The paper focuses on the nexus between climate change and armed conflicts with an empirical analysis based on a panel of 2653 georeferenced cells for the African continent between 1990 and 2016. Our econometric approach addresses unobservable heterogeneity in predicting the probability of violent events and the persistency of conflicting behaviour over time. The proposed strategy also accounts for both changes in climatic conditions and spatial dynamics. The two main findings carry policy-relevant implications. First, changes in climatic conditions influence the probability of conflicts over large spatial ranges, thus suggesting that the design of adaptation policies to reduce climate vulnerability should account for multiple spatial interrelations. Second, the persistency of violence calls for planning adaptation strategies for climate resilience jointly designed with measures in support of peacekeeping.
The paper traces the evolution the concept of socioeconomic vulnerability to climate change has followed in the academic and scientific debate and examines its effects on wellbeing. The recent recognition of vulnerability as a social construction has shifted the focus of the analysis to the dimension of adaptive capacity, restoring a political economy significance to the study of vulnerability. The social origin of vulnerability is related to the presence of structural inequalities, rooted in structural economic and political relationships and reinforced by historical cultural values and praxes. Structural inequalities and power relations in place within a society shape access to resources and capabilities that can enable individuals or population groups to prevent and cope with impacts from extreme weather events, ultimately defining vulnerabilities. Widespread vulnerabilities to climate change can compromise wellbeing in several ways, including an increase in food insecurity, health issues, outbreak of armed conflicts and mass migrations. In addition, the same individual or population group can be vulnerable in more than one wellbeing dimension and, once a dimension is affected, their own vulnerability to other threats is likely to increase.
29 February 2024 in Journal of Environmental Management
While socioeconomic and institutional factors are crucial in explaining the onset and evolution of conflicts, recent research suggests that climate change is a further indirect driver acting as a "threat multiplier". This paper focuses on the concept of vulnerability to both climate change and conflicts to explain why some locations are more likely to engage in armed conflicts than others in the presence of a similar level of exposure to climatic changes. In particular, by means of a Spatial Autoregressive Model, we identify a set of local-specific vulnerability factors that increase conflict risk in East Africa. We employ a georeferenced database with a resolution of 25 × 25 km, covering the period 1997-2016. Results from our analysis provide some interesting insights: first, climate change does not increase conflict risk per se, but only in the presence of pre-existing vulnerabilities. Second, resource access and socioeconomic factors play a key role in driving the climate-conflict nexus especially in urban areas. In particular, vulnerability is increased whenever power is not distributed in such a way as to ensure an equitable distribution of resources. Overall, our findings suggest that, by addressing vulnerability factors that prevent adaptive capacity and an equitable distribution of resources, societies may benefit in terms of both diminished conflict risk and alleviation of climate change impacts.
The relationship between institutional fragmentation and the spatial extent of cities in Europe’s functional urban areas is examined. European Union planning regulations vary across member states, but in most cases local authorities determine land use within the more general regulatory frameworks set by national or subnational authorities. More decentralized and fragmented settings may favour urban sprawl, allowing developers to avoid land-use restrictions in one municipality by moving to adjacent ones and providing incentives for municipalities to adopt less strict land-conversion regulations to attract households and workers. The empirical results fully support this hypothesis and unveil significant differences between small and large cities, the effect of governance fragmentation being a substantial factor in the latter case.