Franklin Camacho

Franklin Camacho

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Franklin Camacho

Yachay Tech University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

9Years (2018-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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7 November 2022 in Mathematical Social Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
FCFranklin Camacho
Franklin Camacho
RFRigoberto Fonseca-Delgado
Rigoberto Fonseca-Delgado
RPRamón Pino Pérez
Ramón Pino Pérez
GRGuido Samuel Tapia Riera
Guido Samuel Tapia Riera

20 March 2021
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
MEMarco Enríquez
Marco Enríquez
SNSamantha Naranjo
Samantha Naranjo
IAIsidro Amaro
Isidro Amaro
FCFranklin Camacho
Franklin Camacho

2 June 2021 in Mathematical Social Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
FCFranklin Camacho
Franklin Camacho
RPRamón Pino Pérez
Ramón Pino Pérez

11 November 2020
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
IPIsrael Pineda
Israel Pineda
CZCristopher Zhunio
Cristopher Zhunio
FCFranklin Camacho
Franklin Camacho
RFRigoberto Fonseca-Delgado
Rigoberto Fonseca-Delgado

23 December 2024
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
EHEdwin Hurtado
Edwin Hurtado
LALuis Arteaga
Luis Arteaga
JDJhon Duta
Jhon Duta
MMManuel Muňoz
Manuel Muňoz
Paulina Vizcaino-ImacañaPaulina Vizcaino-Imacaña
Paulina Vizcaino-Imacaña
AEAndrés Tirado Espín
Andrés Tirado Espín

17 May 2018 in arXiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
FCFranklin Camacho
Franklin Camacho
GCGerardo Chacón
Gerardo Chacón
RPRamón Pino Peréz
Ramón Pino Peréz
We use an algebraic viewpoint, namely a matrix framework to deal with the problem of resource allocation under uncertainty in the context of a qualitative approach. Our basic qualitative data are a plausibility relation over the resources, a hierarchical relation over the agents and of course the preference that the agents have over the resources. With this data we propose a qualitative binary relation $\unrhd$ between allocations such that $\mathcal{F}\unrhd \mathcal{G}$ has the following intended meaning: the allocation $\mathcal{F}$ produces more or equal social welfare than the allocation $\mathcal{G}$. We prove that there is a family of allocations which are maximal with respect to $\unrhd$. We prove also that there is a notion of simple deal such that optimal allocations can be reached by sequences of simple deals. Finally, we introduce some mechanism for discriminating {optimal} allocations.