Cooperation plays a crucial role in both nature and human society, and the conundrum of cooperation attracts the attention from interdisciplinary research. In this study, we investigated the evolution of cooperation in optional Prisoner’s Dilemma games by introducing simple bots. We focused on one-shot and anonymous games, where the bots could be programmed to always cooperate, always defect, never participate or choose each action with equal probability. Our results show that cooperative bots facilitate the emergence of cooperation among ordinary players in both well-mixed populations and a regular lattice under weak imitation scenarios. Introducing loner bots has no impact on the emergence of cooperation in well-mixed populations, but it facilitates the dominance of cooperation in regular lattices under strong imitation scenarios. However, too many loner bots on a regular lattice inhibit the spread of cooperation and can eventually result in a breakdown of cooperation. Our findings emphasize the significance of bot design in promoting cooperation and offer useful insights for encouraging cooperation in real-world scenarios.
Agent-based simulations are essential for studying cooperation on spatial networks. However, finite-size effects—random fluctuations due to limited network sizes—can cause certain strategies to unexpectedly dominate or disappear, leading to unreliable outcomes. While enlarging network sizes or carefully preparing initial states can reduce these effects, both approaches require significant computational resources. In this study, we demonstrate that incorporating mutation into simulations on limited networks offers an effective and resource-efficient alternative. Using spatial optional public goods games and a more intricate tolerance-based variant, we find that rare mutations preserve inherently stable equilibria. When equilibria are affected by finite-size effects, introducing moderate mutation rates prevent finite-size-induced strategy dominance or extinction, producing results consistent with large-network simulations. Our findings position mutation as a practical tool for improving the reliability of agent-based models and emphasize the importance of mutation sensitivity analysis in managing finite-size effects across spatial networks.
1 July 2020 in IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering
The curse of dimensionality is a challenging issue in network science: the problem of inferring the network structure from sparse and noisy data becomes more and more difficult, indeed, as their dimensionality increases. We here develop a general strategy for dimensional reduction using iteratively thresholded ridge regression screener, one statistical method aiming to resolve the problem of variable selection. After drastically reducing the dimensions of the problem, we then employ the lasso method, a convex optimization method, to recover the network structure. We demonstrate the efficiency of the dimensional reduction method, and particular suitability for the natural sparsity of complex networks, in which the average degree is much smaller than their total number of nodes. Analysis based on various game dynamics and network topologies show that higher reconstruction accuracies and smaller reconstruction times can be achieved by our method. Our approach provides, therefore, a novel insight to solve the reconstruction problem and has potential applications in a wide range of fields.
13 March 2024 in Journal of The Royal Society Interface
Prosocial punishment, an important factor to stabilize cooperation in social dilemma games, often faces challenges like second-order free-riders—who cooperate but avoid punishing to save costs—and antisocial punishers, who defect and retaliate against cooperators. Addressing these challenges, our study introduces prosocial punishment bots that consistently cooperate and punish free-riders. Our findings reveal that these bots significantly promote the emergence of prosocial punishment among normal players due to their ‘sticky effect’—an unwavering commitment to cooperation and punishment that magnetically attracts their opponents to emulate this strategy. Additionally, we observe that the prevalence of prosocial punishment is greatly enhanced when normal players exhibit a tendency to follow a ‘copying the majority’ strategy, or when bots are strategically placed in high-degree nodes within scale-free networks. Conversely, bots designed for defection or antisocial punishment diminish overall cooperation levels. This stark contrast underscores the critical role of strategic bot design in enhancing cooperative behaviours in human/AI interactions. Our findings open new avenues in evolutionary game theory, demonstrating the potential of human–machine collaboration in solving the conundrum of punishment.
Addressing collective issues in social development requires a high level of social cohesion, characterized by cooperation and close social connections. However, social cohesion is challenged by selfish, greedy individuals. With the advancement of artificial intelligence (AI), the dynamics of human–machine hybrid interactions introduce new complexities in fostering social cohesion. This study explores the impact of simple bots on social cohesion from the perspective of human–machine hybrid populations within network. By investigating collective self-organizing movement during migration, results indicate that cooperative bots can promote cooperation, facilitate individual aggregation, and thereby enhance social cohesion. The random exploration movement of bots can break the frozen state of greedy population, help to separate defectors in cooperative clusters, and promote the establishment of cooperative clusters. However, the presence of defective bots can weaken social cohesion, underscoring the importance of carefully designing bot behavior. Our research reveals the potential of bots in guiding social self-organization and provides insights for enhancing social cohesion in the era of human–machine interaction within social networks.
27 November 2024 in Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
Stylized experiments, the public goods game and its variants thereof, have taught us the peculiar reproducible fact that humans tend to cooperate (or contribute to shared resources) more than expected from economically rational assumptions. There have been two competing explanations for this phenomenon: Either cooperating is an innate human trait (the prosocial preference hypothesis) or a transitory effect while learning the game (the confused learner hypothesis). We use large-scale experimental data in the two-player version of the public goods game—the prisoner’s dilemma—from an experimental design to distinguish between these two hypotheses. By monitoring the effects of zealots (persistently cooperating bots) and varying the participants’ awareness of them, we find a considerably more complex scenario than previously reported. People indeed have a prosocial bias, but not to the degree that they always forego taking action to increase their profit. While our findings end the simplistic theorizing of prosociality, an observed positive, cooperative response to zealots has actionable policy implications.