Abhishta Abhishta

Abhishta Abhishta

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Abhishta Abhishta

University of Twente

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

9Years (2018-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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28 January 2019 in ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
AAAbhishta Abhishta
Abhishta Abhishta
RRRoland van Rijswijk-Deij
Roland van Rijswijk-Deij
LNLambert J. M. Nieuwenhuis
Lambert J. M. Nieuwenhuis
Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks continue to pose a serious threat to the availability of Internet services. The Domain Name System (DNS) is part of the core of the Internet and a crucial factor in the successful delivery of Internet services. Because of the importance of DNS, specialist service providers have sprung up in the market, that provide managed DNS services. One of their key selling points is that they protect DNS for a domain against DDoS attacks. But what if such a service becomes the target of a DDoS attack, and that attack succeeds? In this paper we analyse two such events, an attack on NS1 in May 2016, and an attack on Dyn in October 2016. We do this by analysing the change in the behaviour of the service's customers. For our analysis we leverage data from the OpenINTEL active DNS measurement system, which covers large parts of the global DNS over time. Our results show an almost immediate and statistically significant change in the behaviour of domains that use NS1 or Dyn as a DNS service provider. We observe a decline in the number of domains that exclusively use NS1 or Dyn as a managed DNS service provider, and see a shift toward risk spreading by using multiple providers. While a large managed DNS provider may be better equipped to protect against attacks, these two case studies show they are not impervious to them. This calls into question the wisdom of using a single provider for managed DNS. Our results show that spreading risk by using multiple providers is an effective countermeasure, albeit probably at a higher cost.

21 December 2023 in Computers & Security
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
TMTom Meurs
Tom Meurs
ECEdward Cartwright
Edward Cartwright
ACAnna Cartwright
Anna Cartwright
MJMarianne Junger
Marianne Junger
AAAbhishta Abhishta
Abhishta Abhishta

1 February 2019
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
AAAbhishta Abhishta
Abhishta Abhishta
RJReinoud Joosten
Reinoud Joosten
SDSergey Dragomiretskiy
Sergey Dragomiretskiy
LNLambert J.M. Nieuwenhuis
Lambert J.M. Nieuwenhuis
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks provide an easy option for these criminals to disrupt the business of these online platforms. We analyse the economic impact of DDoS attacks on a crypto-currency exchange using event analysis. Our contributions are fourfold: Firstly, we develop an estimation model utilising ideas from behavioural finance to predict volume of crypto-currency traded on the basis of changes in price. Secondly, we perform an event analysis to evaluate whether there is an impact of a DDoS attack on the volume traded on the exchange in 17 different cases. Thirdly, we find that in 13 cases the negative impact due to a DDoS attack is recovered within the same day by the exchange. Finally, we evaluate hourly trade data to show why in most cases the volume traded recovers within a single day.

23 September 2025 in Systems
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Journal Article
Open access
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SZSander Zeijlemaker
Sander Zeijlemaker
YLYaphet Kumsa Lemiesa
Yaphet Kumsa Lemiesa
SSSaskia Laura Schröer
Saskia Laura Schröer
AAAbhishta Abhishta
Abhishta Abhishta
MSMichael Siegel
Michael Siegel
Digital transformation embeds smart cities, e-health, and Industry 4.0 into critical infrastructures, thereby increasing reliance on digital systems and exposure to cyber threats and boosting complexity and dependency. Research involving over 200 executives reveals that under rising complexity, only 15% of cyber risk investments are effective, leaving most organizations misaligned or vulnerable. In this context, the role of artificial intelligence (AI) in cybersecurity requires systemic scrutiny. This study analyzes how AI reshapes systemic structures in cyber risk management through a multi-method approach: literature review, expert workshops with practitioners and policymakers, and a structured kill chain analysis of the Colonial Pipeline attack. The findings reveal three new feedback loops: (1) deceptive defense structures that misdirect adversaries while protecting assets, (2) two-step success-to-success attacks that disable defenses before targeting infrastructure, and (3) autonomous proliferation when AI applications go rogue. These dynamics shift cyber risk from linear patterns to adaptive, compounding interactions. The principal conclusion is that AI both amplifies and mitigates systemic risk. The core recommendation is to institutionalize deception in security standards and address drifting AI-powered systems. Deliverables include validated systemic structures, policy options, and a foundation for creating future simulation models to support strategic cyber risk management investment.


1 December 2022 in Tijdschrift voor Veiligheid
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
TMTom Meurs
Tom Meurs
MJMarianne Junger
Marianne Junger
ETErik Tews
Erik Tews
AAAbhishta Abhishta
Abhishta Abhishta
NAS Ransomware: how ransomware targeting NAS devices differs from regular ransomware attacks: The present study examines the impact of ransomware against Network Attached Storage (NAS) devices. NAS devices are external hard drives which are usually easily accessible through the internet. Between 2019 and 2022, 434 ransomware attacks were reported to the Dutch Police, of which 78 (18%) were against NAS devices. These attacks targeted both companies as individuals. One limitation of this sample is possible low willingness to report to the Police. The aim of the present study is to compare NAS attacks with regular attacks. Our findings show that, compared to regular ransomware attacks, NAS ransomware typically targets individual citizens instead of organizations, requests relatively low amounts of ransom, and the attack is carried out in a more automatic fashion. Furthermore, attack campaigns seem to correlate with the publication of certain vulnerabilities of NAS devices.We present recommendations for users of NAS devices, companies who sell NAS devices and local government agencies, to minimize the risk and impact of NAS ransomware attacks among citizens. First, updating the NAS software seems the most important step a user could take to prevent NAS ransomware. NAS vendors should inform clients of the risks of falling victim of NAS malware, including ransomware. Local government agencies could take a more generalized approach where they advise citizens to think about safe data-storage. Our study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to pay attention to NAS ransomware. Although the financial impact of an attack on an individual is relatively low compared to an attack against an organization, the loss of personal pictures and videos can be very painful for victims and therefore we think it is important to address NAS ransomware in the public debate.