Xingping Sun

Xingping Sun

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Xingping Sun

School of Software, Yunnan University 1 , Kunming 650000, Yunnan

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

6Years (2021-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 March 2022 in Swarm and Evolutionary Computation
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
JPJian Peng
Jian Peng
YLYibing Li
Yibing Li
HKHongwei Kang
Hongwei Kang
YSYong Shen
Yong Shen
XSXingping Sun
Xingping Sun
QCQingyi Chen
Qingyi Chen

28 June 2021 in PLOS ONE
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
HKHongwei Kang
Hongwei Kang
MWMie Wang
Mie Wang
YSYong Shen
Yong Shen
XSXingping Sun
Xingping Sun
QCQingyi Chen
Qingyi Chen
In this paper, the coevolution mechanism of trust-based partner switching among partitioned regions on an adaptive network is studied. We investigate a low-information approach to building trust and cooperation in public goods games. Unlike reputation, trust scores are only given to players by those with whom they have a relationship in the game, depending on the game they play together. A player’s trust score for a certain neighbor is given and known by that player only. Players can adjust their connections to neighbors with low trust scores by switching their partners to other players. When switching partners, players divide other nodes in the network into three regions: immediate neighbors as the known region, indirectly connected second-order neighbors as the intermediate region, and other nodes as the unknown region. Such choices and compartmentalization often occur in global and regional economies. Our results show that preference for switching to partners in the intermediate region is not conducive to spreading cooperation, while random selection has the disadvantage of protecting the cooperator. However, selecting new partners in the remaining two regions based on the average trust score of the known region performs well in both protecting partners and finding potential cooperators. Meanwhile, by analyzing the parameters, we find that the influence of vigilance increasing against unsatisfactory behavior on evolution direction depends on the level of cooperation reward.

15 January 2026 in IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YSYong Shen
Yong Shen
YZYan Zhang
Yan Zhang
HKHongwei Kang
Hongwei Kang
XSXingping Sun
Xingping Sun
QCQingyi Chen
Qingyi Chen
XZXinlong Zhang
Xinlong Zhang
In public goods games, the core challenge to sustaining cooperation lies in overcoming the temptation for individuals to free-ride, thereby achieving a collective optimum. Classical spatial game models, which typically employ local imitationbased update rules (e.g., the Fermi rule) and discrete binary strategies, have provided a foundational basis for understanding this problem. To explore more complex cooperative dynamics, this study introduces a novel social learning paradigm. Drawing inspiration from the grey wolf optimization (GWO) algorithm, we abstract its mechanism of collaborative hunting by the leadership layer into an active learning process based on local exemplars, which aligns with the real-world behavior of emulating successful peers. This framework transcends the passive imitation of a single strategy; instead, it emphasizes an active learning process where agents identify and synthesize the leadership group within their social network to explore superior cooperative strategies. We further construct a composite fitness metric by integrating long-term reputation with immediate payoffs and adopt a continuous strategy space to enhance behavioral granularity. Numerical simulations demonstrate that this integrated framework—combining active learning, a reputation mechanism, and continuous strategies—significantly promotes the emergence and maintenance of cooperation under stringent conditions. This research not only presents an effective new model for resolving social dilemmas but also offers a more behaviorally realistic theoretical perspective for understanding the evolution of cooperation in complex systems.

1 September 2026 in Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
XSXingping Sun
Xingping Sun
SXShaoyuan Xiao
Shaoyuan Xiao
HKHongwei Kang
Hongwei Kang
YSYong Shen
Yong Shen
QCQingyi Chen
Qingyi Chen
YSYi Sun
Yi Sun
Cooperation is difficult to sustain in public-goods dilemmas because contributing can reduce an individual’s immediate payoff, while benefits to the surrounding group may emerge only after several rounds. We introduce a dual-value reinforcement-learning model for a spatial public goods game that evaluates these two consequences separately. One value system learns from the individual payoff obtained after each action, whereas the other learns from local welfare accumulated over multiple rounds. The two evaluations are combined only when an action is selected. Within the tested settings, numerical simulations show that cooperation is best supported when neither evaluation fully dominates. A moderate welfare-feedback horizon produces higher cooperation, fewer strategy changes, and stronger agreement between the two value systems than one-step or excessively long feedback. The results further show that increasing the influence or duration of social evaluation does not improve cooperation indefinitely. Stable cooperation instead depends on coordinating immediate individual incentives with delayed neighborhood-level consequences, rather than replacing payoff-oriented learning with social valuation.

1 November 2026 in Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YSYong Shen
Yong Shen
YSYi Sun
Yi Sun
HKHongwei Kang
Hongwei Kang
XSXingping Sun
Xingping Sun
QCQingyi Chen
Qingyi Chen
HYHoulai Yan
Houlai Yan
Spatial public-goods models often measure cooperation by strategy frequency while assuming continued access to interactions and strategy updating. In practice, organizing collective activities requires resources: community-managed water systems, for example, need maintenance funds to sustain service provision. Motivated by these constraints and conceptually inspired by dissipative structures, we propose an organizer-mediated spatial public-goods game to examine how resource constraints on game organization and strategy updating shape overall and non-frozen cooperation. In this model, accumulated resources govern local game organization and evolve through public-goods returns, contribution, metabolic, and organizational costs, and commission-based redistribution between organizers and participants. When all post-settlement resource balances in a prescribed neighborhood are negative, the focal player’s own strategy updating is suspended while its strategy is retained, allowing nominal cooperation to persist despite the loss of updating eligibility. We measure overall cooperation, effective cooperation (non-frozen cooperators as a fraction of the population), freezing, and cooperation within the non-frozen population. Across parameter scans and complementary analyses, resource constraints produce a marked gap between nominal and effective cooperation. Cooperation gains promote system-wide activation, while metabolic costs dissipate resources and organizational costs make local interactions harder to sustain. Commission has a non-monotonic effect: moderate extraction can stabilize active cooperative cores, but excessive extraction limits their expansion. Together, these results show how resource accumulation and allocation shape the organization of interactions and the updating of strategies, highlighting why strategy abundance alone is insufficient to assess cooperation.