Daniel O'KEeffe

Daniel O'KEeffe

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Daniel O'KEeffe

Royal Holloway University of London, UK

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

22Years (2005-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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23 April 2018
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
PAPierre-Louis Aublin
Pierre-Louis Aublin
FKFlorian Kelbert
Florian Kelbert
DODan O'KEeffe
Dan O'KEeffe
DMDivya Muthukumaran
Divya Muthukumaran
CPChristian Priebe
Christian Priebe
PPPeter Pietzuch
Peter Pietzuch

7 November 2014
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
CPChristian Priebe
Christian Priebe
DMDivya Muthukumaran
Divya Muthukumaran
DKDan O' Keeffe
Dan O' Keeffe
DEDavid Eyers
David Eyers
BSBrian Shand
Brian Shand
PPPeter Pietzuch
Peter Pietzuch
When tenants deploy applications under the control of third-party cloud providers, they must trust the provider's security mechanisms for inter-tenant isolation, resource sharing and access control. Despite a provider's best efforts, accidental data leakage may occur due to misconfigurations or bugs in the cloud platform. Especially in Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) clouds, which rely on weaker forms of isolation, the potential for unnoticed data leakage is high. Prior work to raise tenants' trust in clouds relies on attestation, which limits the management flexibility of providers, or fine-grained data tracking, which has high overheads. We describe CloudSafetyNet (CSN), a lightweight monitoring framework that gives tenants visibility into the propagation of their application data in a cloud environment with low performance overhead. It exploits the incentive of tenants to co-operate with each other to detect accidental data leakage. CSN transparently adds opaque security tags to a subset of form fields in HTTP requests, using a client-side JavaScript library. Socket-level monitors maintain a log of observed tags flowing between application components. Tenants retrieve their logs and identify foreign tags that indicate data leakage. To check the correct operation of CSN, tenants send probe requests with known tags and verify that monitors are logging correctly. Using an implementation of CSN deployed on the OpenShift and AppScale PaaS platforms, we show that it can discover misconfigurations and bugs with a negligible performance impact.

12 October 2015
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
DMDivya Muthukumaran
Divya Muthukumaran
DODan O'KEeffe
Dan O'KEeffe
CPChristian Priebe
Christian Priebe
DEDavid Eyers
David Eyers
BSBrian Shand
Brian Shand
PPPeter Pietzuch
Peter Pietzuch
Bugs in the authorisation logic of web applications can expose the data of one user to another. Such data disclosure vulnerabilities are common---they can be caused by a single omitted access control check in the application. We make the observation that, while the implementation of the authorisation logic is complex and therefore error-prone, most web applications only use simple access control models, in which each piece of data is accessible by a user or a group of users. This makes it possible to validate the correct operation of the authorisation logic externally, based on the observed data in HTTP traffic to and from an application. We describe FlowWatcher, an HTTP proxy that mitigates data disclosure vulnerabilities in unmodified web applications. FlowWatcher monitors HTTP traffic and shadows part of an application's access control state based on a rule-based specification of the user-data-access (UDA) policy. The UDA policy states the intended data ownership and how it changes based on observed HTTP requests. FlowWatcher detects violations of the UDA policy by tracking data items that are likely to be unique across HTTP requests and responses of different users. We evaluate a prototype implementation of FlowWatcher as a plug-in for the Nginx reverse proxy and show that, with short UDA policies, it can mitigate CVE bugs in six~popular web applications.

7 April 2021
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
VSVasily A. Sartakov
Vasily A. Sartakov
DODaniel O'KEeffe
Daniel O'KEeffe
DEDavid Eyers
David Eyers
LVLluís Vilanova
Lluís Vilanova
PPPeter Pietzuch
Peter Pietzuch
Trusted execution environments (TEEs) promise a cost-effective, “lift-and-shift” solution for deploying security-sensitive applications in untrusted clouds. For this, they must support rich, multi-component applications, but a large trusted computing base (TCB) inside the TEE risks that attackers can compromise application security. Fine-grained compartmentalisation can increase security through defense-in-depth, but current solutions either run all software components unprotected in the same TEE, lack efficient shared memory support, or isolate application processes using separate TEEs, impacting performance and compatibility. We describe the Spons & Shields framework (SSF) for Intel SGX TEEs, which offers intra-TEE compartmentalisation using two new abstraction, Spons and Shields. Spons and Shields generalise process, library and user/kernel isolation inside the TEE while allowing for efficient memory sharing. When users deploy unmodified multi-component applications in a TEE, SSF dynamically creates Spons (one per POSIX process or library) and Shields (to enforce a given security policy for memory accesses). Applications can be hardened with minor code changes, e.g., by using a separate Shield to isolate an SSL library. SSF uses compiler instrumentation to protect Shield boundaries, exploiting MPX instructions if available. We evaluate SSF using a complex application service (NGINX, PHP interpreter and PostgreSQL) and show that its overhead is comparable to process isolation.

12 July 2010
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
PDF file
DODan O'KEeffe
Dan O'KEeffe
JBJean Bacon
Jean Bacon

8 May 2023
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
GRGiuseppe Raffa
Giuseppe Raffa
JBJorge Blasco
Jorge Blasco
DODan O'KEeffe
Dan O'KEeffe
SDSantanu Kumar Dash
Santanu Kumar Dash
Over the last few years, the serverless computing paradigm has become increasingly popular. Thanks to its cost-effectiveness and the possibility of relying on a cloud provider to manage the underlying infrastructure, companies making use of serverless platforms can fully focus on developing the business logic of their products. However, adopting the serverless model also implies facing several performance, traceability and security-related challenges. Some of them can be tackled by analysing real-world applications and identifying key trends, as these can guide the development of novel models and tools. In spite of this, little up-to-date information on such trends is currently available in the literature. In this work, we gather and interpret information that can be leveraged to analyse serverless applications. To achieve our goal, we study a set of applications developed in Python for the Amazon Web Services (AWS) platform. We first conduct an architectural analysis to identify serverless-specific parameters, e.g., plugins used in deployment tools and the number of events and handlers. We then perform an application code-level analysis in order to establish which cloud services and APIs developers use most frequently. Our results show that granular definition of handler permissions is not common practice. Furthermore, developers make use of configuration services and programmatic creation of cloud resources, thus adding workflows difficult to analyse statically. Our dataset, AWSomePy, is publicly available to support future research work.