Guan-Hua Tu

Guan-Hua Tu

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Guan-Hua Tu

Michigan State University, East Lansing, Michigan, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

9Years (2018-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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17 July 2023 in ACM Computing Surveys
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
XZXiao Zhang
Xiao Zhang
GKGriffin Klevering
Griffin Klevering
XLXinyu Lei
Xinyu Lei
YHYiwen Hu
Yiwen Hu
LXLi Xiao
Li Xiao
GTGuan-Hua Tu
Guan-Hua Tu
With the demand for economical and high-speed wireless services, Optical Wireless Communication (OWC) has attracted increasing attention in both research and the market. In the past decades, numerous optical-related techniques (e.g., LEDs, displays, cameras) and systems (e.g., VLC, LiFi, LiDAR) have been invented. OWC techniques, which are considered as a competitive mechanics in next-generation networks as an alternative to RF approaches, offer 10,000 times more bandwidth than conventional radio frequency (RF)-based wireless techniques (e.g., WiFi, LoRa, Bluetooth, LTE), as well as tremendous spatial reuse potential with even less interference. Because optical communications have a limited wavelength and travel in the line of sight (LoS) manner, the OWC is commonly thought as a secure wireless approach to confine light transmissions within physical bounds. However, in the real world, it is completely untrue. The privacy leakages and security risks broadly exist in the optical-related wireless applications including OWC networks. These threats and weaknesses have recently been the subject of several initial studies. However, they lack systematic analysis and are isolated. This survey first presents a general workflow of OWC systems, which consists of three stages: before signal emission (BSE), during signal propagation (DSP), and after signal receiving (ASV). For each stage, related risks are reviewed. Then, we summarize existing attacks in optical-related wireless applications and corresponding counter-attack solutions. Finally, we outline the future trends for improving OWC security.

18 May 2020 in IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
TXTian Xie
Tian Xie
GTGuan-Hua Tu
Guan-Hua Tu
BYBangjie Yin
Bangjie Yin
CLChi-Yu Li
Chi-Yu Li
CPChunyi Peng
Chunyi Peng
XLXiaoming Liu
Xiaoming Liu
Since 2016, all of four major U.S. operators have rolled out Wi-Fi calling services. They enable mobile users to place cellular calls over Wi-Fi networks based on the 3GPP IMS technology. Compared with conventional cellular voice solutions, the major difference lies in that their traffic traverses untrusted Wi-Fi networks and the Internet. This exposure to insecure networks can cause the Wi-Fi calling users to suffer from security threats. Its security mechanisms are similar to the VoLTE, because both of them are supported by the IMS. They include SIM-based security, 3GPP AKA, IPSec, etc. However, are they sufficient to secure Wi-Fi calling services' Unfortunately, our study yields a negative answer. We conduct the first security study on the operational Wi-Fi calling services in three major U.S. operators' networks using commodity devices. We disclose that current Wi-Fi calling security is not bullet-proof and uncover three vulnerabilities. By exploiting the vulnerabilities, we devise two proof-of-concept attacks: telephony harassment or denial of voice service and user privacy leakage; both of them can bypass the existing security defenses. We have confirmed their feasibility using real-world experiments, as well as assessed their potential damages and proposed a solution to address all identified vulnerabilities.

19 September 2023 in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SWSihan Wang
Sihan Wang
TXTian Xie
Tian Xie
MCMin-Yue Chen
Min-Yue Chen
GTGuan-Hua Tu
Guan-Hua Tu
CLChi-Yu Li
Chi-Yu Li
CPChunyi Peng
Chunyi Peng
More than 150 cellular networks worldwide have rolled out LTE-M (LTE-Machine Type Communication) and/or NB-IoT (Narrow Band Internet of Things) technologies to support massive IoT services such as smart metering and environmental monitoring. Such cellular IoT services share the existing cellular network architecture with non-IoT (e.g., smartphone) ones. When they are newly integrated into the cellular network, new security vulnerabilities may happen from imprudent integration. In this work, we explore the security vulnerabilities of the cellular IoT from both system-integrated and service-integrated aspects. We discover several vulnerabilities spanning cellular standard design defects, network operation slips, and IoT device implementation flaws. Threateningly, they allow an adversary to remotely identify IP addresses and phone numbers assigned to cellular IoT devices, interrupt their power saving services, and launch various attacks, including data/text spamming, battery draining, device hibernation against them. We validate these vulnerabilities over five major cellular IoT carriers in the U.S. and Taiwan using their certified cellular IoT devices. The attack evaluation result shows that the adversary can raise an IoT data bill by up to $226 with less than 120 MB spam traffic, increase an IoT text bill at a rate of $5 per second, and prevent an IoT device from entering/leaving power saving mode; moreover, cellular IoT devices may suffer from denial of IoT services. We finally propose, prototype, and evaluate recommended solutions.

19 September 2022 in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YLYu-Han Lu
Yu-Han Lu
SHSandy Hsin-Yu Hsiao
Sandy Hsin-Yu Hsiao
CLChi-Yu Li
Chi-Yu Li
YHYi-Chen Hsieh
Yi-Chen Hsieh
PCPo-Yi Chou
Po-Yi Chou
GTGuan-Hua Tu
Guan-Hua Tu
IMS (IP Multimedia Subsystem) is an essential 4G/5G component to offer multimedia services. It is used worldwide to support two call services: VoLTE (Voice over LTE) and VoWiFi (Voice over WiFi). In this study, it is shown that the signaling and voice sessions of VoWiFi can both be hijacked by a malicious adversary. By hijacking the signaling session, s(he) gains the ability to make ghost calls to launch stealthy DoS (Denial of Service) or caller-ID spoofing attacks against specific cellular users. Such attacks can be carried out without any malware or network information, and require only the victim’s phone number to be known. It is shown that phones vulnerable to the call DoS attacks can be detected at run time by exploiting a vulnerability of cellular network infrastructures referred to as call information leakage, which is exposed based on a machine learning method. Especially, the call DoS attacks can prevent victims from receiving incoming calls for up to 99.0% time without user awareness. Moreover, by hijacking the voice session, an adversary can launch stealthy free data transfer attacks based on phone numbers alone rather than IP addresses. The identified vulnerabilities/attacks are validated in the operational 4G networks of four top-tier carriers across Asia and North America with seven phone brands. The study concludes by presenting a suite of solutions to address them.

7 October 2021 in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
CLChi-Lun Lin
Chi-Lun Lin
WCWen-Jia Chang
Wen-Jia Chang
GTGuan-Hua Tu
Guan-Hua Tu
Neurodegenerative disorder diseases, such as Parkinson’s disease (PD), are progressive, and their motor symptoms develop slowly. Assessing the motor functions of PD patients relies on the physician’s experience and subjective judgment. However, the disease’s actual condition may not fully present during the clinical examination due to the motor fluctuation or symptom variation in a day. This article proposed a wireless detection method that can enable long-term monitoring and quantification of walking, one of the challenging metrics to be evaluated in clinics. We utilized the channel state information (CSI) from two Wi-Fi links to construct a 2-D coordinate system in space to locate, track, and capture the gait information of a walking subject, including walking distance, step length, and cadence. The results showed that the estimation errors were 0.02–0.16 m (17.84%–38.48%) for step length, 0.01–0.16 Hz (1%–11%) for cadence, and less than 8.84° for walking direction when a subject walked along a straight line. The method could also detect walking that constantly changes direction (circular path) with localization errors of 0.31 (CW) and 0.50 m (CCW). Moreover, the proposed method could distinguish two subjects when they simultaneously walked along nonpredefined paths. The method can be further developed as a home health monitoring technology to provide long-term and reliable data without personally identifiable information for physicians to make more precise treatments.

29 May 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
JSJingwen Shi
Jingwen Shi
SWSihan Wang
Sihan Wang
MCMin-Yue Chen
Min-Yue Chen
GTGuan-Hua Tu
Guan-Hua Tu
TXTian Xie
Tian Xie
CPChunyi Peng
Chunyi Peng
IMS (IP Multimedia Subsystem) is vital for delivering IP-based multimedia services in mobile networks. Despite constant upgrades by 3GPP over the past two decades to support heterogeneous radio access networks (e.g., 4G LTE, 5G NR, and Wi-Fi) and enhance IMS security, the focus has primarily been on cellular infrastructure. Consequently, IMS security measures on mobile equipment (ME), such as smartphones, lag behind rapid technological advancements. Our study reveals that mandated IMS security measures on ME fail to keep pace, resulting in new vulnerabilities and attack vectors, including denial of service (DoS) across all networks, named SMS source spoofing, and covert communications over Video-over-IMS attacks. All vulnerabilities and proof-of-concept attacks have been experimentally validated in operational 5G/4G networks across various phone models and network operators. Finally, we propose and prototype standard-compliant remedies for these vulnerabilities.