

Frankfurt School of Finance & Management

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

11Years (2016-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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19 September 2016 in Economica
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Journal Article
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Anna ConteAnna Conte
Anna Conte
MLM. Vittoria Levati
M. Vittoria Levati
CNChiara Nardi
Chiara Nardi

25 April 2022 in European Journal of Political Economy
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MLM. Vittoria Levati
M. Vittoria Levati
CNChiara Nardi
Chiara Nardi

1 March 2018 in Italian Economic Journal
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Journal Article
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CNChiara Nardi
Chiara Nardi

13 July 2023 in OSF Preprints
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Open access
EBEnnio Bilancini
Ennio Bilancini
LBLeonardo Boncinelli
Leonardo Boncinelli
CNChiara Nardi
Chiara Nardi
VPVeronica Pizziol
Veronica Pizziol
We study how cooperation in one-shot Public Goods Games with large group sizes is affected by the presence of a slight chance of severe adverse events. We find that cooperation is substantial, notwithstanding a low marginal return of contributions. The cooperation level is comparable to what is found in similar settings for small-sized groups. Furthermore, we find no appreciable effect of the threat of severe adverse events, whether their realization is independent across individuals, perfectly positively or negatively correlated. We conclude that cooperation in the Public Goods Game is unlikely to be affected by rare adverse events, independently of how risk is correlated across individuals.

13 July 2023 in OSF Preprints
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Preprint
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AKAnastasios Koukoumelis
Anastasios Koukoumelis
MLMaria Vittoria Levati
Maria Vittoria Levati
CNChiara Nardi
Chiara Nardi
Many socially desirable actions are subject to risk and occur in situations where the others are not anonymous. Assessing whether lower subject-subject anonymity affects behavior when outcomes are risky is likely important but has not been studied in depth so far. Herein, we provide evidence on this issue. In a series of allocation tasks, all of them variations of the dictator game, we systematically vary the party who is exposed to risk and manipulaterecipient anonymity by reducing the social and/or moral distance between the two parties. We propose a model that extends previous work by allowing not only for ex ante and ex post fairness but also for altruism. The model is consistent with observed behavior. In particular, a reduction in social and moral distance significantly increases the likelihood of equal split and more than equal split choices.

23 December 2016 in Review of Behavioral Economics
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WGWerner Güth
Werner Güth
MLM. Vittoria Levati
M. Vittoria Levati
CNChiara Nardi
Chiara Nardi
ISIvan Soraperra
Ivan Soraperra
We enrich the choice task of responders in ultimatum games by allowing them to independently decide whether to collect what is offered to them and whether to destroy what the proposer demanded. Such a multidimensional response format intends to cast further light on the motives guiding responder behavior. Using a conservative approach to type classification, we find that the majority of responder participants choose consistently with outcome-based preference models. There are, however, few responders that destroy the proposer’s demand of a large pie share and concurrently reject their own offer. According to our data, this result can be explained by a concern for moral integrity rather than by a strong preference for equality.