Vasily A. Sartakov

Vasily A. Sartakov

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Vasily A. Sartakov

Imperial College London, UK

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

6Years (2021-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
17 April 2021
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
VSVasily A. Sartakov
Vasily A. Sartakov
LVLluís Vilanova
Lluís Vilanova
PPPeter Pietzuch
Peter Pietzuch
Library OSs have been proposed to deploy applications isolated inside containers, VMs, or trusted execution environments. They often follow a highly modular design in which third-party components are combined to offer the OS functionality needed by an application, and they are customised at compilation and deployment time to fit application requirements. Yet their monolithic design lacks isolation across components: when applications and OS components contain security-sensitive data (e.g., cryptographic keys or user data), the lack of isolation renders library OSs open to security breaches via malicious or vulnerable third-party components. We describe CubicleOS, a library OS that isolates components in the system while maintaining the simple, monolithic development approach of library composition. CubicleOS allows isolated components, called cubicles , to share data dynamically with other components. It provides spatial memory isolation at the granularity of function calls by using Intel MPK at user-level to isolate components. At the same time, it supports zero-copy data access across cubicles with feature-rich OS functionality. Our evaluation shows that CubicleOS introduces moderate end-to-end performance overheads in complex applications: 2× for the I/O-intensive NGINX web server with 8 partitions, and 1.7–8× for the SQLite database engine with 7 partitions.

7 April 2021
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
VSVasily A. Sartakov
Vasily A. Sartakov
DODaniel O'KEeffe
Daniel O'KEeffe
DEDavid Eyers
David Eyers
LVLluís Vilanova
Lluís Vilanova
PPPeter Pietzuch
Peter Pietzuch
Trusted execution environments (TEEs) promise a cost-effective, “lift-and-shift” solution for deploying security-sensitive applications in untrusted clouds. For this, they must support rich, multi-component applications, but a large trusted computing base (TCB) inside the TEE risks that attackers can compromise application security. Fine-grained compartmentalisation can increase security through defense-in-depth, but current solutions either run all software components unprotected in the same TEE, lack efficient shared memory support, or isolate application processes using separate TEEs, impacting performance and compatibility. We describe the Spons & Shields framework (SSF) for Intel SGX TEEs, which offers intra-TEE compartmentalisation using two new abstraction, Spons and Shields. Spons and Shields generalise process, library and user/kernel isolation inside the TEE while allowing for efficient memory sharing. When users deploy unmodified multi-component applications in a TEE, SSF dynamically creates Spons (one per POSIX process or library) and Shields (to enforce a given security policy for memory accesses). Applications can be hardened with minor code changes, e.g., by using a separate Shield to isolate an SSL library. SSF uses compiler instrumentation to protect Shield boundaries, exploiting MPX instructions if available. We evaluate SSF using a complex application service (NGINX, PHP interpreter and PostgreSQL) and show that its overhead is comparable to process isolation.