1 August 2012 in American Economic Review
This paper analyzes the effect on performance and earnings of delegating the wage choice to employees. Our results show that such delegation significantly increases effort levels. Moreover, we observe a Pareto improvement, as the earnings of both employers and employees increase when employers delegate than when they do not. Interestingly, we also find that the employees' performance under delegation is higher than under nondelegation, even for similar wages. While there is strong evidence that behavior reflects strategic considerations, this result also holds for one-shot interactions. A possible nonstrategic motivation explaining the positive reaction to delegation is a sense of enhanced responsibility. (JEL J31, J33, J41)
16 November 2005 in Journal of Population Economics
This paper analyzes the effects of population aging on the preferred legal retirement age. What is revealed is the crucial role that the indirect ‘macro’ effects resulting from a change in the legal retirement age play in the optimal decision. Two social security systems are studied. Under a defined contribution scheme, aging lowers the preferred legal retirement age. However, under a defined pension scheme, the retirement age is delayed. This result shows the relevance of correctly choosing the parameter affected by the dependency ratio in the design of the social security programme.
1 March 2010 in Economica
29 August 2014 in Human Brain Mapping
JRJacqueline S. Rio-Valle
30 September 2006 in Social Choice and Welfare
In the context of the current debate surrounding the reform of pension systems, this paper analyzes the political economy of the legal retirement age. Using a life-cycle model in which individuals differ by age and by wage, we analyze the outcome of a majority voting process on the legal retirement age in a Pay-As-You-Go pension system. The results show that the older an individual is, the closer her optimal retirement age is to the status quo age. That is, the status quo retirement age acts as a magnet. Additionally, we find that the preferred legal retirement age of most of the working population increases when the pension system is more redistributive. We also observe a positive relationship between the preferred legal retirement age and the status quo age.
1 June 2016 in Experimental Economics
We make two main contributions in this article. We examine whether social comparisons affects workers’ performance when a firm can choose workers’ wages or let them choose their own. Firms can delegate the wage decision to neither, one or both workers in the firm. We vary the information workers receive, finding that social comparisons concerning both wages and decision rights affect workers’ performance. Our second contribution is methodological. We find that our treatment effects are present with both stated effort and a real-effort task, which suggests that both approaches may yield similar results in labor experiments.