Houlai Yan

Houlai Yan

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Houlai Yan

School of Software, Yunnan University 1 , Kunming 650000, Yunnan

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

1Year (2026-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 September 2026 in Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
XSXingping Sun
Xingping Sun
SXShaoyuan Xiao
Shaoyuan Xiao
HKHongwei Kang
Hongwei Kang
YSYong Shen
Yong Shen
QCQingyi Chen
Qingyi Chen
YSYi Sun
Yi Sun
Cooperation is difficult to sustain in public-goods dilemmas because contributing can reduce an individual’s immediate payoff, while benefits to the surrounding group may emerge only after several rounds. We introduce a dual-value reinforcement-learning model for a spatial public goods game that evaluates these two consequences separately. One value system learns from the individual payoff obtained after each action, whereas the other learns from local welfare accumulated over multiple rounds. The two evaluations are combined only when an action is selected. Within the tested settings, numerical simulations show that cooperation is best supported when neither evaluation fully dominates. A moderate welfare-feedback horizon produces higher cooperation, fewer strategy changes, and stronger agreement between the two value systems than one-step or excessively long feedback. The results further show that increasing the influence or duration of social evaluation does not improve cooperation indefinitely. Stable cooperation instead depends on coordinating immediate individual incentives with delayed neighborhood-level consequences, rather than replacing payoff-oriented learning with social valuation.

1 November 2026 in Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YSYong Shen
Yong Shen
YSYi Sun
Yi Sun
HKHongwei Kang
Hongwei Kang
XSXingping Sun
Xingping Sun
QCQingyi Chen
Qingyi Chen
HYHoulai Yan
Houlai Yan
Spatial public-goods models often measure cooperation by strategy frequency while assuming continued access to interactions and strategy updating. In practice, organizing collective activities requires resources: community-managed water systems, for example, need maintenance funds to sustain service provision. Motivated by these constraints and conceptually inspired by dissipative structures, we propose an organizer-mediated spatial public-goods game to examine how resource constraints on game organization and strategy updating shape overall and non-frozen cooperation. In this model, accumulated resources govern local game organization and evolve through public-goods returns, contribution, metabolic, and organizational costs, and commission-based redistribution between organizers and participants. When all post-settlement resource balances in a prescribed neighborhood are negative, the focal player’s own strategy updating is suspended while its strategy is retained, allowing nominal cooperation to persist despite the loss of updating eligibility. We measure overall cooperation, effective cooperation (non-frozen cooperators as a fraction of the population), freezing, and cooperation within the non-frozen population. Across parameter scans and complementary analyses, resource constraints produce a marked gap between nominal and effective cooperation. Cooperation gains promote system-wide activation, while metabolic costs dissipate resources and organizational costs make local interactions harder to sustain. Commission has a non-monotonic effect: moderate extraction can stabilize active cooperative cores, but excessive extraction limits their expansion. Together, these results show how resource accumulation and allocation shape the organization of interactions and the updating of strategies, highlighting why strategy abundance alone is insufficient to assess cooperation.