Zhixue He

Zhixue He

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Zhixue He

School of Statistics and Mathematics, Yunnan University of Finance and Economics 1 , Kunming 650221

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

3Years (2024-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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16 May 2025 in Communications Physics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
CSChen Shen
Chen Shen
ZHZhixue He
Zhixue He
LSLei Shi
Lei Shi
JTJun Tanimoto
Jun Tanimoto
Agent-based simulations are essential for studying cooperation on spatial networks. However, finite-size effects—random fluctuations due to limited network sizes—can cause certain strategies to unexpectedly dominate or disappear, leading to unreliable outcomes. While enlarging network sizes or carefully preparing initial states can reduce these effects, both approaches require significant computational resources. In this study, we demonstrate that incorporating mutation into simulations on limited networks offers an effective and resource-efficient alternative. Using spatial optional public goods games and a more intricate tolerance-based variant, we find that rare mutations preserve inherently stable equilibria. When equilibria are affected by finite-size effects, introducing moderate mutation rates prevent finite-size-induced strategy dominance or extinction, producing results consistent with large-network simulations. Our findings position mutation as a practical tool for improving the reliability of agent-based models and emphasize the importance of mutation sensitivity analysis in managing finite-size effects across spatial networks.

31 May 2024 in PNAS Nexus
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
LSLei Shi
Lei Shi
ZHZhixue He
Zhixue He
CSChen Shen
Chen Shen
JTJun Tanimoto
Jun Tanimoto
Addressing collective issues in social development requires a high level of social cohesion, characterized by cooperation and close social connections. However, social cohesion is challenged by selfish, greedy individuals. With the advancement of artificial intelligence (AI), the dynamics of human–machine hybrid interactions introduce new complexities in fostering social cohesion. This study explores the impact of simple bots on social cohesion from the perspective of human–machine hybrid populations within network. By investigating collective self-organizing movement during migration, results indicate that cooperative bots can promote cooperation, facilitate individual aggregation, and thereby enhance social cohesion. The random exploration movement of bots can break the frozen state of greedy population, help to separate defectors in cooperative clusters, and promote the establishment of cooperative clusters. However, the presence of defective bots can weaken social cohesion, underscoring the importance of carefully designing bot behavior. Our research reveals the potential of bots in guiding social self-organization and provides insights for enhancing social cohesion in the era of human–machine interaction within social networks.

27 November 2024 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
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Journal Article
Open access
CSChen Shen
Chen Shen
ZHZhixue He
Zhixue He
HGHao Guo
Hao Guo
SHShuyue Hu
Shuyue Hu
JTJun Tanimoto
Jun Tanimoto
PHPetter Holme
Petter Holme
Stylized experiments, the public goods game and its variants thereof, have taught us the peculiar reproducible fact that humans tend to cooperate (or contribute to shared resources) more than expected from economically rational assumptions. There have been two competing explanations for this phenomenon: Either cooperating is an innate human trait (the prosocial preference hypothesis) or a transitory effect while learning the game (the confused learner hypothesis). We use large-scale experimental data in the two-player version of the public goods game—the prisoner’s dilemma—from an experimental design to distinguish between these two hypotheses. By monitoring the effects of zealots (persistently cooperating bots) and varying the participants’ awareness of them, we find a considerably more complex scenario than previously reported. People indeed have a prosocial bias, but not to the degree that they always forego taking action to increase their profit. While our findings end the simplistic theorizing of prosociality, an observed positive, cooperative response to zealots has actionable policy implications.

17 August 2024 in Chaos, Solitons & Fractals
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Journal Article
Closed access
GSGopal Sharma
Gopal Sharma
ZHZhixue He
Zhixue He
CSChen Shen
Chen Shen
JTJun Tanimoto
Jun Tanimoto

17 July 2024 in Applied Mathematics and Computation
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
QZQiwen Zhao
Qiwen Zhao
ZHZhixue He
Zhixue He
XWXiaoyue Wang
Xiaoyue Wang
LSLei Shi
Lei Shi

1 November 2024 in Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZHZhixue He
Zhixue He
XWXiaoyue Wang
Xiaoyue Wang
QZQiwen Zhao
Qiwen Zhao
LSLei Shi
Lei Shi
The emergence and maintenance of cooperation is a complex and intriguing issue, especially in the context of widespread asymmetries in interactions that arise from individual differences in real-world scenarios. This study investigates how asymmetric payoff distribution affects cooperation in public goods games by considering a population composed of two types of individuals: strong and weak. The asymmetry is reflected in the fact that strong players receive a larger share of the public pool compared to weak players. Our results demonstrate that asymmetric payoff distribution can promote cooperation in well-mixed populations and trigger the co-evolution of cooperation between sub-populations of strong and weak players. In structured populations, however, the effect of asymmetric payoff distribution on cooperation is contingent on the proportion of strong players and the extent of their payoff share, which can either foster or inhibit cooperation. By adjusting the interaction probability between strong and weak players based on their spatial arrangement on lattice networks, we find that moderate interaction probabilities most effectively maintain cooperation. This study provides valuable insights into the dynamics of cooperation under asymmetric conditions, highlighting the complex role of asymmetrical interactions in the evolution of cooperation.