1 March 2022 in Swarm and Evolutionary Computation
15 January 2026 in IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems
In public goods games, the core challenge to sustaining cooperation lies in overcoming the temptation for individuals to free-ride, thereby achieving a collective optimum. Classical spatial game models, which typically employ local imitationbased update rules (e.g., the Fermi rule) and discrete binary strategies, have provided a foundational basis for understanding this problem. To explore more complex cooperative dynamics, this study introduces a novel social learning paradigm. Drawing inspiration from the grey wolf optimization (GWO) algorithm, we abstract its mechanism of collaborative hunting by the leadership layer into an active learning process based on local exemplars, which aligns with the real-world behavior of emulating successful peers. This framework transcends the passive imitation of a single strategy; instead, it emphasizes an active learning process where agents identify and synthesize the leadership group within their social network to explore superior cooperative strategies. We further construct a composite fitness metric by integrating long-term reputation with immediate payoffs and adopt a continuous strategy space to enhance behavioral granularity. Numerical simulations demonstrate that this integrated framework—combining active learning, a reputation mechanism, and continuous strategies—significantly promotes the emergence and maintenance of cooperation under stringent conditions. This research not only presents an effective new model for resolving social dilemmas but also offers a more behaviorally realistic theoretical perspective for understanding the evolution of cooperation in complex systems.
1 September 2026 in Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science
Cooperation is difficult to sustain in public-goods dilemmas because contributing can reduce an individual’s immediate payoff, while benefits to the surrounding group may emerge only after several rounds. We introduce a dual-value reinforcement-learning model for a spatial public goods game that evaluates these two consequences separately. One value system learns from the individual payoff obtained after each action, whereas the other learns from local welfare accumulated over multiple rounds. The two evaluations are combined only when an action is selected. Within the tested settings, numerical simulations show that cooperation is best supported when neither evaluation fully dominates. A moderate welfare-feedback horizon produces higher cooperation, fewer strategy changes, and stronger agreement between the two value systems than one-step or excessively long feedback. The results further show that increasing the influence or duration of social evaluation does not improve cooperation indefinitely. Stable cooperation instead depends on coordinating immediate individual incentives with delayed neighborhood-level consequences, rather than replacing payoff-oriented learning with social valuation.
1 November 2026 in Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science
Spatial public-goods models often measure cooperation by strategy frequency while assuming continued access to interactions and strategy updating. In practice, organizing collective activities requires resources: community-managed water systems, for example, need maintenance funds to sustain service provision. Motivated by these constraints and conceptually inspired by dissipative structures, we propose an organizer-mediated spatial public-goods game to examine how resource constraints on game organization and strategy updating shape overall and non-frozen cooperation. In this model, accumulated resources govern local game organization and evolve through public-goods returns, contribution, metabolic, and organizational costs, and commission-based redistribution between organizers and participants. When all post-settlement resource balances in a prescribed neighborhood are negative, the focal player’s own strategy updating is suspended while its strategy is retained, allowing nominal cooperation to persist despite the loss of updating eligibility. We measure overall cooperation, effective cooperation (non-frozen cooperators as a fraction of the population), freezing, and cooperation within the non-frozen population. Across parameter scans and complementary analyses, resource constraints produce a marked gap between nominal and effective cooperation. Cooperation gains promote system-wide activation, while metabolic costs dissipate resources and organizational costs make local interactions harder to sustain. Commission has a non-monotonic effect: moderate extraction can stabilize active cooperative cores, but excessive extraction limits their expansion. Together, these results show how resource accumulation and allocation shape the organization of interactions and the updating of strategies, highlighting why strategy abundance alone is insufficient to assess cooperation.