Tian Xie

Tian Xie

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Tian Xie

Utah State University, Logan, Utah, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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18 May 2020 in IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
TXTian Xie
Tian Xie
GTGuan-Hua Tu
Guan-Hua Tu
BYBangjie Yin
Bangjie Yin
CLChi-Yu Li
Chi-Yu Li
CPChunyi Peng
Chunyi Peng
XLXiaoming Liu
Xiaoming Liu
Since 2016, all of four major U.S. operators have rolled out Wi-Fi calling services. They enable mobile users to place cellular calls over Wi-Fi networks based on the 3GPP IMS technology. Compared with conventional cellular voice solutions, the major difference lies in that their traffic traverses untrusted Wi-Fi networks and the Internet. This exposure to insecure networks can cause the Wi-Fi calling users to suffer from security threats. Its security mechanisms are similar to the VoLTE, because both of them are supported by the IMS. They include SIM-based security, 3GPP AKA, IPSec, etc. However, are they sufficient to secure Wi-Fi calling services' Unfortunately, our study yields a negative answer. We conduct the first security study on the operational Wi-Fi calling services in three major U.S. operators' networks using commodity devices. We disclose that current Wi-Fi calling security is not bullet-proof and uncover three vulnerabilities. By exploiting the vulnerabilities, we devise two proof-of-concept attacks: telephony harassment or denial of voice service and user privacy leakage; both of them can bypass the existing security defenses. We have confirmed their feasibility using real-world experiments, as well as assessed their potential damages and proposed a solution to address all identified vulnerabilities.

19 September 2023 in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
SWSihan Wang
Sihan Wang
TXTian Xie
Tian Xie
MCMin-Yue Chen
Min-Yue Chen
GTGuan-Hua Tu
Guan-Hua Tu
CLChi-Yu Li
Chi-Yu Li
CPChunyi Peng
Chunyi Peng
More than 150 cellular networks worldwide have rolled out LTE-M (LTE-Machine Type Communication) and/or NB-IoT (Narrow Band Internet of Things) technologies to support massive IoT services such as smart metering and environmental monitoring. Such cellular IoT services share the existing cellular network architecture with non-IoT (e.g., smartphone) ones. When they are newly integrated into the cellular network, new security vulnerabilities may happen from imprudent integration. In this work, we explore the security vulnerabilities of the cellular IoT from both system-integrated and service-integrated aspects. We discover several vulnerabilities spanning cellular standard design defects, network operation slips, and IoT device implementation flaws. Threateningly, they allow an adversary to remotely identify IP addresses and phone numbers assigned to cellular IoT devices, interrupt their power saving services, and launch various attacks, including data/text spamming, battery draining, device hibernation against them. We validate these vulnerabilities over five major cellular IoT carriers in the U.S. and Taiwan using their certified cellular IoT devices. The attack evaluation result shows that the adversary can raise an IoT data bill by up to $226 with less than 120 MB spam traffic, increase an IoT text bill at a rate of $5 per second, and prevent an IoT device from entering/leaving power saving mode; moreover, cellular IoT devices may suffer from denial of IoT services. We finally propose, prototype, and evaluate recommended solutions.

19 September 2022 in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YLYu-Han Lu
Yu-Han Lu
SHSandy Hsin-Yu Hsiao
Sandy Hsin-Yu Hsiao
CLChi-Yu Li
Chi-Yu Li
YHYi-Chen Hsieh
Yi-Chen Hsieh
PCPo-Yi Chou
Po-Yi Chou
GTGuan-Hua Tu
Guan-Hua Tu
IMS (IP Multimedia Subsystem) is an essential 4G/5G component to offer multimedia services. It is used worldwide to support two call services: VoLTE (Voice over LTE) and VoWiFi (Voice over WiFi). In this study, it is shown that the signaling and voice sessions of VoWiFi can both be hijacked by a malicious adversary. By hijacking the signaling session, s(he) gains the ability to make ghost calls to launch stealthy DoS (Denial of Service) or caller-ID spoofing attacks against specific cellular users. Such attacks can be carried out without any malware or network information, and require only the victim’s phone number to be known. It is shown that phones vulnerable to the call DoS attacks can be detected at run time by exploiting a vulnerability of cellular network infrastructures referred to as call information leakage, which is exposed based on a machine learning method. Especially, the call DoS attacks can prevent victims from receiving incoming calls for up to 99.0% time without user awareness. Moreover, by hijacking the voice session, an adversary can launch stealthy free data transfer attacks based on phone numbers alone rather than IP addresses. The identified vulnerabilities/attacks are validated in the operational 4G networks of four top-tier carriers across Asia and North America with seven phone brands. The study concludes by presenting a suite of solutions to address them.

29 May 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
JSJingwen Shi
Jingwen Shi
SWSihan Wang
Sihan Wang
MCMin-Yue Chen
Min-Yue Chen
GTGuan-Hua Tu
Guan-Hua Tu
TXTian Xie
Tian Xie
CPChunyi Peng
Chunyi Peng
IMS (IP Multimedia Subsystem) is vital for delivering IP-based multimedia services in mobile networks. Despite constant upgrades by 3GPP over the past two decades to support heterogeneous radio access networks (e.g., 4G LTE, 5G NR, and Wi-Fi) and enhance IMS security, the focus has primarily been on cellular infrastructure. Consequently, IMS security measures on mobile equipment (ME), such as smartphones, lag behind rapid technological advancements. Our study reveals that mandated IMS security measures on ME fail to keep pace, resulting in new vulnerabilities and attack vectors, including denial of service (DoS) across all networks, named SMS source spoofing, and covert communications over Video-over-IMS attacks. All vulnerabilities and proof-of-concept attacks have been experimentally validated in operational 5G/4G networks across various phone models and network operators. Finally, we propose and prototype standard-compliant remedies for these vulnerabilities.

10 January 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
TXTian Xie
Tian Xie
SWSihan Wang
Sihan Wang
XLXinyu Lei
Xinyu Lei
JSJingwen Shi
Jingwen Shi
GTGuan-Hua Tu
Guan-Hua Tu
CLChi-Yu Li
Chi-Yu Li
Nowadays, both Internet Application Service (IAS) providers and users face various security threats and legal issues. Due to the lack of reliable user information verification mechanisms, adversaries can abuse IASs to launch various cyberattacks, such as misinformation distributing and phishing, by using fake user accounts. IAS providers may thus inadvertently offer inappropriate content to restricted users, thereby suffering a serious risk of prosecution under local or international laws. Also, IAS users may suffer from nefarious ID theft attacks. In this paper, we proposed a novel security framework, ${{\sf MPKIX}}$ , designated as Mobile-assisted PKIX (Public-Key Infrastructure X.509). ${{\sf MPKIX}}$ secures both IAS providers and users by leveraging the broadly used PKIX services and mobile networked systems. It not only provides IAS providers with a reliable user verification mechanism while simultaneously enabling cross-IAS user privacy protection, but also largely mitigates the possibility of ID theft attacks and benefits other involved parties, such as cellular network operators and PKIX service providers. We further conduct a security analysis of ${{\sf MPKIX}}$ and implement an ${{\sf MPKIX}}$ prototype. The evaluation results based on the prototype confirm the effectiveness and efficiency of ${{\sf MPKIX}}$ with low overhead.

26 March 2024 in IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MCMin-Yue Chen
Min-Yue Chen
YHYiwen Hu
Yiwen Hu
GTGuan-Hua Tu
Guan-Hua Tu
CLChi-Yu Li
Chi-Yu Li
SWSihan Wang
Sihan Wang
SLSongwu Lu
Songwu Lu
Cellular networks, vital for delivering emergency services, enable mobile users to dial emergency calls (e.g., 9-1-1 in the U.S.), which are forwarded to public safety answer points (PSAPs). Regulatory requirements allow anonymous user equipment (UE) without a SIM card or valid mobile subscription to access these services. However, supporting emergency services for anonymous UEs introduces different operations, expanding the attack surface of cellular infrastructure. In this study, we explore the insecurity of cellular emergency services, identifying six security vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities can be exploited for free data service attacks against carriers and data DoS/overcharge and denial of cellular emergency service (DoCES) attacks against mobile users. Experimental validation in networks of three major U.S. carriers and two major Taiwan carriers demonstrates the global impact of our findings. Finally, we propose and prototype standard-compliant remedies to mitigate these vulnerabilities.