More than 150 cellular networks worldwide have rolled out LTE-M (LTE-Machine Type Communication) and/or NB-IoT (Narrow Band Internet of Things) technologies to support massive IoT services such as smart metering and environmental monitoring. Such cellular IoT services share the existing cellular network architecture with non-IoT (e.g., smartphone) ones. When they are newly integrated into the cellular network, new security vulnerabilities may happen from imprudent integration. In this work, we explore the security vulnerabilities of the cellular IoT from both system-integrated and service-integrated aspects. We discover several vulnerabilities spanning cellular standard design defects, network operation slips, and IoT device implementation flaws. Threateningly, they allow an adversary to remotely identify IP addresses and phone numbers assigned to cellular IoT devices, interrupt their power saving services, and launch various attacks, including data/text spamming, battery draining, device hibernation against them. We validate these vulnerabilities over five major cellular IoT carriers in the U.S. and Taiwan using their certified cellular IoT devices. The attack evaluation result shows that the adversary can raise an IoT data bill by up to $226 with less than 120 MB spam traffic, increase an IoT text bill at a rate of $5 per second, and prevent an IoT device from entering/leaving power saving mode; moreover, cellular IoT devices may suffer from denial of IoT services. We finally propose, prototype, and evaluate recommended solutions.
IMS (IP Multimedia Subsystem) is vital for delivering IP-based multimedia services in mobile networks. Despite constant upgrades by 3GPP over the past two decades to support heterogeneous radio access networks (e.g., 4G LTE, 5G NR, and Wi-Fi) and enhance IMS security, the focus has primarily been on cellular infrastructure. Consequently, IMS security measures on mobile equipment (ME), such as smartphones, lag behind rapid technological advancements. Our study reveals that mandated IMS security measures on ME fail to keep pace, resulting in new vulnerabilities and attack vectors, including denial of service (DoS) across all networks, named SMS source spoofing, and covert communications over Video-over-IMS attacks. All vulnerabilities and proof-of-concept attacks have been experimentally validated in operational 5G/4G networks across various phone models and network operators. Finally, we propose and prototype standard-compliant remedies for these vulnerabilities.
26 March 2024 in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
Cellular networks, vital for delivering emergency services, enable mobile users to dial emergency calls (e.g., 9-1-1 in the U.S.), which are forwarded to public safety answer points (PSAPs). Regulatory requirements allow anonymous user equipment (UE) without a SIM card or valid mobile subscription to access these services. However, supporting emergency services for anonymous UEs introduces different operations, expanding the attack surface of cellular infrastructure. In this study, we explore the insecurity of cellular emergency services, identifying six security vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities can be exploited for free data service attacks against carriers and data DoS/overcharge and denial of cellular emergency service (DoCES) attacks against mobile users. Experimental validation in networks of three major U.S. carriers and two major Taiwan carriers demonstrates the global impact of our findings. Finally, we propose and prototype standard-compliant remedies to mitigate these vulnerabilities.
Cellular networks provide the most accessible emergency services with ubiquitous coverage, yet their emergency-specific designs remain largely unexplored. To systematically explore potential design defects that lead to failures or delays in emergency services, we introduce M911-Verifier, an emergency-specific model checking tool. It reveals many counterintuitive findings regarding the ubiquitous access support for cellular emergency services. Our study shows that, despite sufficient wireless signal coverage, users may still experience prolonged emergency call setup times, call initiation failures, or call drops due to flaws in the design of cellular emergency services. These design defects arise from three major causes: problematic network selection for initiating emergency calls, emergency-unaware call operation, and network escalation forbidden during emergency calls. The impacts of these defects have been experimentally validated across three U.S. carriers and two Taiwan carriers using commodity smartphones. Finally, we propose solutions and evaluate their effectiveness.