16 June 2025 in Science China Information Sciences
26 June 2023 in Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Altruistic punishment (or punishment) has been extensively shown as an important mechanism for promoting cooperation in human societies. In AI, the emergence of punishment has received much recent interest. In this paper, we contribute with a novel evolutionary game theoretic model to study the impacts of environmental feedback. Whereas a population of agents plays public goods games, there exists a third-party population whose payoffs depend not only on whether to punish or not, but also on the state of the environment (e.g., how cooperative the agents in a social dilemma are). Focusing on one-shot public goods games, we show that environmental feedback, by itself, can lead to the emergence of punishment. We analyze the co-evolution of punishment and cooperation, and derive conditions for their co-presence, co-dominance and co-extinction. Moreover, we show that the system can exhibit bistability as well as cyclic dynamics. Our findings provide a new explanation for the emergence of punishment. On the other hand, our results also alert the need for careful design of implementing punishment in multi-agent systems, as the resulting evolutionary dynamics can be somewhat complex.
27 November 2024 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Stylized experiments, the public goods game and its variants thereof, have taught us the peculiar reproducible fact that humans tend to cooperate (or contribute to shared resources) more than expected from economically rational assumptions. There have been two competing explanations for this phenomenon: Either cooperating is an innate human trait (the prosocial preference hypothesis) or a transitory effect while learning the game (the confused learner hypothesis). We use large-scale experimental data in the two-player version of the public goods game—the prisoner’s dilemma—from an experimental design to distinguish between these two hypotheses. By monitoring the effects of zealots (persistently cooperating bots) and varying the participants’ awareness of them, we find a considerably more complex scenario than previously reported. People indeed have a prosocial bias, but not to the degree that they always forego taking action to increase their profit. While our findings end the simplistic theorizing of prosociality, an observed positive, cooperative response to zealots has actionable policy implications.
3 January 2025 in IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics
In this article, we introduce a new theory for payoff control in multichannel learning environments, where agents interact with each other over multiple channels and each channel is a repeated normal form game. We propose two payoff control strategies—partial control and full control—that allow a single agent to set an upper bound to the opponent’s expected payoffs summed across all channels, even if the opponent is a reinforcement learning agent. We prove that a partial (or full) control strategy can be obtained by solving a system of inequalities, and characterize the conditions under which such a partial (or full) control strategy exists. We show that by utilizing these control strategies, the agent can influence the opponent’s learning evolution and direct it toward a desired viable equilibrium. Our experiments confirm the effectiveness of our theory for payoff control in a wide range of multichannel learning environments.